diff options
author | Linus Torvalds | 2024-05-13 14:32:22 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds | 2024-05-13 14:53:05 -0700 |
commit | 84c7d76b5ab6a52e1b3d8101b9f910c128dca396 (patch) | |
tree | c015aaa6f0cacdf36488eb3bcbde834892679a15 /arch | |
parent | 87caef42200cd44f8b808ec2f8ac2257f3e0a8c1 (diff) | |
parent | 13909a0c88972c5ef5d13f44d1a8bf065a31bdf4 (diff) |
Merge tag 'v6.10-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Remove crypto stats interface
Algorithms:
- Add faster AES-XTS on modern x86_64 CPUs
- Forbid curves with order less than 224 bits in ecc (FIPS 186-5)
- Add ECDSA NIST P521
Drivers:
- Expose otp zone in atmel
- Add dh fallback for primes > 4K in qat
- Add interface for live migration in qat
- Use dma for aes requests in starfive
- Add full DMA support for stm32mpx in stm32
- Add Tegra Security Engine driver
Others:
- Introduce scope-based x509_certificate allocation"
* tag 'v6.10-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (123 commits)
crypto: atmel-sha204a - provide the otp content
crypto: atmel-sha204a - add reading from otp zone
crypto: atmel-i2c - rename read function
crypto: atmel-i2c - add missing arg description
crypto: iaa - Use kmemdup() instead of kzalloc() and memcpy()
crypto: sahara - use 'time_left' variable with wait_for_completion_timeout()
crypto: api - use 'time_left' variable with wait_for_completion_killable_timeout()
crypto: caam - i.MX8ULP donot have CAAM page0 access
crypto: caam - init-clk based on caam-page0-access
crypto: starfive - Use fallback for unaligned dma access
crypto: starfive - Do not free stack buffer
crypto: starfive - Skip unneeded fallback allocation
crypto: starfive - Skip dma setup for zeroed message
crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - fix for register offset
crypto: hisilicon/debugfs - mask the unnecessary info from the dump
crypto: qat - specify firmware files for 402xx
crypto: x86/aes-gcm - simplify GCM hash subkey derivation
crypto: x86/aes-gcm - delete unused GCM assembly code
crypto: x86/aes-xts - simplify loop in xts_crypt_slowpath()
hwrng: stm32 - repair clock handling
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce.S | 34 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neon.S | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/s390/configs/defconfig | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/crypto/Makefile | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/crypto/aes-xts-avx-x86_64.S | 845 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S | 467 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c | 400 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S | 253 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx2-asm.S | 1 |
13 files changed, 1307 insertions, 730 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce.S index 1dc5bbbfeed2..b262eaa9170c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce.S +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-ce.S @@ -25,33 +25,28 @@ .endm /* preload all round keys */ - .macro load_round_keys, rounds, rk - cmp \rounds, #12 - blo 2222f /* 128 bits */ - beq 1111f /* 192 bits */ - ld1 {v17.4s-v18.4s}, [\rk], #32 -1111: ld1 {v19.4s-v20.4s}, [\rk], #32 -2222: ld1 {v21.4s-v24.4s}, [\rk], #64 - ld1 {v25.4s-v28.4s}, [\rk], #64 - ld1 {v29.4s-v31.4s}, [\rk] + .macro load_round_keys, rk, nr, tmp + add \tmp, \rk, \nr, sxtw #4 + sub \tmp, \tmp, #160 + ld1 {v17.4s-v20.4s}, [\rk] + ld1 {v21.4s-v24.4s}, [\tmp], #64 + ld1 {v25.4s-v28.4s}, [\tmp], #64 + ld1 {v29.4s-v31.4s}, [\tmp] .endm /* prepare for encryption with key in rk[] */ .macro enc_prepare, rounds, rk, temp - mov \temp, \rk - load_round_keys \rounds, \temp + load_round_keys \rk, \rounds, \temp .endm /* prepare for encryption (again) but with new key in rk[] */ .macro enc_switch_key, rounds, rk, temp - mov \temp, \rk - load_round_keys \rounds, \temp + load_round_keys \rk, \rounds, \temp .endm /* prepare for decryption with key in rk[] */ .macro dec_prepare, rounds, rk, temp - mov \temp, \rk - load_round_keys \rounds, \temp + load_round_keys \rk, \rounds, \temp .endm .macro do_enc_Nx, de, mc, k, i0, i1, i2, i3, i4 @@ -110,14 +105,13 @@ /* up to 5 interleaved blocks */ .macro do_block_Nx, enc, rounds, i0, i1, i2, i3, i4 - cmp \rounds, #12 - blo 2222f /* 128 bits */ - beq 1111f /* 192 bits */ + tbz \rounds, #2, .L\@ /* 128 bits */ round_Nx \enc, v17, \i0, \i1, \i2, \i3, \i4 round_Nx \enc, v18, \i0, \i1, \i2, \i3, \i4 -1111: round_Nx \enc, v19, \i0, \i1, \i2, \i3, \i4 + tbz \rounds, #1, .L\@ /* 192 bits */ + round_Nx \enc, v19, \i0, \i1, \i2, \i3, \i4 round_Nx \enc, v20, \i0, \i1, \i2, \i3, \i4 -2222: .irp key, v21, v22, v23, v24, v25, v26, v27, v28, v29 +.L\@: .irp key, v21, v22, v23, v24, v25, v26, v27, v28, v29 round_Nx \enc, \key, \i0, \i1, \i2, \i3, \i4 .endr fin_round_Nx \enc, v30, v31, \i0, \i1, \i2, \i3, \i4 diff --git a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neon.S b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neon.S index 9de7fbc797af..3a8961b6ea51 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neon.S +++ b/arch/arm64/crypto/aes-neon.S @@ -99,16 +99,16 @@ ld1 {v15.4s}, [\rk] add \rkp, \rk, #16 mov \i, \rounds -1111: eor \in\().16b, \in\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ +.La\@: eor \in\().16b, \in\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ movi v15.16b, #0x40 tbl \in\().16b, {\in\().16b}, v13.16b /* ShiftRows */ sub_bytes \in - subs \i, \i, #1 + sub \i, \i, #1 ld1 {v15.4s}, [\rkp], #16 - beq 2222f + cbz \i, .Lb\@ mix_columns \in, \enc - b 1111b -2222: eor \in\().16b, \in\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ + b .La\@ +.Lb\@: eor \in\().16b, \in\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ .endm .macro encrypt_block, in, rounds, rk, rkp, i @@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ ld1 {v15.4s}, [\rk] add \rkp, \rk, #16 mov \i, \rounds -1111: eor \in0\().16b, \in0\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ +.La\@: eor \in0\().16b, \in0\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ eor \in1\().16b, \in1\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ eor \in2\().16b, \in2\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ eor \in3\().16b, \in3\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ @@ -216,13 +216,13 @@ tbl \in2\().16b, {\in2\().16b}, v13.16b /* ShiftRows */ tbl \in3\().16b, {\in3\().16b}, v13.16b /* ShiftRows */ sub_bytes_4x \in0, \in1, \in2, \in3 - subs \i, \i, #1 + sub \i, \i, #1 ld1 {v15.4s}, [\rkp], #16 - beq 2222f + cbz \i, .Lb\@ mix_columns_2x \in0, \in1, \enc mix_columns_2x \in2, \in3, \enc - b 1111b -2222: eor \in0\().16b, \in0\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ + b .La\@ +.Lb\@: eor \in0\().16b, \in0\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ eor \in1\().16b, \in1\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ eor \in2\().16b, \in2\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ eor \in3\().16b, \in3\().16b, v15.16b /* ^round key */ diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig index f1fb01cd5a25..145342e46ea8 100644 --- a/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig +++ b/arch/s390/configs/debug_defconfig @@ -760,7 +760,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_S390=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_S390=m diff --git a/arch/s390/configs/defconfig b/arch/s390/configs/defconfig index d33f814f78b2..dc237896f99d 100644 --- a/arch/s390/configs/defconfig +++ b/arch/s390/configs/defconfig @@ -745,7 +745,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_S390=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_S390=m diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler index 8ad41da301e5..59aedf32c4ea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler @@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ config AS_GFNI help Supported by binutils >= 2.30 and LLVM integrated assembler +config AS_VAES + def_bool $(as-instr,vaesenc %ymm0$(comma)%ymm1$(comma)%ymm2) + help + Supported by binutils >= 2.30 and LLVM integrated assembler + +config AS_VPCLMULQDQ + def_bool $(as-instr,vpclmulqdq \$0x10$(comma)%ymm0$(comma)%ymm1$(comma)%ymm2) + help + Supported by binutils >= 2.30 and LLVM integrated assembler + config AS_WRUSS def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx)) help diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile index 9aa46093c91b..9c5ce5613738 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile @@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ chacha-x86_64-$(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) += chacha-avx512vl-x86_64.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL) += aesni-intel.o aesni-intel-y := aesni-intel_asm.o aesni-intel_glue.o -aesni-intel-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.o aes_ctrby8_avx-x86_64.o +aesni-intel-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.o \ + aes_ctrby8_avx-x86_64.o aes-xts-avx-x86_64.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_SSSE3) += sha1-ssse3.o sha1-ssse3-y := sha1_avx2_x86_64_asm.o sha1_ssse3_asm.o sha1_ssse3_glue.o diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aes-xts-avx-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-xts-avx-x86_64.