diff options
author | Borislav Petkov (AMD) | 2023-08-15 11:53:13 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Borislav Petkov (AMD) | 2023-08-18 12:43:10 +0200 |
commit | 6405b72e8d17bd1875a56ae52d23ec3cd51b9d66 (patch) | |
tree | 3b6a7dba267858b4d43ea542bbf79f8638c061bb | |
parent | 54097309620ef0dc2d7083783dc521c6a5fef957 (diff) |
x86/srso: Correct the mitigation status when SMT is disabled
Specify how is SRSO mitigated when SMT is disabled. Also, correct the
SMT check for that.
Fixes: e9fbc47b818b ("x86/srso: Disable the mitigation on unaffected configurations")
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814200813.p5czl47zssuej7nv@treble
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 9026e3fe9f6c..f081d26616ac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -2428,8 +2428,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right * IBPB microcode has been applied. */ - if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) && - (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED))) { + if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO); return; } @@ -2714,7 +2713,7 @@ static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) - return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n"); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: SMT disabled\n"); return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], |