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authorSteven Rostedt (Google)2022-10-12 06:40:58 -0400
committerSteven Rostedt (Google)2022-10-12 13:51:16 -0400
commit0934ae9977c27133449b6dd8c6213970e7eece38 (patch)
tree7ba1cb9d4da3ba80d2240661dd4383c8a6e12582
parent2e9906f84fc7c99388bb7123ade167250d50f1c0 (diff)
tracing: Fix reading strings from synthetic events
The follow commands caused a crash: # cd /sys/kernel/tracing # echo 's:open char file[]' > dynamic_events # echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:file=filename:onchange($file).trace(open,$file)' > events/syscalls/sys_enter_openat/trigger' # echo 1 > events/synthetic/open/enable BOOM! The problem is that the synthetic event field "char file[]" will read the value given to it as a string without any memory checks to make sure the address is valid. The above example will pass in the user space address and the sythetic event code will happily call strlen() on it and then strscpy() where either one will cause an oops when accessing user space addresses. Use the helper functions from trace_kprobe and trace_eprobe that can read strings safely (and actually succeed when the address is from user space and the memory is mapped in). Now the above can show: packagekitd-1721 [000] ...2. 104.597170: open: file=/usr/lib/rpm/fileattrs/cmake.attr in:imjournal-978 [006] ...2. 104.599642: open: file=/var/lib/rsyslog/imjournal.state.tmp packagekitd-1721 [000] ...2. 104.626308: open: file=/usr/lib/rpm/fileattrs/debuginfo.attr Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221012104534.826549315@goodmis.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org> Fixes: bd82631d7ccdc ("tracing: Add support for dynamic strings to synthetic events") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c23
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
index 5e8c07aef071..e310052dc83c 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
/* for gfp flag names */
#include <linux/trace_events.h>
#include <trace/events/mmflags.h>
+#include "trace_probe.h"
+#include "trace_probe_kernel.h"
#include "trace_synth.h"
@@ -409,6 +411,7 @@ static unsigned int trace_string(struct synth_trace_event *entry,
{
unsigned int len = 0;
char *str_field;
+ int ret;
if (is_dynamic) {
u32 data_offset;
@@ -417,19 +420,27 @@ static unsigned int trace_string(struct synth_trace_event *entry,
data_offset += event->n_u64 * sizeof(u64);
data_offset += data_size;
- str_field = (char *)entry + data_offset;
-
- len = strlen(str_val) + 1;
- strscpy(str_field, str_val, len);
+ len = kern_fetch_store_strlen((unsigned long)str_val);
data_offset |= len << 16;
*(u32 *)&entry->fields[*n_u64] = data_offset;
+ ret = kern_fetch_store_string((unsigned long)str_val, &entry->fields[*n_u64], entry);
+
(*n_u64)++;
} else {
str_field = (char *)&entry->fields[*n_u64];
- strscpy(str_field, str_val, STR_VAR_LEN_MAX);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE
+ if ((unsigned long)str_val < TASK_SIZE)
+ ret = strncpy_from_user_nofault(str_field, str_val, STR_VAR_LEN_MAX);
+ else
+#endif
+ ret = strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(str_field, str_val, STR_VAR_LEN_MAX);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ strcpy(str_field, FAULT_STRING);
+
(*n_u64) += STR_VAR_LEN_MAX / sizeof(u64);
}
@@ -462,7 +473,7 @@ static notrace void trace_event_raw_event_synth(void *__data,
val_idx = var_ref_idx[field_pos];
str_val = (char *)(long)var_ref_vals[val_idx];
- len = strlen(str_val) + 1;
+ len = kern_fetch_store_strlen((unsigned long)str_val);
fields_size += len;
}