diff options
author | Eric Biggers | 2018-09-11 20:05:10 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Herbert Xu | 2018-09-21 13:24:50 +0800 |
commit | a5e9f557098e54af44ade5d501379be18435bfbf (patch) | |
tree | 4410647aaa269fd9a4e304851b06f83251b12853 | |
parent | 78105c7e769b8cfa4a4d59027807882b560a2634 (diff) |
crypto: chacha20 - Fix chacha20_block() keystream alignment (again)
In commit 9f480faec58c ("crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for
chacha20_block()"), I had missed that chacha20_block() can be called
directly on the buffer passed to get_random_bytes(), which can have any
alignment. So, while my commit didn't break anything, it didn't fully
solve the alignment problems.
Revert my solution and just update chacha20_block() to use
put_unaligned_le32(), so the output buffer need not be aligned.
This is simpler, and on many CPUs it's the same speed.
But, I kept the 'tmp' buffers in extract_crng_user() and
_get_random_bytes() 4-byte aligned, since that alignment is actually
needed for _crng_backtrack_protect() too.
Reported-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/crypto/chacha20.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/chacha20.c | 6 |
4 files changed, 20 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c index e451c3cb6a56..3ae96587caf9 100644 --- a/crypto/chacha20_generic.c +++ b/crypto/chacha20_generic.c @@ -18,20 +18,21 @@ static void chacha20_docrypt(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes) { - u32 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]; + /* aligned to potentially speed up crypto_xor() */ + u8 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(sizeof(long)); if (dst != src) memcpy(dst, src, bytes); while (bytes >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) { chacha20_block(state, stream); - crypto_xor(dst, (const u8 *)stream, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); + crypto_xor(dst, stream, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE); bytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; dst += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; } if (bytes) { chacha20_block(state, stream); - crypto_xor(dst, (const u8 *)stream, bytes); + crypto_xor(dst, stream, bytes); } } diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index bf5f99fc36f1..d22d967c50f0 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -433,9 +433,9 @@ static int crng_init_cnt = 0; static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0; #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, - __u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]); + __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]); static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, - __u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used); + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used); static void process_random_ready_list(void); static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); @@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) unsigned long flags; int i, num; union { - __u32 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]; + __u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]; __u32 key[8]; } buf; @@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) } static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, - __u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]) + __u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) { unsigned long v, flags; @@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } -static void extract_crng(__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]) +static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]) { struct crng_state *crng = NULL; @@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ static void extract_crng(__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]) * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. */ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, - __u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used) + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { unsigned long flags; __u32 *s, *d; @@ -1015,14 +1015,14 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng, used = 0; } spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags); - s = &tmp[used / sizeof(__u32)]; + s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used]; d = &crng->state[4]; for (i=0; i < 8; i++) *d++ ^= *s++; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags); } -static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used) +static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used) { struct crng_state *crng = NULL; @@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS], int used) static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes) { ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE; - __u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]; + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); int large_request = (nbytes > 256); while (nbytes) { @@ -1617,7 +1617,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, */ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { - __u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]; + __u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4); trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_); @@ -2243,7 +2243,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) if (use_lock) read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) { - extract_crng((__u32 *)batch->entropy_u64); + extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position = 0; } ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; @@ -2273,7 +2273,7 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) if (use_lock) read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) { - extract_crng(batch->entropy_u32); + extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position = 0; } ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha20.h b/include/crypto/chacha20.h index b83d66073db0..f76302d99e2b 100644 --- a/include/crypto/chacha20.h +++ b/include/crypto/chacha20.h @@ -13,13 +13,12 @@ #define CHACHA20_IV_SIZE 16 #define CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE 32 #define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE 64 -#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS (CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)) struct chacha20_ctx { u32 key[8]; }; -void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u32 *stream); +void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream); void crypto_chacha20_init(u32 *state, struct chacha20_ctx *ctx, u8 *iv); int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keysize); diff --git a/lib/chacha20.c b/lib/chacha20.c index c1cc50fb68c9..d907fec6a9ed 100644 --- a/lib/chacha20.c +++ b/lib/chacha20.c @@ -16,9 +16,9 @@ #include <asm/unaligned.h> #include <crypto/chacha20.h> -void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u32 *stream) +void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u8 *stream) { - u32 x[16], *out = stream; + u32 x[16]; int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++) @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u32 *stream) } for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(x); i++) - out[i] = cpu_to_le32(x[i] + state[i]); + put_unaligned_le32(x[i] + state[i], &stream[i * sizeof(u32)]); state[12]++; } |