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..48f97b79f7a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-xts-avx-x86_64.S @@ -0,0 +1,845 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* + * AES-XTS for modern x86_64 CPUs + * + * Copyright 2024 Google LLC + * + * Author: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> + */ + +/* + * This file implements AES-XTS for modern x86_64 CPUs. To handle the + * complexities of coding for x86 SIMD, e.g. where every vector length needs + * different code, it uses a macro to generate several implementations that + * share similar source code but are targeted at different CPUs, listed below: + * + * AES-NI + AVX + * - 128-bit vectors (1 AES block per vector) + * - VEX-coded instructions + * - xmm0-xmm15 + * - This is for older CPUs that lack VAES but do have AVX. + * + * VAES + VPCLMULQDQ + AVX2 + * - 256-bit vectors (2 AES blocks per vector) + * - VEX-coded instructions + * - ymm0-ymm15 + * - This is for CPUs that have VAES but lack AVX512 or AVX10, + * e.g. Intel's Alder Lake and AMD's Zen 3. + * + * VAES + VPCLMULQDQ + AVX10/256 + BMI2 + * - 256-bit vectors (2 AES blocks per vector) + * - EVEX-coded instructions + * - ymm0-ymm31 + * - This is for CPUs that have AVX512 but where using zmm registers causes + * downclocking, and for CPUs that have AVX10/256 but not AVX10/512. + * - By "AVX10/256" we really mean (AVX512BW + AVX512VL) || AVX10/256. + * To avoid confusion with 512-bit, we just write AVX10/256. + * + * VAES + VPCLMULQDQ + AVX10/512 + BMI2 + * - Same as the previous one, but upgrades to 512-bit vectors + * (4 AES blocks per vector) in zmm0-zmm31. + * - This is for CPUs that have good AVX512 or AVX10/512 support. + * + * This file doesn't have an implementation for AES-NI alone (without AVX), as + * the lack of VEX would make all the assembly code different. + * + * When we use VAES, we also use VPCLMULQDQ to parallelize the computation of + * the XTS tweaks. This avoids a bottleneck. Currently there don't seem to be + * any CPUs that support VAES but not VPCLMULQDQ. If that changes, we might + * need to start also providing an implementation using VAES alone. + * + * The AES-XTS implementations in this file support everything required by the + * crypto API, including support for arbitrary input lengths and multi-part + * processing. However, they are most heavily optimized for the common case of + * power-of-2 length inputs that are processed in a single part (disk sectors). + */ + +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/cfi_types.h> + +.section .rodata +.p2align 4 +.Lgf_poly: + // The low 64 bits of this value represent the polynomial x^7 + x^2 + x + // + 1. It is the value that must be XOR'd into the low 64 bits of the + // tweak each time a 1 is carried out of the high 64 bits. + // + // The high 64 bits of this value is just the internal carry bit that + // exists when there's a carry out of the low 64 bits of the tweak. + .quad 0x87, 1 + + // This table contains constants for vpshufb and vpblendvb, used to + // handle variable byte shifts and blending during ciphertext stealing + // on CPUs that don't support AVX10-style masking. +.Lcts_permute_table: + .byte 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80 + .byte 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80 + .byte 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07 + .byte 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f + .byte 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80 + .byte 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80 +.text + +// Function parameters +.set KEY, %rdi // Initially points to crypto_aes_ctx, then is + // advanced to point to 7th-from-last round key +.set SRC, %rsi // Pointer to next source data +.set DST, %rdx // Pointer to next destination data +.set LEN, %ecx // Remaining length in bytes +.set LEN8, %cl +.set LEN64, %rcx +.set TWEAK, %r8 // Pointer to next tweak + +// %rax holds the AES key length in bytes. +.set KEYLEN, %eax +.set KEYLEN64, %rax + +// %r9-r11 are available as temporaries. + +.macro _define_Vi i +.if VL == 16 + .set V\i, %xmm\i +.elseif VL == 32 + .set V\i, %ymm\i +.elseif VL == 64 + .set V\i, %zmm\i +.else + .error "Unsupported Vector Length (VL)" +.endif +.endm + +.macro _define_aliases + // Define register aliases V0-V15, or V0-V31 if all 32 SIMD registers + // are available, that map to the xmm, ymm, or zmm registers according + // to the selected Vector Length (VL). + _define_Vi 0 + _define_Vi 1 + _define_Vi 2 + _define_Vi 3 + _define_Vi 4 + _define_Vi 5 + _define_Vi 6 + _define_Vi 7 + _define_Vi 8 + _define_Vi 9 + _define_Vi 10 + _define_Vi 11 + _define_Vi 12 + _define_Vi 13 + _define_Vi 14 + _define_Vi 15 +.if USE_AVX10 + _define_Vi 16 + _define_Vi 17 + _define_Vi 18 + _define_Vi 19 + _define_Vi 20 + _define_Vi 21 + _define_Vi 22 + _define_Vi 23 + _define_Vi 24 + _define_Vi 25 + _define_Vi 26 + _define_Vi 27 + _define_Vi 28 + _define_Vi 29 + _define_Vi 30 + _define_Vi 31 +.endif + + // V0-V3 hold the data blocks during the main loop, or temporary values + // otherwise. V4-V5 hold temporary values. + + // V6-V9 hold XTS tweaks. Each 128-bit lane holds one tweak. + .set TWEAK0_XMM, %xmm6 + .set TWEAK0, V6 + .set TWEAK1_XMM, %xmm7 + .set TWEAK1, V7 + .set TWEAK2, V8 + .set TWEAK3, V9 + + // V10-V13 are used for computing the next values of TWEAK[0-3]. + .set NEXT_TWEAK0, V10 + .set NEXT_TWEAK1, V11 + .set NEXT_TWEAK2, V12 + .set NEXT_TWEAK3, V13 + + // V14 holds the constant from .Lgf_poly, copied to all 128-bit lanes. + .set GF_POLY_XMM, %xmm14 + .set GF_POLY, V14 + + // V15 holds the key for AES "round 0", copied to all 128-bit lanes. + .set KEY0_XMM, %xmm15 + .set KEY0, V15 + + // If 32 SIMD registers are available, then V16-V29 hold the remaining + // AES round keys, copied to all 128-bit lanes. + // + // AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 use different numbers of round keys. + // To allow handling all three variants efficiently, we align the round + // keys to the *end* of this register range. I.e., AES-128 uses + // KEY5-KEY14, AES-192 uses KEY3-KEY14, and AES-256 uses KEY1-KEY14. + // (All also use KEY0 for the XOR-only "round" at the beginning.) +.if USE_AVX10 + .set KEY1_XMM, %xmm16 + .set KEY1, V16 + .set KEY2_XMM, %xmm17 + .set KEY2, V17 + .set KEY3_XMM, %xmm18 + .set KEY3, V18 + .set KEY4_XMM, %xmm19 + .set KEY4, V19 + .set KEY5_XMM, %xmm20 + .set KEY5, V20 + .set KEY6_XMM, %xmm21 + .set KEY6, V21 + .set KEY7_XMM, %xmm22 + .set KEY7, V22 + .set KEY8_XMM, %xmm23 + .set KEY8, V23 + .set KEY9_XMM, %xmm24 + .set KEY9, V24 + .set KEY10_XMM, %xmm25 + .set KEY10, V25 + .set KEY11_XMM, %xmm26 + .set KEY11, V26 + .set KEY12_XMM, %xmm27 + .set KEY12, V27 + .set KEY13_XMM, %xmm28 + .set KEY13, V28 + .set KEY14_XMM, %xmm29 + .set KEY14, V29 +.endif + // V30-V31 are currently unused. +.endm + +// Move a vector between memory and a register. +.macro _vmovdqu src, dst +.if VL < 64 + vmovdqu \src, \dst +.else + vmovdqu8 \src, \dst +.endif +.endm + +// Broadcast a 128-bit value into a vector. +.macro _vbroadcast128 src, dst +.if VL == 16 && !USE_AVX10 + vmovdqu \src, \dst +.elseif VL == 32 && !USE_AVX10 + vbroadcasti128 \src, \dst +.else + vbroadcasti32x4 \src, \dst +.endif +.endm + +// XOR two vectors together. +.macro _vpxor src1, src2, dst +.if USE_AVX10 + vpxord \src1, \src2, \dst +.else + vpxor \src1, \src2, \dst +.endif +.endm + +// XOR three vectors together. +.macro _xor3 src1, src2, src3_and_dst +.if USE_AVX10 + // vpternlogd with immediate 0x96 is a three-argument XOR. + vpternlogd $0x96, \src1, \src2, \src3_and_dst +.else + vpxor \src1, \src3_and_dst, \src3_and_dst + vpxor \src2, \src3_and_dst, \src3_and_dst +.endif +.endm + +// Given a 128-bit XTS tweak in the xmm register \src, compute the next tweak +// (by multiplying by the polynomial 'x') and write it to \dst. +.macro _next_tweak src, tmp, dst + vpshufd $0x13, \src, \tmp + vpaddq \src, \src, \dst + vpsrad $31, \tmp, \tmp + vpand GF_POLY_XMM, \tmp, \tmp + vpxor \tmp, \dst, \dst +.endm + +// Given the XTS tweak(s) in the vector \src, compute the next vector of +// tweak(s) (by multiplying by the polynomial 'x^(VL/16)') and write it to \dst. +// +// If VL > 16, then there are multiple tweaks, and we use vpclmulqdq to compute +// all tweaks in the vector in parallel. If VL=16, we just do the regular +// computation without vpclmulqdq, as it's the faster method for a single tweak. +.macro _next_tweakvec src, tmp1, tmp2, dst +.if VL == 16 + _next_tweak \src, \tmp1, \dst +.else + vpsrlq $64 - VL/16, \src, \tmp1 + vpclmulqdq $0x01, GF_POLY, \tmp1, \tmp2 + vpslldq $8, \tmp1, \tmp1 + vpsllq $VL/16, \src, \dst + _xor3 \tmp1, \tmp2, \dst +.endif +.endm + +// Given the first XTS tweak at (TWEAK), compute the first set of tweaks and +// store them in the vector registers TWEAK0-TWEAK3. Clobbers V0-V5. +.macro _compute_first_set_of_tweaks + vmovdqu (TWEAK), TWEAK0_XMM + _vbroadcast128 .Lgf_poly(%rip), GF_POLY +.if VL == 16 + // With VL=16, multiplying by x serially is fastest. + _next_tweak TWEAK0, %xmm0, TWEAK1 + _next_tweak TWEAK1, %xmm0, TWEAK2 + _next_tweak TWEAK2, %xmm0, TWEAK3 +.else +.if VL == 32 + // Compute the second block of TWEAK0. + _next_tweak TWEAK0_XMM, %xmm0, %xmm1 + vinserti128 $1, %xmm1, TWEAK0, TWEAK0 +.elseif VL == 64 + // Compute the remaining blocks of TWEAK0. + _next_tweak TWEAK0_XMM, %xmm0, %xmm1 + _next_tweak %xmm1, %xmm0, %xmm2 + _next_tweak %xmm2, %xmm0, %xmm3 + vinserti32x4 $1, %xmm1, TWEAK0, TWEAK0 + vinserti32x4 $2, %xmm2, TWEAK0, TWEAK0 + vinserti32x4 $3, %xmm3, TWEAK0, TWEAK0 +.endif + // Compute TWEAK[1-3] from TWEAK0. + vpsrlq $64 - 1*VL/16, TWEAK0, V0 + vpsrlq $64 - 2*VL/16, TWEAK0, V2 + vpsrlq $64 - 3*VL/16, TWEAK0, V4 + vpclmulqdq $0x01, GF_POLY, V0, V1 + vpclmulqdq $0x01, GF_POLY, V2, V3 + vpclmulqdq $0x01, GF_POLY, V4, V5 + vpslldq $8, V0, V0 + vpslldq $8, V2, V2 + vpslldq $8, V4, V4 + vpsllq $1*VL/16, TWEAK0, TWEAK1 + vpsllq $2*VL/16, TWEAK0, TWEAK2 + vpsllq $3*VL/16, TWEAK0, TWEAK3 +.if USE_AVX10 + vpternlogd $0x96, V0, V1, TWEAK1 + vpternlogd $0x96, V2, V3, TWEAK2 + vpternlogd $0x96, V4, V5, TWEAK3 +.else + vpxor V0, TWEAK1, TWEAK1 + vpxor V2, TWEAK2, TWEAK2 + vpxor V4, TWEAK3, TWEAK3 + vpxor V1, TWEAK1, TWEAK1 + vpxor V3, TWEAK2, TWEAK2 + vpxor V5, TWEAK3, TWEAK3 +.endif +.endif +.endm + +// Do one step in computing the next set of tweaks using the method of just +// multiplying by x repeatedly (the same method _next_tweak uses). +.macro _tweak_step_mulx i +.if \i == 0 + .set PREV_TWEAK, TWEAK3 + .set NEXT_TWEAK, NEXT_TWEAK0 +.elseif \i == 5 + .set PREV_TWEAK, NEXT_TWEAK0 + .set NEXT_TWEAK, NEXT_TWEAK1 +.elseif \i == 10 + .set PREV_TWEAK, NEXT_TWEAK1 + .set NEXT_TWEAK, NEXT_TWEAK2 +.elseif \i == 15 + .set PREV_TWEAK, NEXT_TWEAK2 + .set NEXT_TWEAK, NEXT_TWEAK3 +.endif +.if \i >= 0 && \i < 20 && \i % 5 == 0 + vpshufd $0x13, PREV_TWEAK, V5 +.elseif \i >= 0 && \i < 20 && \i % 5 == 1 + vpaddq PREV_TWEAK, PREV_TWEAK, NEXT_TWEAK +.elseif \i >= 0 && \i < 20 && \i % 5 == 2 + vpsrad $31, V5, V5 +.elseif \i >= 0 && \i < 20 && \i % 5 == 3 + vpand GF_POLY, V5, V5 +.elseif \i >= 0 && \i < 20 && \i % 5 == 4 + vpxor V5, NEXT_TWEAK, NEXT_TWEAK +.elseif \i == 1000 + vmovdqa NEXT_TWEAK0, TWEAK0 + vmovdqa NEXT_TWEAK1, TWEAK1 + vmovdqa NEXT_TWEAK2, TWEAK2 + vmovdqa NEXT_TWEAK3, TWEAK3 +.endif +.endm + +// Do one step in computing the next set of tweaks using the VPCLMULQDQ method +// (the same method _next_tweakvec uses for VL > 16). This means multiplying +// each tweak by x^(4*VL/16) independently. Since 4*VL/16 is a multiple of 8 +// when VL > 16 (which it is here), the needed shift amounts are byte-aligned, +// which allows the use of vpsrldq and vpslldq to do 128-bit wide shifts. +.macro _tweak_step_pclmul i +.if \i == 0 + vpsrldq $(128 - 4*VL/16) / 8, TWEAK0, NEXT_TWEAK0 +.elseif \i == 2 + vpsrldq $(128 - 4*VL/16) / 8, TWEAK1, NEXT_TWEAK1 +.elseif \i == 4 + vpsrldq $(128 - 4*VL/16) / 8, TWEAK2, NEXT_TWEAK2 +.elseif \i == 6 + vpsrldq $(128 - 4*VL/16) / 8, TWEAK3, NEXT_TWEAK3 +.elseif \i == 8 + vpclmulqdq $0x00, GF_POLY, NEXT_TWEAK0, NEXT_TWEAK0 +.elseif \i == 10 + vpclmulqdq $0x00, GF_POLY, NEXT_TWEAK1, NEXT_TWEAK1 +.elseif \i == 12 + vpclmulqdq $0x00, GF_POLY, NEXT_TWEAK2, NEXT_TWEAK2 +.elseif \i == 14 + vpclmulqdq $0x00, GF_POLY, NEXT_TWEAK3, NEXT_TWEAK3 +.elseif \i == 1000 + vpslldq $(4*VL/16) / 8, TWEAK0, TWEAK0 + vpslldq $(4*VL/16) / 8, TWEAK1, TWEAK1 + vpslldq $(4*VL/16) / 8, TWEAK2, TWEAK2 + vpslldq $(4*VL/16) / 8, TWEAK3, TWEAK3 + _vpxor NEXT_TWEAK0, TWEAK0, TWEAK0 + _vpxor NEXT_TWEAK1, TWEAK1, TWEAK1 + _vpxor NEXT_TWEAK2, TWEAK2, TWEAK2 + _vpxor NEXT_TWEAK3, TWEAK3, TWEAK3 +.endif +.endm + +// _tweak_step does one step of the computation of the next set of tweaks from +// TWEAK[0-3]. To complete all steps, this is invoked with increasing values of +// \i that include at least 0 through 19, then 1000 which signals the last step. +// +// This is used to interleave the computation of the next set of tweaks with the +// AES en/decryptions, which increases performance in some cases. +.macro _tweak_step i +.if VL == 16 + _tweak_step_mulx \i +.else + _tweak_step_pclmul \i +.endif +.endm + +.macro _setup_round_keys enc + + // Select either the encryption round keys or the decryption round keys. +.if \enc + .set OFFS, 0 +.else + .set OFFS, 240 +.endif + + // Load the round key for "round 0". + _vbroadcast128 OFFS(KEY), KEY0 + + // Increment KEY to make it so that 7*16(KEY) is the last round key. + // For AES-128, increment by 3*16, resulting in the 10 round keys (not + // counting the zero-th round key which was just loaded into KEY0) being + // -2*16(KEY) through 7*16(KEY). For AES-192, increment by 5*16 and use + // 12 round keys -4*16(KEY) through 7*16(KEY). For AES-256, increment + // by 7*16 and use 14 round keys -6*16(KEY) through 7*16(KEY). + // + // This rebasing provides two benefits. First, it makes the offset to + // any round key be in the range [-96, 112], fitting in a signed byte. + // This shortens VEX-encoded instructions that access the later round + // keys which otherwise would need 4-byte offsets. Second, it makes it + // easy to do AES-128 and AES-192 by skipping irrelevant rounds at the + // beginning. Skipping rounds at the end doesn't work as well because + // the last round needs different instructions. + // + // An alternative approach would be to roll up all the round loops. We + // don't do that because it isn't compatible with caching the round keys + // in registers which we do when possible (see below), and also because + // it seems unwise to rely *too* heavily on the CPU's branch predictor. + lea OFFS-16(KEY, KEYLEN64, 4), KEY + + // If all 32 SIMD registers are available, cache all the round keys. +.if USE_AVX10 + cmp $24, KEYLEN + jl .Laes128\@ + je .Laes192\@ + _vbroadcast128 -6*16(KEY), KEY1 + _vbroadcast128 -5*16(KEY), KEY2 +.Laes192\@: + _vbroadcast128 -4*16(KEY), KEY3 + _vbroadcast128 -3*16(KEY), KEY4 +.Laes128\@: + _vbroadcast128 -2*16(KEY), KEY5 + _vbroadcast128 -1*16(KEY), KEY6 + _vbroadcast128 0*16(KEY), KEY7 + _vbroadcast128 1*16(KEY), KEY8 + _vbroadcast128 2*16(KEY), KEY9 + _vbroadcast128 3*16(KEY), KEY10 + _vbroadcast128 4*16(KEY), KEY11 + _vbroadcast128 5*16(KEY), KEY12 + _vbroadcast128 6*16(KEY), KEY13 + _vbroadcast128 7*16(KEY), KEY14 +.endif +.endm + +// Do a single round of AES encryption (if \enc==1) or decryption (if \enc==0) +// on the block(s) in \data using the round key(s) in \key. The register length +// determines the number of AES blocks en/decrypted. +.macro _vaes enc, last, key, data +.if \enc +.if \last + vaesenclast \key, \data, \data +.else + vaesenc \key, \data, \data +.endif +.else +.if \last + vaesdeclast \key, \data, \data +.else + vaesdec \key, \data, \data +.endif +.endif +.endm + +// Do a single round of AES en/decryption on the block(s) in \data, using the +// same key for all block(s). The round key is loaded from the appropriate +// register or memory location for round \i. May clobber V4. +.macro _vaes_1x enc, last, i, xmm_suffix, data +.if USE_AVX10 + _vaes \enc, \last, KEY\i\xmm_suffix, \data +.else +.ifnb \xmm_suffix + _vaes \enc, \last, (\i-7)*16(KEY), \data +.else + _vbroadcast128 (\i-7)*16(KEY), V4 + _vaes \enc, \last, V4, \data +.endif +.endif +.endm + +// Do a single round of AES en/decryption on the blocks in registers V0-V3, +// using the same key for all blocks. The round key is loaded from the +// appropriate register or memory location for round \i. In addition, does two +// steps of the computation of the next set of tweaks. May clobber V4. +.macro _vaes_4x enc, last, i +.if USE_AVX10 + _tweak_step (2*(\i-5)) + _vaes \enc, \last, KEY\i, V0 + _vaes \enc, \last, KEY\i, V1 + _tweak_step (2*(\i-5) + 1) + _vaes \enc, \last, KEY\i, V2 + _vaes \enc, \last, KEY\i, V3 +.else + _vbroadcast128 (\i-7)*16(KEY), V4 + _tweak_step (2*(\i-5)) + _vaes \enc, \last, V4, V0 + _vaes \enc, \last, V4, V1 + _tweak_step (2*(\i-5) + 1) + _vaes \enc, \last, V4, V2 + _vaes \enc, \last, V4, V3 +.endif +.endm + +// Do tweaked AES en/decryption (i.e., XOR with \tweak, then AES en/decrypt, +// then XOR with \tweak again) of the block(s) in \data. To process a single +// block, use xmm registers and set \xmm_suffix=_XMM. To process a vector of +// length VL, use V* registers and leave \xmm_suffix empty. May clobber V4. +.macro _aes_crypt enc, xmm_suffix, tweak, data + _xor3 KEY0\xmm_suffix, \tweak, \data + cmp $24, KEYLEN + jl .Laes128\@ + je .Laes192\@ + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 1, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 2, \xmm_suffix, \data +.Laes192\@: + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 3, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 4, \xmm_suffix, \data +.Laes128\@: + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 5, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 6, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 7, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 8, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 9, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 10, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 11, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 12, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 0, 13, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vaes_1x \enc, 1, 14, \xmm_suffix, \data + _vpxor \tweak, \data, \data +.endm + +.macro _aes_xts_crypt enc + _define_aliases + +.if !\enc + // When decrypting a message whose length isn't a multiple of the AES + // block length, exclude the last full block from the main loop by + // subtracting 16 from LEN. This is needed because ciphertext stealing + // decryption uses the last two tweaks in reverse order. We'll handle + // the last full block and the partial block specially at the end. + lea -16(LEN), %eax + test $15, LEN8 + cmovnz %eax, LEN +.endif + + // Load the AES key length: 16 (AES-128), 24 (AES-192), or 32 (AES-256). + movl 480(KEY), KEYLEN + + // Setup the pointer to the round keys and cache as many as possible. + _setup_round_keys \enc + + // Compute the first set of tweaks TWEAK[0-3]. + _compute_first_set_of_tweaks + + sub $4*VL, LEN + jl .Lhandle_remainder\@ + +.Lmain_loop\@: + // This is the main loop, en/decrypting 4*VL bytes per iteration. + + // XOR each source block with its tweak and the zero-th round key. +.if USE_AVX10 + vmovdqu8 0*VL(SRC), V0 + vmovdqu8 1*VL(SRC), V1 + vmovdqu8 2*VL(SRC), V2 + vmovdqu8 3*VL(SRC), V3 + vpternlogd $0x96, TWEAK0, KEY0, V0 + vpternlogd $0x96, TWEAK1, KEY0, V1 + vpternlogd $0x96, TWEAK2, KEY0, V2 + vpternlogd $0x96, TWEAK3, KEY0, V3 +.else + vpxor 0*VL(SRC), KEY0, V0 + vpxor 1*VL(SRC), KEY0, V1 + vpxor 2*VL(SRC), KEY0, V2 + vpxor 3*VL(SRC), KEY0, V3 + vpxor TWEAK0, V0, V0 + vpxor TWEAK1, V1, V1 + vpxor TWEAK2, V2, V2 + vpxor TWEAK3, V3, V3 +.endif + cmp $24, KEYLEN + jl .Laes128\@ + je .Laes192\@ + // Do all the AES rounds on the data blocks, interleaved with + // the computation of the next set of tweaks. + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 1 + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 2 +.Laes192\@: + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 3 + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 4 +.Laes128\@: + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 5 + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 6 + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 7 + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 8 + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 9 + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 10 + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 11 + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 12 + _vaes_4x \enc, 0, 13 + _vaes_4x \enc, 1, 14 + + // XOR in the tweaks again. + _vpxor TWEAK0, V0, V0 + _vpxor TWEAK1, V1, V1 + _vpxor TWEAK2, V2, V2 + _vpxor TWEAK3, V3, V3 + + // Store the destination blocks. + _vmovdqu V0, 0*VL(DST) + _vmovdqu V1, 1*VL(DST) + _vmovdqu V2, 2*VL(DST) + _vmovdqu V3, 3*VL(DST) + + // Finish computing the next set of tweaks. + _tweak_step 1000 + + add $4*VL, SRC + add $4*VL, DST + sub $4*VL, LEN + jge .Lmain_loop\@ + + // Check for the uncommon case where the data length isn't a multiple of + // 4*VL. Handle it out-of-line in order to optimize for the common + // case. In the common case, just fall through to the ret. + test $4*VL-1, LEN8 + jnz .Lhandle_remainder\@ +.Ldone\@: + // Store the next tweak back to *TWEAK to support continuation calls. + vmovdqu TWEAK0_XMM, (TWEAK) +.if VL > 16 + vzeroupper +.endif + RET + +.Lhandle_remainder\@: + + // En/decrypt any remaining full blocks, one vector at a time. +.if VL > 16 + add $3*VL, LEN // Undo extra sub of 4*VL, then sub VL. + jl .Lvec_at_a_time_done\@ +.Lvec_at_a_time\@: + _vmovdqu (SRC), V0 + _aes_crypt \enc, , TWEAK0, V0 + _vmovdqu V0, (DST) + _next_tweakvec TWEAK0, V0, V1, TWEAK0 + add $VL, SRC + add $VL, DST + sub $VL, LEN + jge .Lvec_at_a_time\@ +.Lvec_at_a_time_done\@: + add $VL-16, LEN // Undo extra sub of VL, then sub 16. +.else + add $4*VL-16, LEN // Undo extra sub of 4*VL, then sub 16. +.endif + + // En/decrypt any remaining full blocks, one at a time. + jl .Lblock_at_a_time_done\@ +.Lblock_at_a_time\@: + vmovdqu (SRC), %xmm0 + _aes_crypt \enc, _XMM, TWEAK0_XMM, %xmm0 + vmovdqu %xmm0, (DST) + _next_tweak TWEAK0_XMM, %xmm0, TWEAK0_XMM + add $16, SRC + add $16, DST + sub $16, LEN + jge .Lblock_at_a_time\@ +.Lblock_at_a_time_done\@: + add $16, LEN // Undo the extra sub of 16. + // Now 0 <= LEN <= 15. If LEN is zero, we're done. + jz .Ldone\@ + + // Otherwise 1 <= LEN <= 15, but the real remaining length is 16 + LEN. + // Do ciphertext stealing to process the last 16 + LEN bytes. + +.if \enc + // If encrypting, the main loop already encrypted the last full block to + // create the CTS intermediate ciphertext. Prepare for the rest of CTS + // by rewinding the pointers and loading the intermediate ciphertext. + sub $16, SRC + sub $16, DST + vmovdqu (DST), %xmm0 +.else + // If decrypting, the main loop didn't decrypt the last full block + // because CTS decryption uses the last two tweaks in reverse order. + // Do it now by advancing the tweak and decrypting the last full block. + _next_tweak TWEAK0_XMM, %xmm0, TWEAK1_XMM + vmovdqu (SRC), %xmm0 + _aes_crypt \enc, _XMM, TWEAK1_XMM, %xmm0 +.endif + +.if USE_AVX10 + // Create a mask that has the first LEN bits set. + mov $-1, %r9d + bzhi LEN, %r9d, %r9d + kmovd %r9d, %k1 + + // Swap the first LEN bytes of the en/decryption of the last full block + // with the partial block. Note that to support in-place en/decryption, + // the load from the src partial block must happen before the store to + // the dst partial block. + vmovdqa %xmm0, %xmm1 + vmovdqu8 16(SRC), %xmm0{%k1} + vmovdqu8 %xmm1, 16(DST){%k1} +.else + lea .Lcts_permute_table(%rip), %r9 + + // Load the src partial block, left-aligned. Note that to support + // in-place en/decryption, this must happen before the store to the dst + // partial block. + vmovdqu (SRC, LEN64, 1), %xmm1 + + // Shift the first LEN bytes of the en/decryption of the last full block + // to the end of a register, then store it to DST+LEN. This stores the + // dst partial block. It also writes to the second part of the dst last + // full block, but that part is overwritten later. + vpshufb (%r9, LEN64, 1), %xmm0, %xmm2 + vmovdqu %xmm2, (DST, LEN64, 1) + + // Make xmm3 contain [16-LEN,16-LEN+1,...,14,15,0x80,0x80,...]. + sub LEN64, %r9 + vmovdqu 32(%r9), %xmm3 + + // Shift the src partial block to the beginning of its register. + vpshufb %xmm3, %xmm1, %xmm1 + + // Do a blend to generate the src partial block followed by the second + // part of the en/decryption of the last full block. + vpblendvb %xmm3, %xmm0, %xmm1, %xmm0 +.endif + // En/decrypt again and store the last full block. + _aes_crypt \enc, _XMM, TWEAK0_XMM, %xmm0 + vmovdqu %xmm0, (DST) + jmp .Ldone\@ +.endm + +// void aes_xts_encrypt_iv(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *tweak_key, +// u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aes_xts_encrypt_iv) + vmovdqu (%rsi), %xmm0 + vpxor (%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + movl 480(%rdi), %eax // AES key length + lea -16(%rdi, %rax, 4), %rdi + cmp $24, %eax + jl .Lencrypt_iv_aes128 + je .Lencrypt_iv_aes192 + vaesenc -6*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenc -5*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 +.Lencrypt_iv_aes192: + vaesenc -4*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenc -3*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 +.Lencrypt_iv_aes128: + vaesenc -2*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenc -1*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenc 0*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenc 1*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenc 2*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenc 3*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenc 4*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenc 5*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenc 6*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vaesenclast 7*16(%rdi), %xmm0, %xmm0 + vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rsi) + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_encrypt_iv) + +// Below are the actual AES-XTS encryption and decryption functions, +// instantiated from the above macro. They all have the following prototype: +// +// void (*xts_asm_func)(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, +// const u8 *src, u8 *dst, unsigned int len, +// u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); +// +// |key| is the data key. |tweak| contains the next tweak; the encryption of +// the original IV with the tweak key was already done. This function supports +// incremental computation, but |len| must always be >= 16 (AES_BLOCK_SIZE), and +// |len| must be a multiple of 16 except on the last call. If |len| is a +// multiple of 16, then this function updates |tweak| to contain the next tweak. + +.set VL, 16 +.set USE_AVX10, 0 +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aes_xts_encrypt_aesni_avx) + _aes_xts_crypt 1 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_encrypt_aesni_avx) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aes_xts_decrypt_aesni_avx) + _aes_xts_crypt 0 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_decrypt_aesni_avx) + +#if defined(CONFIG_AS_VAES) && defined(CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ) +.set VL, 32 +.set USE_AVX10, 0 +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aes_xts_encrypt_vaes_avx2) + _aes_xts_crypt 1 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_encrypt_vaes_avx2) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aes_xts_decrypt_vaes_avx2) + _aes_xts_crypt 0 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_decrypt_vaes_avx2) + +.set VL, 32 +.set USE_AVX10, 1 +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aes_xts_encrypt_vaes_avx10_256) + _aes_xts_crypt 1 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_encrypt_vaes_avx10_256) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aes_xts_decrypt_vaes_avx10_256) + _aes_xts_crypt 0 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_decrypt_vaes_avx10_256) + +.set VL, 64 +.set USE_AVX10, 1 +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aes_xts_encrypt_vaes_avx10_512) + _aes_xts_crypt 1 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_encrypt_vaes_avx10_512) +SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(aes_xts_decrypt_vaes_avx10_512) + _aes_xts_crypt 0 +SYM_FUNC_END(aes_xts_decrypt_vaes_avx10_512) +#endif /* CONFIG_AS_VAES && CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S index 411d8c83e88a..39066b57a70e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S @@ -83,9 +83,6 @@ ALL_F: .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff .text - -#define STACK_OFFSET 8*3 - #define AadHash 16*0 #define AadLen 16*1 #define InLen (16*1)+8 @@ -116,11 +113,6 @@ ALL_F: .octa 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff #define arg4 rcx #define arg5 r8 #define arg6 r9 -#define arg7 STACK_OFFSET+8(%rsp) -#define arg8 STACK_OFFSET+16(%rsp) -#define arg9 STACK_OFFSET+24(%rsp) -#define arg10 STACK_OFFSET+32(%rsp) -#define arg11 STACK_OFFSET+40(%rsp) #define keysize 2*15*16(%arg1) #endif @@ -1507,184 +1499,6 @@ _esb_loop_\@: MOVADQ (%r10),\TMP1 aesenclast \TMP1,\XMM0 .endm -/***************************************************************************** -* void aesni_gcm_dec(void *aes_ctx, // AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary. -* struct gcm_context_data *data -* // Context data -* u8 *out, // Plaintext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed. -* const u8 *in, // Ciphertext input -* u64 plaintext_len, // Length of data in bytes for decryption. -* u8 *iv, // Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt (from Security Association) -* // concatenated with 8 byte Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload) -* // concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. -* u8 *hash_subkey, // H, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. -* const u8 *aad, // Additional Authentication Data (AAD) -* u64 aad_len, // Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 bytes -* u8 *auth_tag, // Authenticated Tag output. The driver will compare this to the -* // given authentication tag and only return the plaintext if they match. -* u64 auth_tag_len); // Authenticated Tag Length in bytes. Valid values are 16 -* // (most likely), 12 or 8. -* -* Assumptions: -* -* keys: -* keys are pre-expanded and aligned to 16 bytes. we are using the first -* set of 11 keys in the data structure void *aes_ctx -* -* iv: -* 0 1 2 3 -* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | Salt (From the SA) | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | Initialization Vector | -* | (This is the sequence number from IPSec header) | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | 0x1 | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* -* -* -* AAD: -* AAD padded to 128 bits with 0 -* for example, assume AAD is a u32 vector -* -* if AAD is 8 bytes: -* AAD[3] = {A0, A1}; -* padded AAD in xmm register = {A1 A0 0 0} -* -* 0 1 2 3 -* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | SPI (A1) | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | 32-bit Sequence Number (A0) | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | 0x0 | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* -* AAD Format with 32-bit Sequence Number -* -* if AAD is 12 bytes: -* AAD[3] = {A0, A1, A2}; -* padded AAD in xmm register = {A2 A1 A0 0} -* -* 0 1 2 3 -* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | SPI (A2) | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | 64-bit Extended Sequence Number {A1,A0} | -* | | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | 0x0 | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* -* AAD Format with 64-bit Extended Sequence Number -* -* poly = x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + 1 -* -*****************************************************************************/ -SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_dec) - FUNC_SAVE - - GCM_INIT %arg6, arg7, arg8, arg9 - GCM_ENC_DEC dec - GCM_COMPLETE arg10, arg11 - FUNC_RESTORE - RET -SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_dec) - - -/***************************************************************************** -* void aesni_gcm_enc(void *aes_ctx, // AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary. -* struct gcm_context_data *data -* // Context data -* u8 *out, // Ciphertext output. Encrypt in-place is allowed. -* const u8 *in, // Plaintext input -* u64 plaintext_len, // Length of data in bytes for encryption. -* u8 *iv, // Pre-counter block j0: 4 byte salt (from Security Association) -* // concatenated with 8 byte Initialisation Vector (from IPSec ESP Payload) -* // concatenated with 0x00000001. 