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authorLinus Torvalds2017-11-23 20:51:27 -1000
committerLinus Torvalds2017-11-23 20:51:27 -1000
commitdab0badc8735f4e8bf07bc56bdeefce91d413924 (patch)
tree1b7f175d6bffe4ee6d93d1828a730daccf1d77d0
parent26064dea2dc65c57d44ad37e645ebe47f1c51828 (diff)
parentce44cd8dfc55110fa7423ceb47a8a70dac65fe89 (diff)
Merge branch 'next-keys' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull keys update from James Morris: "There's nothing too controversial here: - Doc fix for keyctl_read(). - time_t -> time64_t replacement. - Set the module licence on things to prevent tainting" * 'next-keys' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: pkcs7: Set the module licence to prevent tainting security: keys: Replace time_t with time64_t for struct key_preparsed_payload security: keys: Replace time_t/timespec with time64_t KEYS: fix in-kernel documentation for keyctl_read()
-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/keys/core.rst10
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c5
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key-type.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key.h7
-rw-r--r--security/keys/gc.c20
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h8
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c27
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c20
-rw-r--r--security/keys/permission.c5
-rw-r--r--security/keys/proc.c21
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c2
14 files changed, 66 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst
index 1266eeae45f6..9ce7256c6edb 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst
@@ -628,12 +628,12 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are:
defined key type will return its data as is. If a key type does not
implement this function, error EOPNOTSUPP will result.
- As much of the data as can be fitted into the buffer will be copied to
- userspace if the buffer pointer is not NULL.
-
- On a successful return, the function will always return the amount of data
- available rather than the amount copied.
+ If the specified buffer is too small, then the size of the buffer required
+ will be returned. Note that in this case, the contents of the buffer may
+ have been overwritten in some undefined way.
+ Otherwise, on success, the function will return the amount of data copied
+ into the buffer.
* Instantiate a partially constructed key::
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
index 1063b644efcd..e284d9cb9237 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 testing key type");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
static unsigned pkcs7_usage;
module_param_named(usage, pkcs7_usage, uint, S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index d140d8bb2c96..c1ca1e86f5c4 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
@@ -19,6 +20,10 @@
#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
#include "pkcs7-asn1.h"
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 parser");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
struct pkcs7_parse_context {
struct pkcs7_message *msg; /* Message being constructed */
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; /* SignedInfo being constructed */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index d916235d6cf5..bc3035ef27a2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("In-software asymmetric public-key subtype");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
/*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index eea71dc9686c..c9013582c026 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -275,4 +275,5 @@ module_init(x509_key_init);
module_exit(x509_key_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("X.509 certificate parser");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
index 9520fc3c3b9a..05d8fb5a06c4 100644
--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload {
const void *data; /* Raw data */
size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */
size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */
- time_t expiry; /* Expiry time of key */
+ time64_t expiry; /* Expiry time of key */
} __randomize_layout;
typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key,
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 8a15cabe928d..e58ee10f6e58 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/assoc_array.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/time64.h>
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
@@ -162,10 +163,10 @@ struct key {
struct key_user *user; /* owner of this key */
void *security; /* security data for this key */
union {
- time_t expiry; /* time at which key expires (or 0) */
- time_t revoked_at; /* time at which key was revoked */
+ time64_t expiry; /* time at which key expires (or 0) */
+ time64_t revoked_at; /* time at which key was revoked */
};
- time_t last_used_at; /* last time used for LRU keyring discard */
+ time64_t last_used_at; /* last time used for LRU keyring discard */
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
key_perm_t perm; /* access permissions */
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
index afb3a9175d76..6713fee893fb 100644
--- a/security/keys/gc.c
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ DECLARE_WORK(key_gc_work, key_garbage_collector);
static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long);
static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func);
-static time_t key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+static time64_t key_gc_next_run = TIME64_MAX;
static struct key_type *key_gc_dead_keytype;
static unsigned long key_gc_flags;
@@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ struct key_type key_type_dead = {
* Schedule a garbage collection run.
* - time precision isn't particularly important
*/
-void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at)
+void key_schedule_gc(time64_t gc_at)
{
unsigned long expires;
- time_t now = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+ time64_t now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
- kenter("%ld", gc_at - now);
+ kenter("%lld", gc_at - now);
if (gc_at <= now || test_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags)) {
kdebug("IMMEDIATE");
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void key_schedule_gc_links(void)
static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data)
{
kenter("");
- key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+ key_gc_next_run = TIME64_MAX;
key_schedule_gc_links();
}
@@ -184,11 +184,11 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
struct rb_node *cursor;
struct key *key;
- time_t new_timer, limit;
+ time64_t new_timer, limit;
kenter("[%lx,%x]", key_gc_flags, gc_state);
- limit = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+ limit = ktime_get_real_seconds();
if (limit > key_gc_delay)
limit -= key_gc_delay;
else
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1;
kdebug("new pass %x", gc_state);
- new_timer = LONG_MAX;
+ new_timer = TIME64_MAX;
/* As only this function is permitted to remove things from the key
* serial tree, if cursor is non-NULL then it will always point to a
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ continue_scanning:
if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER) {
if (key->expiry > limit && key->expiry < new_timer) {
- kdebug("will expire %x in %ld",
+ kdebug("will expire %x in %lld",
key_serial(key), key->expiry - limit);
new_timer = key->expiry;
}
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ maybe_resched:
*/
kdebug("pass complete");
- if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER && new_timer != (time_t)LONG_MAX) {
+ if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER && new_timer != (time64_t)TIME64_MAX) {
new_timer += key_gc_delay;
key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 503adbae7b0d..9f8208dc0e55 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ struct keyring_search_context {
int skipped_ret;
bool possessed;
key_ref_t result;
- struct timespec now;
+ time64_t now;
};
extern bool key_default_cmp(const struct key *key,
@@ -169,10 +169,10 @@ extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork);
extern struct work_struct key_gc_work;
extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
-extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit);
+extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit);
extern void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring,
struct key_type *dead_type);
-extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at);
+extern void key_schedule_gc(time64_t gc_at);
extern void key_schedule_gc_links(void);
extern void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype);
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
/*
* Determine whether a key is dead.
