diff options
author | Linus Torvalds | 2017-11-23 20:51:27 -1000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds | 2017-11-23 20:51:27 -1000 |
commit | dab0badc8735f4e8bf07bc56bdeefce91d413924 (patch) | |
tree | 1b7f175d6bffe4ee6d93d1828a730daccf1d77d0 | |
parent | 26064dea2dc65c57d44ad37e645ebe47f1c51828 (diff) | |
parent | ce44cd8dfc55110fa7423ceb47a8a70dac65fe89 (diff) |
Merge branch 'next-keys' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull keys update from James Morris:
"There's nothing too controversial here:
- Doc fix for keyctl_read().
- time_t -> time64_t replacement.
- Set the module licence on things to prevent tainting"
* 'next-keys' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
pkcs7: Set the module licence to prevent tainting
security: keys: Replace time_t with time64_t for struct key_preparsed_payload
security: keys: Replace time_t/timespec with time64_t
KEYS: fix in-kernel documentation for keyctl_read()
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/security/keys/core.rst | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/key-type.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/key.h | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/gc.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/internal.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/key.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyring.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/permission.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/proc.c | 21 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/process_keys.c | 2 |
14 files changed, 66 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst index 1266eeae45f6..9ce7256c6edb 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/core.rst @@ -628,12 +628,12 @@ The keyctl syscall functions are: defined key type will return its data as is. If a key type does not implement this function, error EOPNOTSUPP will result. - As much of the data as can be fitted into the buffer will be copied to - userspace if the buffer pointer is not NULL. - - On a successful return, the function will always return the amount of data - available rather than the amount copied. + If the specified buffer is too small, then the size of the buffer required + will be returned. Note that in this case, the contents of the buffer may + have been overwritten in some undefined way. + Otherwise, on success, the function will return the amount of data copied + into the buffer. * Instantiate a partially constructed key:: diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c index 1063b644efcd..e284d9cb9237 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 testing key type"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc."); static unsigned pkcs7_usage; module_param_named(usage, pkcs7_usage, uint, S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO); diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c index d140d8bb2c96..c1ca1e86f5c4 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/err.h> @@ -19,6 +20,10 @@ #include "pkcs7_parser.h" #include "pkcs7-asn1.h" +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 parser"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc."); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + struct pkcs7_parse_context { struct pkcs7_message *msg; /* Message being constructed */ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; /* SignedInfo being constructed */ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index d916235d6cf5..bc3035ef27a2 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <crypto/akcipher.h> +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("In-software asymmetric public-key subtype"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc."); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); /* diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index eea71dc9686c..c9013582c026 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -275,4 +275,5 @@ module_init(x509_key_init); module_exit(x509_key_exit); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("X.509 certificate parser"); +MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc."); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h index 9520fc3c3b9a..05d8fb5a06c4 100644 --- a/include/linux/key-type.h +++ b/include/linux/key-type.h @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload { const void *data; /* Raw data */ size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */ size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */ - time_t expiry; /* Expiry time of key */ + time64_t expiry; /* Expiry time of key */ } __randomize_layout; typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key, diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 8a15cabe928d..e58ee10f6e58 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <linux/assoc_array.h> #include <linux/refcount.h> +#include <linux/time64.h> #ifdef __KERNEL__ #include <linux/uidgid.h> @@ -162,10 +163,10 @@ struct key { struct key_user *user; /* owner of this key */ void *security; /* security data for this key */ union { - time_t expiry; /* time at which key expires (or 0) */ - time_t revoked_at; /* time at which key was revoked */ + time64_t expiry; /* time at which key expires (or 0) */ + time64_t revoked_at; /* time at which key was revoked */ }; - time_t last_used_at; /* last time used for LRU keyring discard */ + time64_t last_used_at; /* last time used for LRU keyring discard */ kuid_t uid; kgid_t gid; key_perm_t perm; /* access permissions */ diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c index afb3a9175d76..6713fee893fb 100644 --- a/security/keys/gc.c +++ b/security/keys/gc.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ DECLARE_WORK(key_gc_work, key_garbage_collector); static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long); static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func); -static time_t key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX; +static time64_t key_gc_next_run = TIME64_MAX; static struct key_type *key_gc_dead_keytype; static unsigned long key_gc_flags; @@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ struct key_type key_type_dead = { * Schedule a garbage collection run. * - time precision isn't particularly important */ -void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at) +void key_schedule_gc(time64_t gc_at) { unsigned long expires; - time_t now = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + time64_t now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); - kenter("%ld", gc_at - now); + kenter("%lld", gc_at - now); if (gc_at <= now || test_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags)) { kdebug("IMMEDIATE"); @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void key_schedule_gc_links(void) static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data) { kenter(""); - key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX; + key_gc_next_run = TIME64_MAX; key_schedule_gc_links(); } @@ -184,11 +184,11 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work) struct rb_node *cursor; struct key *key; - time_t new_timer, limit; + time64_t new_timer, limit; kenter("[%lx,%x]", key_gc_flags, gc_state); - limit = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + limit = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (limit > key_gc_delay) limit -= key_gc_delay; else @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work) gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1; kdebug("new pass %x", gc_state); - new_timer = LONG_MAX; + new_timer = TIME64_MAX; /* As only this function is permitted to remove things from the key * serial tree, if cursor is non-NULL then it will always point to a @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ continue_scanning: if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER) { if (key->expiry > limit && key->expiry < new_timer) { - kdebug("will expire %x in %ld", + kdebug("will expire %x in %lld", key_serial(key), key->expiry - limit); new_timer = key->expiry; } @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ maybe_resched: */ kdebug("pass complete"); - if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER && new_timer != (time_t)LONG_MAX) { + if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER && new_timer != (time64_t)TIME64_MAX) { new_timer += key_gc_delay; key_schedule_gc(new_timer); } diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 503adbae7b0d..9f8208dc0e55 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ struct keyring_search_context { int skipped_ret; bool possessed; key_ref_t result; - struct timespec now; + time64_t now; }; extern bool key_default_cmp(const struct key *key, @@ -169,10 +169,10 @@ extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork); extern struct work_struct