16-byte aligned pointer. -* u8 *hash_subkey, // H, the Hash sub key input. Data starts on a 16-byte boundary. -* const u8 *aad, // Additional Authentication Data (AAD) -* u64 aad_len, // Length of AAD in bytes. With RFC4106 this is going to be 8 or 12 bytes -* u8 *auth_tag, // Authenticated Tag output. -* u64 auth_tag_len); // Authenticated Tag Length in bytes. Valid values are 16 (most likely), -* // 12 or 8. -* -* Assumptions: -* -* keys: -* keys are pre-expanded and aligned to 16 bytes. we are using the -* first set of 11 keys in the data structure void *aes_ctx -* -* -* iv: -* 0 1 2 3 -* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | Salt (From the SA) | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | Initialization Vector | -* | (This is the sequence number from IPSec header) | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | 0x1 | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* -* -* -* AAD: -* AAD padded to 128 bits with 0 -* for example, assume AAD is a u32 vector -* -* if AAD is 8 bytes: -* AAD[3] = {A0, A1}; -* padded AAD in xmm register = {A1 A0 0 0} -* -* 0 1 2 3 -* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | SPI (A1) | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | 32-bit Sequence Number (A0) | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | 0x0 | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* -* AAD Format with 32-bit Sequence Number -* -* if AAD is 12 bytes: -* AAD[3] = {A0, A1, A2}; -* padded AAD in xmm register = {A2 A1 A0 0} -* -* 0 1 2 3 -* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | SPI (A2) | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | 64-bit Extended Sequence Number {A1,A0} | -* | | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* | 0x0 | -* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ -* -* AAD Format with 64-bit Extended Sequence Number -* -* poly = x^128 + x^127 + x^126 + x^121 + 1 -***************************************************************************/ -SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_gcm_enc) - FUNC_SAVE - - GCM_INIT %arg6, arg7, arg8, arg9 - GCM_ENC_DEC enc - - GCM_COMPLETE arg10, arg11 - FUNC_RESTORE - RET -SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_gcm_enc) /***************************************************************************** * void aesni_gcm_init(void *aes_ctx, // AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary. @@ -1820,8 +1634,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL(_key_expansion_256b) SYM_FUNC_END(_key_expansion_256b) /* - * int aesni_set_key(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, - * unsigned int key_len) + * void aesni_set_key(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, + * unsigned int key_len) */ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_set_key) FRAME_BEGIN @@ -1926,7 +1740,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_set_key) sub $0x10, UKEYP cmp TKEYP, KEYP jb .Ldec_key_loop - xor AREG, AREG #ifndef __x86_64__ popl KEYP #endif @@ -2826,28 +2639,24 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_ctr_enc) .previous /* - * _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble: internal ABI - * Multiply in GF(2^128) for XTS IVs + * _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble: Multiply in GF(2^128) for XTS IVs * input: * IV: current IV * GF128MUL_MASK == mask with 0x87 and 0x01 * output: * IV: next IV * changed: - * CTR: == temporary value + * KEY: == temporary value */ -#define _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() \ - pshufd $0x13, IV, KEY; \ - paddq IV, IV; \ - psrad $31, KEY; \ - pand GF128MUL_MASK, KEY; \ - pxor KEY, IV; +.macro _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble + pshufd $0x13, IV, KEY + paddq IV, IV + psrad $31, KEY + pand GF128MUL_MASK, KEY + pxor KEY, IV +.endm -/* - * void aesni_xts_encrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, - * const u8 *src, unsigned int len, le128 *iv) - */ -SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_encrypt) +.macro _aesni_xts_crypt enc FRAME_BEGIN #ifndef __x86_64__ pushl IVP @@ -2866,35 +2675,46 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_encrypt) movups (IVP), IV mov 480(KEYP), KLEN +.if !\enc + add $240, KEYP -.Lxts_enc_loop4: + test $15, LEN + jz .Lxts_loop4\@ + sub $16, LEN +.endif + +.Lxts_loop4\@: sub $64, LEN - jl .Lxts_enc_1x + jl .Lxts_1x\@ movdqa IV, STATE1 movdqu 0x00(INP), IN pxor IN, STATE1 movdqu IV, 0x00(OUTP) - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() + _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble movdqa IV, STATE2 movdqu 0x10(INP), IN pxor IN, STATE2 movdqu IV, 0x10(OUTP) - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() + _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble movdqa IV, STATE3 movdqu 0x20(INP), IN pxor IN, STATE3 movdqu IV, 0x20(OUTP) - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() + _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble movdqa IV, STATE4 movdqu 0x30(INP), IN pxor IN, STATE4 movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP) +.if \enc call _aesni_enc4 +.else + call _aesni_dec4 +.endif movdqu 0x00(OUTP), IN pxor IN, STATE1 @@ -2912,17 +2732,17 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_encrypt) pxor IN, STATE4 movdqu STATE4, 0x30(OUTP) - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() + _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble add $64, INP add $64, OUTP test LEN, LEN - jnz .Lxts_enc_loop4 + jnz .Lxts_loop4\@ -.Lxts_enc_ret_iv: +.Lxts_ret_iv\@: movups IV, (IVP) -.Lxts_enc_ret: +.Lxts_ret\@: #ifndef __x86_64__ popl KLEN popl KEYP @@ -2932,201 +2752,60 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_encrypt) FRAME_END RET -.Lxts_enc_1x: +.Lxts_1x\@: add $64, LEN - jz .Lxts_enc_ret_iv + jz .Lxts_ret_iv\@ +.if \enc sub $16, LEN - jl .Lxts_enc_cts4 + jl .Lxts_cts4\@ +.endif -.Lxts_enc_loop1: +.Lxts_loop1\@: movdqu (INP), STATE +.if \enc pxor IV, STATE call _aesni_enc1 - pxor IV, STATE - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() - - test LEN, LEN - jz .Lxts_enc_out - +.else add $16, INP sub $16, LEN - jl .Lxts_enc_cts1 - - movdqu STATE, (OUTP) - add $16, OUTP - jmp .Lxts_enc_loop1 - -.Lxts_enc_out: - movdqu STATE, (OUTP) - jmp .Lxts_enc_ret_iv - -.Lxts_enc_cts4: - movdqa STATE4, STATE - sub $16, OUTP - -.Lxts_enc_cts1: -#ifndef __x86_64__ - lea .Lcts_permute_table, T1 -#else - lea .Lcts_permute_table(%rip), T1 -#endif - add LEN, INP /* rewind input pointer */ - add $16, LEN /* # bytes in final block */ - movups (INP), IN1 - - mov T1, IVP - add $32, IVP - add LEN, T1 - sub LEN, IVP - add OUTP, LEN - - movups (T1), %xmm4 - movaps STATE, IN2 - pshufb %xmm4, STATE - movups STATE, (LEN) - - movups (IVP), %xmm0 - pshufb %xmm0, IN1 - pblendvb IN2, IN1 - movaps IN1, STATE - + jl .Lxts_cts1\@ pxor IV, STATE - call _aesni_enc1 + call _aesni_dec1 +.endif pxor IV, STATE + _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble - movups STATE, (OUTP) - jmp .Lxts_enc_ret -SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_xts_encrypt) - -/* - * void aesni_xts_decrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, - * const u8 *src, unsigned int len, le128 *iv) - */ -SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_decrypt) - FRAME_BEGIN -#ifndef __x86_64__ - pushl IVP - pushl LEN - pushl KEYP - pushl KLEN - movl (FRAME_OFFSET+20)(%esp), KEYP # ctx - movl (FRAME_OFFSET+24)(%esp), OUTP # dst - movl (FRAME_OFFSET+28)(%esp), INP # src - movl (FRAME_OFFSET+32)(%esp), LEN # len - movl (FRAME_OFFSET+36)(%esp), IVP # iv - movdqa .Lgf128mul_x_ble_mask, GF128MUL_MASK -#else - movdqa .Lgf128mul_x_ble_mask(%rip), GF128MUL_MASK -#endif - movups (IVP), IV - - mov 480(KEYP), KLEN - add $240, KEYP - - test $15, LEN - jz .Lxts_dec_loop4 - sub $16, LEN - -.Lxts_dec_loop4: - sub $64, LEN - jl .Lxts_dec_1x - - movdqa IV, STATE1 - movdqu 0x00(INP), IN - pxor IN, STATE1 - movdqu IV, 0x00(OUTP) - - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() - movdqa IV, STATE2 - movdqu 0x10(INP), IN - pxor IN, STATE2 - movdqu IV, 0x10(OUTP) - - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() - movdqa IV, STATE3 - movdqu 0x20(INP), IN - pxor IN, STATE3 - movdqu IV, 0x20(OUTP) - - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() - movdqa IV, STATE4 - movdqu 0x30(INP), IN - pxor IN, STATE4 - movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP) - - call _aesni_dec4 - - movdqu 0x00(OUTP), IN - pxor IN, STATE1 - movdqu STATE1, 0x00(OUTP) - - movdqu 0x10(OUTP), IN - pxor IN, STATE2 - movdqu STATE2, 0x10(OUTP) - - movdqu 0x20(OUTP), IN - pxor IN, STATE3 - movdqu STATE3, 0x20(OUTP) - - movdqu 0x30(OUTP), IN - pxor IN, STATE4 - movdqu STATE4, 0x30(OUTP) - - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() - - add $64, INP - add $64, OUTP test LEN, LEN - jnz .Lxts_dec_loop4 - -.Lxts_dec_ret_iv: - movups IV, (IVP) - -.Lxts_dec_ret: -#ifndef __x86_64__ - popl KLEN - popl KEYP - popl LEN - popl IVP -#endif - FRAME_END - RET - -.Lxts_dec_1x: - add $64, LEN - jz .Lxts_dec_ret_iv - -.Lxts_dec_loop1: - movdqu (INP), STATE + jz .Lxts_out\@ +.if \enc add $16, INP sub $16, LEN - jl .Lxts_dec_cts1 - - pxor IV, STATE - call _aesni_dec1 - pxor IV, STATE - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() - - test LEN, LEN - jz .Lxts_dec_out + jl .Lxts_cts1\@ +.endif movdqu STATE, (OUTP) add $16, OUTP - jmp .Lxts_dec_loop1 + jmp .Lxts_loop1\@ -.Lxts_dec_out: +.Lxts_out\@: movdqu