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authorLinus Torvalds2019-09-28 08:14:15 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds2019-09-28 08:14:15 -0700
commitaefcf2f4b58155d27340ba5f9ddbe9513da8286d (patch)
treea8ae994ca71b2e43e3075c796165e5ed62e28e42 /arch/s390
parentf1f2f614d535564992f32e720739cb53cf03489f (diff)
parent45893a0abee6b5fd52994a3a1095735aeaec472b (diff)
Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris: "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others. From the original description: This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature, intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel. When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted. Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand. The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer to not requiring external patches. There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline: - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/ - Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven, rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism. The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line: lockdown={integrity|confidentiality} Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract confidential information from the kernel are also disabled. This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and overriden by kernel configuration. New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in include/linux/security.h for details. The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way. Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing this under category (c) of the DCO" * 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits) kexec: Fix file verification on S390 security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down ...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/s390')
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c4
4 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 68f7c2b16ff7..43a81d0ad507 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
def_bool y
depends on KEXEC_FILE
-config KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+config KEXEC_SIG
bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
help
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c b/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c
index 6d0635ceddd0..9da6fa30c447 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_elf.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int s390_elf_probe(const char *buf, unsigned long len)
const struct kexec_file_ops s390_kexec_elf_ops = {
.probe = s390_elf_probe,
.load = s390_elf_load,
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
.verify_sig = s390_verify_sig,
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
};
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c b/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c
index 58318bf89fd9..af23eff5774d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/kexec_image.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static int s390_image_probe(const char *buf, unsigned long len)
const struct kexec_file_ops s390_kexec_image_ops = {
.probe = s390_image_probe,
.load = s390_image_load,
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
.verify_sig = s390_verify_sig,
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
};
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
index 1ac9fbc6e01e..8415ae7d2a23 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
NULL,
};
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
{
const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
NULL, NULL);
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
static int kexec_file_update_purgatory(struct kimage *image,
struct s390_load_data *data)