diff options
author | Linus Torvalds | 2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds | 2022-03-27 10:17:23 -0700 |
commit | 7001052160d172f6de06adeffde24dde9935ece8 (patch) | |
tree | 65fbc9c0df5a2989b68882ce1d893a0d78134c6a /arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | |
parent | f022814633e1c600507b3a99691b4d624c2813f0 (diff) | |
parent | 3986f65d4f408ce9d0a361e3226a3246a5fb701c (diff) |
Merge tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CET-IBT (Control-Flow-Integrity) support from Peter Zijlstra:
"Add support for Intel CET-IBT, available since Tigerlake (11th gen),
which is a coarse grained, hardware based, forward edge
Control-Flow-Integrity mechanism where any indirect CALL/JMP must
target an ENDBR instruction or suffer #CP.
Additionally, since Alderlake (12th gen)/Sapphire-Rapids, speculation
is limited to 2 instructions (and typically fewer) on branch targets
not starting with ENDBR. CET-IBT also limits speculation of the next
sequential instruction after the indirect CALL/JMP [1].
CET-IBT is fundamentally incompatible with retpolines, but provides,
as described above, speculation limits itself"
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
* tag 'x86_core_for_5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (53 commits)
kvm/emulate: Fix SETcc emulation for ENDBR
x86/Kconfig: Only allow CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT with ld.lld >= 14.0.0
x86/Kconfig: Only enable CONFIG_CC_HAS_IBT for clang >= 14.0.0
kbuild: Fixup the IBT kbuild changes
x86/Kconfig: Do not allow CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y with llvm-objcopy
x86: Remove toolchain check for X32 ABI capability
x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls
objtool: Find unused ENDBR instructions
objtool: Validate IBT assumptions
objtool: Add IBT/ENDBR decoding
objtool: Read the NOENDBR annotation
x86: Annotate idtentry_df()
x86,objtool: Move the ASM_REACHABLE annotation to objtool.h
x86: Annotate call_on_stack()
objtool: Rework ASM_REACHABLE
x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturn
exit: Mark do_group_exit() __noreturn
x86: Mark stop_this_cpu() __noreturn
objtool: Ignore extra-symbol code
objtool: Rename --duplicate to --lto
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/idt.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c index df0fa695bb09..608eb63bf044 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <asm/proto.h> #include <asm/desc.h> #include <asm/hw_irq.h> +#include <asm/idtentry.h> #define DPL0 0x0 #define DPL3 0x3 @@ -103,6 +104,10 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = { ISTG(X86_TRAP_MC, asm_exc_machine_check, IST_INDEX_MCE), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT + INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, asm_exc_control_protection), +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT ISTG(X86_TRAP_VC, asm_exc_vmm_communication, IST_INDEX_VC), #endif @@ -272,7 +277,7 @@ void __init idt_setup_apic_and_irq_gates(void) idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, apic_idts, ARRAY_SIZE(apic_idts), true); for_each_clear_bit_from(i, system_vectors, FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR) { - entry = irq_entries_start + 8 * (i - FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR); + entry = irq_entries_start + IDT_ALIGN * (i - FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR); set_intr_gate(i, entry); } @@ -283,7 +288,7 @@ void __init idt_setup_apic_and_irq_gates(void) * system_vectors bitmap. Otherwise they show up in * /proc/interrupts. */ - entry = spurious_entries_start + 8 * (i - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR); + entry = spurious_entries_start + IDT_ALIGN * (i - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR); set_intr_gate(i, entry); } #endif |