STATE, (OUTP) - jmp .Lxts_dec_ret_iv + jmp .Lxts_ret_iv\@ -.Lxts_dec_cts1: +.if \enc +.Lxts_cts4\@: + movdqa STATE4, STATE + sub $16, OUTP +.Lxts_cts1\@: +.else +.Lxts_cts1\@: movdqa IV, STATE4 - _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble() + _aesni_gf128mul_x_ble pxor IV, STATE call _aesni_dec1 pxor IV, STATE - +.endif #ifndef __x86_64__ lea .Lcts_permute_table, T1 #else @@ -3152,10 +2831,32 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_decrypt) pblendvb IN2, IN1 movaps IN1, STATE +.if \enc + pxor IV, STATE + call _aesni_enc1 + pxor IV, STATE +.else pxor STATE4, STATE call _aesni_dec1 pxor STATE4, STATE +.endif movups STATE, (OUTP) - jmp .Lxts_dec_ret -SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_xts_decrypt) + jmp .Lxts_ret\@ +.endm + +/* + * void aesni_xts_enc(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, + * const u8 *src, unsigned int len, le128 *iv) + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_enc) + _aesni_xts_crypt 1 +SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_xts_enc) + +/* + * void aesni_xts_dec(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, + * const u8 *src, unsigned int len, le128 *iv) + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_dec) + _aesni_xts_crypt 0 +SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_xts_dec) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c index b1d90c25975a..5b25d2a58aeb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ #define AESNI_ALIGN 16 #define AESNI_ALIGN_ATTR __attribute__ ((__aligned__(AESNI_ALIGN))) #define AES_BLOCK_MASK (~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)) -#define RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE 16 #define AESNI_ALIGN_EXTRA ((AESNI_ALIGN - 1) & ~(CRYPTO_MINALIGN - 1)) #define CRYPTO_AES_CTX_SIZE (sizeof(struct crypto_aes_ctx) + AESNI_ALIGN_EXTRA) #define XTS_AES_CTX_SIZE (sizeof(struct aesni_xts_ctx) + AESNI_ALIGN_EXTRA) @@ -87,8 +86,8 @@ static inline void *aes_align_addr(void *addr) return PTR_ALIGN(addr, AESNI_ALIGN); } -asmlinkage int aesni_set_key(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, - unsigned int key_len); +asmlinkage void aesni_set_key(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, + unsigned int key_len); asmlinkage void aesni_enc(const void *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in); asmlinkage void aesni_dec(const void *ctx, u8 *out, const u8 *in); asmlinkage void aesni_ecb_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, @@ -107,11 +106,11 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_cts_cbc_dec(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, #define AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE 640 #define AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE 4096 -asmlinkage void aesni_xts_encrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, - const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv); +asmlinkage void aesni_xts_enc(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, + const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv); -asmlinkage void aesni_xts_decrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, - const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv); +asmlinkage void aesni_xts_dec(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out, + const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 @@ -233,19 +232,17 @@ static int aes_set_key_common(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, { int err; - if (key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 && - key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256) - return -EINVAL; - if (!crypto_simd_usable()) - err = aes_expandkey(ctx, in_key, key_len); - else { - kernel_fpu_begin(); - err = aesni_set_key(ctx, in_key, key_len); - kernel_fpu_end(); - } + return aes_expandkey(ctx, in_key, key_len); - return err; + err = aes_check_keylen(key_len); + if (err) + return err; + + kernel_fpu_begin(); + aesni_set_key(ctx, in_key, key_len); + kernel_fpu_end(); + return 0; } static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key, @@ -592,23 +589,12 @@ static int xctr_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req) return err; } -static int -rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(u8 *hash_subkey, const u8 *key, unsigned int key_len) +static int aes_gcm_derive_hash_subkey(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *aes_key, + u8 hash_subkey[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]) { - struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx; - int ret; - - ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx, key, key_len); - if (ret) - return ret; - - /* Clear the data in the hash sub key container to zero.*/ - /* We want to cipher all zeros to create the hash sub key. */ - memset(hash_subkey, 0, RFC4106_HASH_SUBKEY_SIZE); - - aes_encrypt(&ctx, hash_subkey, hash_subkey); + static const u8 zeroes[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; - memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof(ctx)); + aes_encrypt(aes_key, hash_subkey, zeroes); return 0; } @@ -626,7 +612,8 @@ static int common_rfc4106_set_key(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key, memcpy(ctx->nonce, key + key_len, sizeof(ctx->nonce)); return aes_set_key_common(&ctx->aes_key_expanded, key, key_len) ?: - rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len); + aes_gcm_derive_hash_subkey(&ctx->aes_key_expanded, + ctx->hash_subkey); } /* This is the Integrity Check Value (aka the authentication tag) length and can @@ -877,7 +864,7 @@ static int helper_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) } #endif -static int xts_aesni_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, +static int xts_setkey_aesni(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) { struct aesni_xts_ctx *ctx = aes_xts_ctx(tfm); @@ -898,108 +885,149 @@ static int xts_aesni_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, return aes_set_key_common(&ctx->tweak_ctx, key + keylen, keylen); } -static int xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool encrypt) +typedef void (*xts_encrypt_iv_func)(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *tweak_key, + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); +typedef void (*xts_crypt_func)(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 *src, u8 *dst, unsigned int len, + u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); + +/* This handles cases where the source and/or destination span pages. */ +static noinline int +xts_crypt_slowpath(struct skcipher_request *req, xts_crypt_func crypt_func) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); - struct aesni_xts_ctx *ctx = aes_xts_ctx(tfm); + const struct aesni_xts_ctx *ctx = aes_xts_ctx(tfm); int tail = req->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + struct scatterlist sg_src[2], sg_dst[2]; struct skcipher_request subreq; struct skcipher_walk walk; + struct scatterlist *src, *dst; int err; - if (req->cryptlen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); - if (!walk.nbytes) - return err; - - if (unlikely(tail > 0 && walk.nbytes < walk.total)) { - int blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(req->cryptlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 2; - - skcipher_walk_abort(&walk); - + /* + * If the message length isn't divisible by the AES block size, then + * separate off the last full block and the partial block. This ensures + * that they are processed in the same call to the assembly function, + * which is required for ciphertext stealing. + */ + if (tail) { skcipher_request_set_tfm(&subreq, tfm); skcipher_request_set_callback(&subreq, skcipher_request_flags(req), NULL, NULL); skcipher_request_set_crypt(&subreq, req->src, req->dst, - blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, req->iv); + req->cryptlen - tail - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + req->iv); req = &subreq; + } - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); - if (!walk.nbytes) - return err; - } else { - tail = 0; + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + + while (walk.nbytes) { + kernel_fpu_begin(); + (*crypt_func)(&ctx->crypt_ctx, + walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.nbytes & ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1), req->iv); + kernel_fpu_end(); + err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, + walk.nbytes & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1)); } - kernel_fpu_begin(); + if (err || !tail) + return err; - /* calculate first value of T */ - aesni_enc(&ctx->tweak_ctx, walk.iv, walk.iv); + /* Do ciphertext stealing with the last full block and partial block. */ - while (walk.nbytes > 0) { - int nbytes = walk.nbytes; - - if (nbytes < walk.total) - nbytes &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); - - if (encrypt) - aesni_xts_encrypt(&ctx->crypt_ctx, - walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, - nbytes, walk.iv); - else - aesni_xts_decrypt(&ctx->crypt_ctx, - walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, - nbytes, walk.iv); - kernel_fpu_end(); + dst = src = scatterwalk_ffwd(sg_src, req->src, req->cryptlen); + if (req->dst != req->src) + dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(sg_dst, req->dst, req->cryptlen); - err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + tail, + req->iv); - if (walk.nbytes > 0) - kernel_fpu_begin(); - } + err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, req, false); + if (err) + return err; - if (unlikely(tail > 0 && !err)) { - struct scatterlist sg_src[2], sg_dst[2]; - struct scatterlist *src, *dst; + kernel_fpu_begin(); + (*crypt_func)(&ctx->crypt_ctx, walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr, + walk.nbytes, req->iv); + kernel_fpu_end(); - dst = src = scatterwalk_ffwd(sg_src, req->src, req->cryptlen); - if (req->dst != req->src) - dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(sg_dst, req->dst, req->cryptlen); + return skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0); +} - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + tail, - req->iv); +/* __always_inline to avoid indirect call in fastpath */ +static __always_inline int +xts_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, xts_encrypt_iv_func encrypt_iv, + xts_crypt_func