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authorDavid S. Miller2018-07-23 12:01:36 -0700
committerDavid S. Miller2018-07-23 12:01:48 -0700
commit1a4f14bab1868b443f0dd3c55b689a478f82e72e (patch)
tree67c0e66dbb4895d1c03116df3a63896c67431680
parent3dd1c9a1270736029ffca670e9bd0265f4120600 (diff)
parent58152ecbbcc6a0ce7fddd5bf5f6ee535834ece0c (diff)
Merge branch 'tcp-robust-ooo'
Eric Dumazet says: ==================== Juha-Matti Tilli reported that malicious peers could inject tiny packets in out_of_order_queue, forcing very expensive calls to tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() and tcp_prune_ofo_queue() for every incoming packet. With tcp_rmem[2] default of 6MB, the ooo queue could contain ~7000 nodes. This patch series makes sure we cut cpu cycles enough to render the attack not critical. We might in the future go further, like disconnecting or black-holing proven malicious flows. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/tcp_input.c62
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index 6bade06aaf72..3bcd30a2ba06 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -4358,6 +4358,23 @@ static bool tcp_try_coalesce(struct sock *sk,
return true;
}
+static bool tcp_ooo_try_coalesce(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sk_buff *to,
+ struct sk_buff *from,
+ bool *fragstolen)
+{
+ bool res = tcp_try_coalesce(sk, to, from, fragstolen);
+
+ /* In case tcp_drop() is called later, update to->gso_segs */
+ if (res) {
+ u32 gso_segs = max_t(u16, 1, skb_shinfo(to)->gso_segs) +
+ max_t(u16, 1, skb_shinfo(from)->gso_segs);
+
+ skb_shinfo(to)->gso_segs = min_t(u32, gso_segs, 0xFFFF);
+ }
+ return res;
+}
+
static void tcp_drop(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
@@ -4481,8 +4498,8 @@ static void tcp_data_queue_ofo(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
/* In the typical case, we are adding an skb to the end of the list.
* Use of ooo_last_skb avoids the O(Log(N)) rbtree lookup.
*/
- if (tcp_try_coalesce(sk, tp->ooo_last_skb,
- skb, &fragstolen)) {
+ if (tcp_ooo_try_coalesce(sk, tp->ooo_last_skb,
+ skb, &fragstolen)) {
coalesce_done:
tcp_grow_window(sk, skb);
kfree_skb_partial(skb, fragstolen);
@@ -4510,7 +4527,7 @@ coalesce_done:
/* All the bits are present. Drop. */
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
LINUX_MIB_TCPOFOMERGE);
- __kfree_skb(skb);
+ tcp_drop(sk, skb);
skb = NULL;
tcp_dsack_set(sk, seq, end_seq);
goto add_sack;
@@ -4529,11 +4546,11 @@ coalesce_done:
TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq);
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
LINUX_MIB_TCPOFOMERGE);
- __kfree_skb(skb1);
+ tcp_drop(sk, skb1);
goto merge_right;
}
- } else if (tcp_try_coalesce(sk, skb1,
- skb, &fragstolen)) {
+ } else if (tcp_ooo_try_coalesce(sk, skb1,
+ skb, &fragstolen)) {
goto coalesce_done;
}
p = &parent->rb_right;
@@ -4902,6 +4919,7 @@ end:
static void tcp_collapse_ofo_queue(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
+ u32 range_truesize, sum_tiny = 0;
struct sk_buff *skb, *head;
u32 start, end;
@@ -4913,6 +4931,7 @@ new_range:
}
start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
end = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
+ range_truesize = skb->truesize;
for (head = skb;;) {
skb = skb_rb_next(skb);
@@ -4923,11 +4942,20 @@ new_range:
if (!skb ||
after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, end) ||
before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, start)) {
- tcp_collapse(sk, NULL, &tp->out_of_order_queue,
- head, skb, start, end);
+ /* Do not attempt collapsing tiny skbs */
+ if (range_truesize != head->truesize ||
+ end - start >= SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(SK_MEM_QUANTUM)) {
+ tcp_collapse(sk, NULL, &tp->out_of_order_queue,
+ head, skb, start, end);
+ } else {
+ sum_tiny += range_truesize;
+ if (sum_tiny > sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 3)
+ return;
+ }
goto new_range;
}
+ range_truesize += skb->truesize;
if (unlikely(before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, start)))
start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
if (after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, end))
@@ -4942,6 +4970,7 @@ new_range:
* 2) not add too big latencies if thousands of packets sit there.
* (But if application shrinks SO_RCVBUF, we could still end up
* freeing whole queue here)
+ * 3) Drop at least 12.5 % of sk_rcvbuf to avoid malicious attacks.
*
* Return true if queue has shrunk.
*/
@@ -4949,20 +4978,26 @@ static bool tcp_prune_ofo_queue(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct rb_node *node, *prev;
+ int goal;
if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&tp->out_of_order_queue))
return false;
NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_OFOPRUNED);
+ goal = sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 3;
node = &tp->ooo_last_skb->rbnode;
do {
prev = rb_prev(node);
rb_erase(node, &tp->out_of_order_queue);
+ goal -= rb_to_skb(node)->truesize;
tcp_drop(sk, rb_to_skb(node));
- sk_mem_reclaim(sk);
- if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf &&
- !tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk))
- break;
+ if (!prev || goal <= 0) {
+ sk_mem_reclaim(sk);
+ if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf &&
+ !tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk))
+ break;
+ goal = sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 3;
+ }
node = prev;
} while (node);
tp->ooo_last_skb = rb_to_skb(prev);
@@ -4997,6 +5032,9 @@ static int tcp_prune_queue(struct sock *sk)
else if (tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk))
tp->rcv_ssthresh = min(tp->rcv_ssthresh, 4U * tp->advmss);
+ if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf)
+ return 0;
+
tcp_collapse_ofo_queue(sk);
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
tcp_collapse(sk, &sk->sk_receive_queue, NULL,