key_gc_work; extern unsigned key_gc_delay; -extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit); +extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit); extern void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *dead_type); -extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at); +extern void key_schedule_gc(time64_t gc_at); extern void key_schedule_gc_links(void); extern void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype); @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id); /* * Determine whether a key is dead. */ -static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time_t limit) +static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time64_t limit) { return key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD) | diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 83bf4b4afd49..66049183ad89 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, if (authkey) key_revoke(authkey); - if (prep->expiry != TIME_T_MAX) { + if (prep->expiry != TIME64_MAX) { key->expiry = prep->expiry; key_schedule_gc(prep->expiry + key_gc_delay); } @@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, prep.data = data; prep.datalen = datalen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -570,7 +570,6 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, struct key *authkey) { struct assoc_array_edit *edit; - struct timespec now; int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0; key_check(key); @@ -593,8 +592,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, /* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); mark_key_instantiated(key, -error); - now = current_kernel_time(); - key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; + key->expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) @@ -710,16 +708,13 @@ found_kernel_type: void key_set_timeout(struct key *key, unsigned timeout) { - struct timespec now; - time_t expiry = 0; + time64_t expiry = 0; /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */ down_write(&key->sem); - if (timeout > 0) { - now = current_kernel_time(); - expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; - } + if (timeout > 0) + expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout; key->expiry = expiry; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); @@ -850,7 +845,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (index_key.type->preparse) { ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) { @@ -994,7 +989,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -1028,8 +1023,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); */ void key_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct timespec now; - time_t time; + time64_t time; key_check(key); @@ -1044,8 +1038,7 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key) key->type->revoke(key); /* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */ - now = current_kernel_time(); - time = now.tv_sec; + time = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) { key->revoked_at = time; key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay); diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 36f842ec87f0..d0bccebbd3b5 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) /* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */ if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { - time_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); + time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) { @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) goto skipped; } - if (expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= expiry) { + if (expiry && ctx->now >= expiry) { if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED)) ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED); kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret); @@ -834,10 +834,10 @@ found: key = key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result); key_check(key); if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME)) { - key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; - keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; + key->last_used_at = ctx->now; + keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now; while (sp > 0) - stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; + stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now; } kleave(" = true"); return true; @@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, } rcu_read_lock(); - ctx->now = current_kernel_time(); + ctx->now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (search_nested_keyrings(keyring, ctx)) __key_get(key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result)); rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1149,7 +1149,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring) * (ie. it has a zero usage count) */ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage)) continue; - keyring->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + keyring->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds(); goto out; } } @@ -1489,7 +1489,7 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring) static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data) { struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - time_t *limit = iterator_data; + time64_t *limit = iterator_data; if (key_is_dead(key, *limit)) return false; @@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data) static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) { const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - time_t *limit = iterator_data; + time64_t *limit = iterator_data; key_check(key); return key_is_dead(key, *limit); @@ -1512,7 +1512,7 @@ static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) * Not called with any locks held. The keyring's key struct will not be * deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it. */ -void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit) +void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit) { int result; diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c index a72b4dd70c8a..f68dc04d614e 100644 --- a/security/keys/permission.c +++ b/security/keys/permission.c @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission); int key_validate(const struct key *key) { unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); - time_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); + time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED)) return -ENOKEY; @@ -101,8 +101,7 @@ int key_validate(const struct key *key) /* check it hasn't expired */ if (expiry) { - struct timespec now = current_kernel_time(); - if (now.tv_sec >= expiry) + if (ktime_get_real_seconds() >= expiry) return -EKEYEXPIRED; } diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 6d1fcbba1e09..fbc4af5c6c9f 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -178,13 +178,12 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct rb_node *_p = v; struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node); - struct timespec now; - time_t expiry; - unsigned long timo; unsigned long flags; key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref; + time64_t now, expiry; char xbuf[16]; short state; + u64 timo; int rc; struct keyring_search_context ctx = { @@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) if (rc < 0) return 0; - now = current_kernel_time(); + now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); rcu_read_lock(); @@ -223,21 +222,21 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); if (expiry == 0) { memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5); - } else if (now.tv_sec >= expiry) { + } else if (now >= expiry) { memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5); } else { - timo = expiry - now.tv_sec; + timo = expiry - now; if (timo < 60) - sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo); + sprintf(xbuf, "%llus", timo); else if (timo < 60*60) - sprintf(xbuf, "%lum", timo / 60); + sprintf(xbuf, "%llum", div_u64(timo, 60)); else if (timo < 60*60*24) - sprintf(xbuf, "%luh", timo / (60*60)); + sprintf(xbuf, "%lluh", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60)); else if (timo < 60*60*24*7) - sprintf(xbuf, "%lud", timo / (60*60*24)); + sprintf(xbuf, "%llud", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60 * 24)); else - sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7)); + sprintf(xbuf, "%lluw", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60 * 24 * 7)); } state = key_read_state(key); diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 740affd65ee9..d5b25e535d3a 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ try_again: if (ret < 0) goto invalid_key; - key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + key->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds(); error: put_cred(ctx.cred); |