*/
-static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time_t limit)
+static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time64_t limit)
{
return
key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD) |
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 83bf4b4afd49..66049183ad89 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
if (authkey)
key_revoke(authkey);
- if (prep->expiry != TIME_T_MAX) {
+ if (prep->expiry != TIME64_MAX) {
key->expiry = prep->expiry;
key_schedule_gc(prep->expiry + key_gc_delay);
}
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
prep.data = data;
prep.datalen = datalen;
prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
- prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
+ prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX;
if (key->type->preparse) {
ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -570,7 +570,6 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
struct key *authkey)
{
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
- struct timespec now;
int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0;
key_check(key);
@@ -593,8 +592,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
mark_key_instantiated(key, -error);
- now = current_kernel_time();
- key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
+ key->expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout;
key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
@@ -710,16 +708,13 @@ found_kernel_type:
void key_set_timeout(struct key *key, unsigned timeout)
{
- struct timespec now;
- time_t expiry = 0;
+ time64_t expiry = 0;
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */
down_write(&key->sem);
- if (timeout > 0) {
- now = current_kernel_time();
- expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
- }
+ if (timeout > 0)
+ expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout;
key->expiry = expiry;
key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
@@ -850,7 +845,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
- prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
+ prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX;
if (index_key.type->preparse) {
ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -994,7 +989,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
- prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
+ prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX;
if (key->type->preparse) {
ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -1028,8 +1023,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
*/
void key_revoke(struct key *key)
{
- struct timespec now;
- time_t time;
+ time64_t time;
key_check(key);
@@ -1044,8 +1038,7 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key)
key->type->revoke(key);
/* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */
- now = current_kernel_time();
- time = now.tv_sec;
+ time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
key->revoked_at = time;
key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 36f842ec87f0..d0bccebbd3b5 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
/* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */
if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) {
- time_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
+ time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
(1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) {
@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
goto skipped;
}
- if (expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= expiry) {
+ if (expiry && ctx->now >= expiry) {
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED))
ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED);
kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret);
@@ -834,10 +834,10 @@ found:
key = key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result);
key_check(key);
if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME)) {
- key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
- keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
+ key->last_used_at = ctx->now;
+ keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now;
while (sp > 0)
- stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec;
+ stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now;
}
kleave(" = true");
return true;
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
}
rcu_read_lock();
- ctx->now = current_kernel_time();
+ ctx->now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
if (search_nested_keyrings(keyring, ctx))
__key_get(key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result));
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)
* (ie. it has a zero usage count) */
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage))
continue;
- keyring->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+ keyring->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds();
goto out;
}
}
@@ -1489,7 +1489,7 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data)
{
struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
- time_t *limit = iterator_data;
+ time64_t *limit = iterator_data;
if (key_is_dead(key, *limit))
return false;
@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data)
static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
{
const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object);
- time_t *limit = iterator_data;
+ time64_t *limit = iterator_data;
key_check(key);
return key_is_dead(key, *limit);
@@ -1512,7 +1512,7 @@ static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
* Not called with any locks held. The keyring's key struct will not be
* deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it.
*/
-void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
+void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit)
{
int result;
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index a72b4dd70c8a..f68dc04d614e 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission);
int key_validate(const struct key *key)
{
unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags);
- time_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
+ time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED))
return -ENOKEY;
@@ -101,8 +101,7 @@ int key_validate(const struct key *key)
/* check it hasn't expired */
if (expiry) {
- struct timespec now = current_kernel_time();
- if (now.tv_sec >= expiry)
+ if (ktime_get_real_seconds() >= expiry)
return -EKEYEXPIRED;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 6d1fcbba1e09..fbc4af5c6c9f 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -178,13 +178,12 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct rb_node *_p = v;
struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
- struct timespec now;
- time_t expiry;
- unsigned long timo;
unsigned long flags;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
+ time64_t now, expiry;
char xbuf[16];
short state;
+ u64 timo;
int rc;
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
@@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (rc < 0)
return 0;
- now = current_kernel_time();
+ now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -223,21 +222,21 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry);
if (expiry == 0) {
memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
- } else if (now.tv_sec >= expiry) {
+ } else if (now >= expiry) {
memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
} else {
- timo = expiry - now.tv_sec;
+ timo = expiry - now;
if (timo < 60)
- sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo);
+ sprintf(xbuf, "%llus", timo);
else if (timo < 60*60)
- sprintf(xbuf, "%lum", timo / 60);
+ sprintf(xbuf, "%llum", div_u64(timo, 60));
else if (timo < 60*60*24)
- sprintf(xbuf, "%luh", timo / (60*60));
+ sprintf(xbuf, "%lluh", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60));
else if (timo < 60*60*24*7)
- sprintf(xbuf, "%lud", timo / (60*60*24));
+ sprintf(xbuf, "%llud", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60 * 24));
else
- sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7));
+ sprintf(xbuf, "%lluw", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60 * 24 * 7));
}
state = key_read_state(key);
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 740affd65ee9..d5b25e535d3a 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ try_again:
if (ret < 0)
goto invalid_key;
- key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+ key->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds();
error:
put_cred(ctx.cred);