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authorLuca Boccassi2024-09-15 11:11:19 +0200
committerFan Wu2024-10-17 11:46:10 -0700
commit02e2f9aa33e461468de02e35ad977bd7233960ae (patch)
tree1b05e9d1b3db1e4fb340f10111986e35ba59dec3
parent5ceecb301e50e933c1e621fbeea5ec239fbff858 (diff)
ipe: allow secondary and platform keyrings to install/update policies
The current policy management makes it impossible to use IPE in a general purpose distribution. In such cases the users are not building the kernel, the distribution is, and access to the private key included in the trusted keyring is, for obvious reason, not available. This means that users have no way to enable IPE, since there will be no built-in generic policy, and no access to the key to sign updates validated by the trusted keyring. Just as we do for dm-verity, kernel modules and more, allow the secondary and platform keyrings to also validate policies. This allows users enrolling their own keys in UEFI db or MOK to also sign policies, and enroll them. This makes it sensible to enable IPE in general purpose distributions, as it becomes usable by any user wishing to do so. Keys in these keyrings can already load kernels and kernel modules, so there is no security downgrade. Add a kconfig each, like dm-verity does, but default to enabled if the dependencies are available. Signed-off-by: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> [FW: fixed some style issues] Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst5
-rw-r--r--security/ipe/Kconfig19
-rw-r--r--security/ipe/policy.c14
3 files changed, 36 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
index fcb3c493104b..f93a467db628 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
@@ -223,7 +223,10 @@ are signed through the PKCS#7 message format to enforce some level of
authorization of the policies (prohibiting an attacker from gaining
unconstrained root, and deploying an "allow all" policy). These
policies must be signed by a certificate that chains to the
-``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING``. With openssl, the policy can be signed by::
+``SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING``, or to the secondary and/or platform keyrings if
+``CONFIG_IPE_POLICY_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING`` and/or
+``CONFIG_IPE_POLICY_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING`` are enabled, respectively.
+With openssl, the policy can be signed by::
openssl smime -sign \
-in "$MY_POLICY" \
diff --git a/security/ipe/Kconfig b/security/ipe/Kconfig
index 3ab582606ed2..3c75bf267da4 100644
--- a/security/ipe/Kconfig
+++ b/security/ipe/Kconfig
@@ -31,6 +31,25 @@ config IPE_BOOT_POLICY
If unsure, leave blank.
+config IPE_POLICY_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING
+ bool "IPE policy update verification with secondary keyring"
+ default y
+ depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ help
+ Also allow the secondary trusted keyring to verify IPE policy
+ updates.
+
+ If unsure, answer Y.
+
+config IPE_POLICY_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ bool "IPE policy update verification with platform keyring"
+ default y
+ depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ help
+ Also allow the platform keyring to verify IPE policy updates.
+
+ If unsure, answer Y.
+
menu "IPE Trust Providers"
config IPE_PROP_DM_VERITY
diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c
index 4cea067adf6a..45f7d6a0ed23 100644
--- a/security/ipe/policy.c
+++ b/security/ipe/policy.c
@@ -169,9 +169,21 @@ struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen,
goto err;
}
- rc = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, new->pkcs7, pkcs7len, NULL,
+ rc = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, new->pkcs7, pkcs7len,
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_POLICY_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING
+ VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+#else
+ NULL,
+#endif
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
set_pkcs7_data, new);
+#ifdef CONFIG_IPE_POLICY_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING
+ if (rc == -ENOKEY)
+ rc = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, new->pkcs7, pkcs7len,
+ VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+ VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
+ set_pkcs7_data, new);
+#endif
if (rc)
goto err;
} else {