crypt_func) +{ + struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); + const struct aesni_xts_ctx *ctx = aes_xts_ctx(tfm); + const unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen; + struct scatterlist *src = req->src; + struct scatterlist *dst = req->dst; - err = skcipher_walk_virt(&walk, &subreq, false); - if (err) - return err; + if (unlikely(cryptlen < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; - kernel_fpu_begin(); - if (encrypt) - aesni_xts_encrypt(&ctx->crypt_ctx, - walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, - walk.nbytes, walk.iv); - else - aesni_xts_decrypt(&ctx->crypt_ctx, - walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr, - walk.nbytes, walk.iv); - kernel_fpu_end(); + kernel_fpu_begin(); + (*encrypt_iv)(&ctx->tweak_ctx, req->iv); - err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, 0); + /* + * In practice, virtually all XTS plaintexts and ciphertexts are either + * 512 or 4096 bytes, aligned such that they don't span page boundaries. + * To optimize the performance of these cases, and also any other case + * where no page boundary is spanned, the below fast-path handles + * single-page sources and destinations as efficiently as possible. + */ + if (likely(src->length >= cryptlen && dst->length >= cryptlen && + src->offset + cryptlen <= PAGE_SIZE && + dst->offset + cryptlen <= PAGE_SIZE)) { + struct page *src_page = sg_page(src); + struct page *dst_page = sg_page(dst); + void *src_virt = kmap_local_page(src_page) + src->offset; + void *dst_virt = kmap_local_page(dst_page) + dst->offset; + + (*crypt_func)(&ctx->crypt_ctx, src_virt, dst_virt, cryptlen, + req->iv); + kunmap_local(dst_virt); + kunmap_local(src_virt); + kernel_fpu_end(); + return 0; } - return err; + kernel_fpu_end(); + return xts_crypt_slowpath(req, crypt_func); +} + +static void aesni_xts_encrypt_iv(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *tweak_key, + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + aesni_enc(tweak_key, iv, iv); +} + +static void aesni_xts_encrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 *src, u8 *dst, unsigned int len, + u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + aesni_xts_enc(key, dst, src, len, tweak); } -static int xts_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +static void aesni_xts_decrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, + const u8 *src, u8 *dst, unsigned int len, + u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]) { - return xts_crypt(req, true); + aesni_xts_dec(key, dst, src, len, tweak); } -static int xts_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +static int xts_encrypt_aesni(struct skcipher_request *req) { - return xts_crypt(req, false); + return xts_crypt(req, aesni_xts_encrypt_iv, aesni_xts_encrypt); +} + +static int xts_decrypt_aesni(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return xts_crypt(req, aesni_xts_encrypt_iv, aesni_xts_decrypt); } static struct crypto_alg aesni_cipher_alg = { @@ -1103,9 +1131,9 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aesni_skciphers[] = { .max_keysize = 2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, .walksize = 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, - .setkey = xts_aesni_setkey, - .encrypt = xts_encrypt, - .decrypt = xts_decrypt, + .setkey = xts_setkey_aesni, + .encrypt = xts_encrypt_aesni, + .decrypt = xts_decrypt_aesni, } }; @@ -1137,7 +1165,149 @@ static struct skcipher_alg aesni_xctr = { }; static struct simd_skcipher_alg *aesni_simd_xctr; -#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ + +asmlinkage void aes_xts_encrypt_iv(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *tweak_key, + u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); + +#define DEFINE_XTS_ALG(suffix, driver_name, priority) \ + \ +asmlinkage void \ +aes_xts_encrypt_##suffix(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, const u8 *src, \ + u8 *dst, unsigned int len, u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); \ +asmlinkage void \ +aes_xts_decrypt_##suffix(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *key, const u8 *src, \ + u8 *dst, unsigned int len, u8 tweak[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]); \ + \ +static int xts_encrypt_##suffix(struct skcipher_request *req) \ +{ \ + return xts_crypt(req, aes_xts_encrypt_iv, aes_xts_encrypt_##suffix); \ +} \ + \ +static int xts_decrypt_##suffix(struct skcipher_request *req) \ +{ \ + return xts_crypt(req, aes_xts_encrypt_iv, aes_xts_decrypt_##suffix); \ +} \ + \ +static struct skcipher_alg aes_xts_alg_##suffix = { \ + .base = { \ + .cra_name = "__xts(aes)", \ + .cra_driver_name = "__" driver_name, \ + .cra_priority = priority, \ + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, \ + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, \ + .cra_ctxsize = XTS_AES_CTX_SIZE, \ + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, \ + }, \ + .min_keysize = 2 * AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, \ + .max_keysize = 2 * AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, \ + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, \ + .walksize = 2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, \ + .setkey = xts_setkey_aesni, \ + .encrypt = xts_encrypt_##suffix, \ + .decrypt = xts_decrypt_##suffix, \ +}; \ + \ +static struct simd_skcipher_alg *aes_xts_simdalg_##suffix + +DEFINE_XTS_ALG(aesni_avx, "xts-aes-aesni-avx", 500); +#if defined(CONFIG_AS_VAES) && defined(CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ) +DEFINE_XTS_ALG(vaes_avx2, "xts-aes-vaes-avx2", 600); +DEFINE_XTS_ALG(vaes_avx10_256, "xts-aes-vaes-avx10_256", 700); +DEFINE_XTS_ALG(vaes_avx10_512, "xts-aes-vaes-avx10_512", 800); +#endif + +/* + * This is a list of CPU models that are known to suffer from downclocking when + * zmm registers (512-bit vectors) are used. On these CPUs, the AES-XTS + * implementation with zmm registers won't be used by default. An + * implementation with ymm registers (256-bit vectors) will be used instead. + */ +static const struct x86_cpu_id zmm_exclusion_list[] = { + { .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 6, .model = INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X }, + { .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 6, .model = INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_X }, + { .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 6, .model = INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_D }, + { .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 6, .model = INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE }, + { .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 6, .model = INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_L }, + { .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 6, .model = INTEL_FAM6_ICELAKE_NNPI }, + { .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 6, .model = INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE_L }, + { .vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL, .family = 6, .model = INTEL_FAM6_TIGERLAKE }, + /* Allow Rocket Lake and later, and Sapphire Rapids and later. */ + /* Also allow AMD CPUs (starting with Zen 4, the first with AVX-512). */ + {}, +}; + +static int __init register_xts_algs(void) +{ + int err; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) + return 0; + err = simd_register_skciphers_compat(&aes_xts_alg_aesni_avx, 1, + &aes_xts_simdalg_aesni_avx); + if (err) + return err; +#if defined(CONFIG_AS_VAES) && defined(CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ) + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) || + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VAES) || + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ) || + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCLMULQDQ) || + !cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM, NULL)) + return 0; + err = simd_register_skciphers_compat(&aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx2, 1, + &aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx2); + if (err) + return err; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW) || + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL) || + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMI2) || + !cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM | + XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512, NULL)) + return 0; + + err = simd_register_skciphers_compat(&aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx10_256, 1, + &aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_256); + if (err) + return err; + + if (x86_match_cpu(zmm_exclusion_list)) + aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx10_512.base.cra_priority = 1; + + err = simd_register_skciphers_compat(&aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx10_512, 1, + &aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_512); + if (err) + return err; +#endif /* CONFIG_AS_VAES && CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ */ + return 0; +} + +static void unregister_xts_algs(void) +{ + if (aes_xts_simdalg_aesni_avx) + simd_unregister_skciphers(&aes_xts_alg_aesni_avx, 1, + &aes_xts_simdalg_aesni_avx); +#if defined(CONFIG_AS_VAES) && defined(CONFIG_AS_VPCLMULQDQ) + if (aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx2) + simd_unregister_skciphers(&aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx2, 1, + &aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx2); + if (aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_256) + simd_unregister_skciphers(&aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx10_256, 1, + &aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_256); + if (aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_512) + simd_unregister_skciphers(&aes_xts_alg_vaes_avx10_512, 1, + &aes_xts_simdalg_vaes_avx10_512); +#endif +} +#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ +static int __init register_xts_algs(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +static void unregister_xts_algs(void) +{ +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 static int generic_gcmaes_set_key(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key, @@ -1146,7 +1316,8 @@ static int generic_gcmaes_set_key(struct crypto_aead *aead, const u8 *key, struct generic_gcmaes_ctx *ctx = generic_gcmaes_ctx_get(aead); return aes_set_key_common(&ctx->aes_key_expanded, key, key_len) ?: - rfc4106_set_hash_subkey(ctx->hash_subkey, key, key_len); + aes_gcm_derive_hash_subkey(&ctx->aes_key_expanded, + ctx->hash_subkey); } static int generic_gcmaes_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) @@ -1276,13 +1447,21 @@ static int __init aesni_init(void) goto unregister_aeads; #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ + err = register_xts_algs(); + if (err) + goto unregister_xts; + return 0; +unregister_xts: + unregister_xts_algs(); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + if (aesni_simd_xctr) + simd_unregister_skciphers(&aesni_xctr, 1, &aesni_simd_xctr); unregister_aeads: +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ simd_unregister_aeads(aesni_aeads, ARRAY_SIZE(aesni_aeads), aesni_simd_aeads); -#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ unregister_skciphers: simd_unregister_skciphers(aesni_skciphers, ARRAY_SIZE(aesni_skciphers), @@ -1303,6 +1482,7 @@ static void __exit aesni_exit(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX)) simd_unregister_skciphers(&aesni_xctr, 1, &aesni_simd_xctr); #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ + unregister_xts_algs(); } late_initcall(aesni_init); diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S index ef73a3ab8726..791386d9a83a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/nh-avx2-x86_64.S @@ -154,5 +154,6 @@ SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(nh_avx2) vpaddq T1, T0, T0 vpaddq T4, T0, T0 vmovdqu T0, (HASH) + vzeroupper RET SYM_FUNC_END(nh_avx2) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S index 9918212faf91..0ffb072be956 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256-avx2-asm.S @@ -716,6 +716,7 @@ SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(sha256_transform_rorx) popq %r13 popq %r12 popq %rbx + vzeroupper RET SYM_FUNC_END(sha256_transform_rorx) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S index 537b6dcd7ed8..d515a55a3bc1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha256_ni_asm.S @@ -62,20 +62,41 @@ #define SHA256CONSTANTS %rax -#define MSG %xmm0 +#define MSG %xmm0 /* sha256rnds2 implicit operand */ #define STATE0 %xmm1 #define STATE1 %xmm2 -#define MSGTMP0 %xmm3 -#define MSGTMP1 %xmm4 -#define MSGTMP2 %xmm5 -#define MSGTMP3 %xmm6 -#define MSGTMP4 %xmm7 +#define MSG0 %xmm3 +#define MSG1 %xmm4 +#define MSG2 %xmm5 +#define MSG3 %xmm6 +#define TMP %xmm7 #define SHUF_MASK %xmm8 #define ABEF_SAVE %xmm9 #define CDGH_SAVE %xmm10 +.macro do_4rounds i, m0, m1, m2, m3 +.if \i < 16 + movdqu \i*4(DATA_PTR), \m0 + pshufb SHUF_MASK, \m0 +.endif + movdqa (\i-32)*4(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG + paddd \m0, MSG + sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 +.if \i >= 12 && \i < 60 + movdqa \m0, TMP + palignr $4, \m3, TMP + paddd TMP, \m1 + sha256msg2 \m0, \m1 +.endif + punpckhqdq MSG, MSG + sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 +.if \i >= 4 && \i < 52 + sha256msg1 \m0, \m3 +.endif +.endm + /* * Intel SHA Extensions optimized implementation of a SHA-256 update function * @@ -86,9 +107,6 @@ * store partial blocks. All message padding and hash value initialization must * be done outside the update function. * - * The indented lines in the loop are instructions related to rounds processing. - * The non-indented lines are instructions related to the message schedule. - * * void sha256_ni_transform(uint32_t *digest, const void *data, uint32_t numBlocks); * digest : pointer to digest @@ -108,202 +126,29 @@ SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(sha256_ni_transform) * Need to reorder these appropriately * DCBA, HGFE -> ABEF, CDGH */ - movdqu 0*16(DIGEST_PTR), STATE0 - movdqu 1*16(DIGEST_PTR), STATE1 + movdqu 0*16(DIGEST_PTR), STATE0 /* DCBA */ + movdqu 1*16(DIGEST_PTR), STATE1 /* HGFE */ - pshufd $0xB1, STATE0, STATE0 /* CDAB */ - pshufd $0x1B, STATE1, STATE1 /* EFGH */ - movdqa STATE0, MSGTMP4 - palignr $8, STATE1, STATE0 /* ABEF */ - pblendw $0xF0, MSGTMP4, STATE1 /* CDGH */ + movdqa STATE0, TMP + punpcklqdq STATE1, STATE0 /* FEBA */ + punpckhqdq TMP, STATE1 /* DCHG */ + pshufd $0x1B, STATE0, STATE0 /* ABEF */ + pshufd $0xB1, STATE1, STATE1 /* CDGH */ movdqa PSHUFFLE_BYTE_FLIP_MASK(%rip), SHUF_MASK - lea K256(%rip), SHA256CONSTANTS + lea K256+32*4(%rip), SHA256CONSTANTS .Lloop0: /* Save hash values for addition after rounds */ movdqa STATE0, ABEF_SAVE movdqa STATE1, CDGH_SAVE - /* Rounds 0-3 */ - movdqu 0*16(DATA_PTR), MSG - pshufb SHUF_MASK, MSG - movdqa MSG, MSGTMP0 - paddd 0*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - - /* Rounds 4-7 */ - movdqu 1*16(DATA_PTR), MSG - pshufb SHUF_MASK, MSG - movdqa MSG, MSGTMP1 - paddd 1*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP1, MSGTMP0 - - /* Rounds 8-11 */ - movdqu 2*16(DATA_PTR), MSG - pshufb SHUF_MASK, MSG - movdqa MSG, MSGTMP2 - paddd 2*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP2, MSGTMP1 - - /* Rounds 12-15 */ - movdqu 3*16(DATA_PTR), MSG - pshufb SHUF_MASK, MSG - movdqa MSG, MSGTMP3 - paddd 3*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP3, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP2, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP0 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP3, MSGTMP0 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP3, MSGTMP2 - - /* Rounds 16-19 */ - movdqa MSGTMP0, MSG - paddd 4*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP0, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP3, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP1 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP0, MSGTMP1 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP0, MSGTMP3 - - /* Rounds 20-23 */ - movdqa MSGTMP1, MSG - paddd 5*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP1, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP0, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP2 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP1, MSGTMP2 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP1, MSGTMP0 - - /* Rounds 24-27 */ - movdqa MSGTMP2, MSG - paddd 6*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP2, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP1, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP3 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP2, MSGTMP3 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP2, MSGTMP1 - - /* Rounds 28-31 */ - movdqa MSGTMP3, MSG - paddd 7*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP3, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP2, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP0 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP3, MSGTMP0 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP3, MSGTMP2 - - /* Rounds 32-35 */ - movdqa MSGTMP0, MSG - paddd 8*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP0, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP3, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP1 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP0, MSGTMP1 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP0, MSGTMP3 - - /* Rounds 36-39 */ - movdqa MSGTMP1, MSG - paddd 9*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP1, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP0, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP2 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP1, MSGTMP2 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP1, MSGTMP0 - - /* Rounds 40-43 */ - movdqa MSGTMP2, MSG - paddd 10*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP2, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP1, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP3 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP2, MSGTMP3 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP2, MSGTMP1 - - /* Rounds 44-47 */ - movdqa MSGTMP3, MSG - paddd 11*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP3, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP2, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP0 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP3, MSGTMP0 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP3, MSGTMP2 - - /* Rounds 48-51 */ - movdqa MSGTMP0, MSG - paddd 12*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP0, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP3, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP1 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP0, MSGTMP1 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - sha256msg1 MSGTMP0, MSGTMP3 - - /* Rounds 52-55 */ - movdqa MSGTMP1, MSG - paddd 13*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP1, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP0, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP2 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP1, MSGTMP2 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - - /* Rounds 56-59 */ - movdqa MSGTMP2, MSG - paddd 14*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - movdqa MSGTMP2, MSGTMP4 - palignr $4, MSGTMP1, MSGTMP4 - paddd MSGTMP4, MSGTMP3 - sha256msg2 MSGTMP2, MSGTMP3 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 - - /* Rounds 60-63 */ - movdqa MSGTMP3, MSG - paddd 15*16(SHA256CONSTANTS), MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE0, STATE1 - pshufd $0x0E, MSG, MSG - sha256rnds2 STATE1, STATE0 +.irp i, 0, 16, 32, 48 + do_4rounds (\i + 0), MSG0, MSG1, MSG2, MSG3 + do_4rounds (\i + 4), MSG1, MSG2, MSG3, MSG0 + do_4rounds (\i + 8), MSG2, MSG3, MSG0, MSG1 + do_4rounds (\i + 12), MSG3, MSG0, MSG1, MSG2 +.endr /* Add current hash values with previously saved */ paddd ABEF_SAVE, STATE0 @@ -315,14 +160,14 @@ SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(sha256_ni_transform) jne .Lloop0 /* Write hash values back in the correct order */ - pshufd $0x1B, STATE0, STATE0 /* FEBA */ - pshufd $0xB1, STATE1, STATE1 /* DCHG */ - movdqa STATE0, MSGTMP4 - pblendw $0xF0, STATE1, STATE0 /* DCBA */ - palignr $8, MSGTMP4, STATE1 /* HGFE */ - - movdqu STATE0, 0*16(DIGEST_PTR) - movdqu STATE1, 1*16(DIGEST_PTR) + movdqa STATE0, TMP + punpcklqdq STATE1, STATE0 /* GHEF */ + punpckhqdq TMP, STATE1 /* ABCD */ + pshufd $0xB1, STATE0, STATE0 /* HGFE */ + pshufd $0x1B, STATE1, STATE1 /* DCBA */ + + movdqu STATE1, 0*16(DIGEST_PTR) + movdqu STATE0, 1*16(DIGEST_PTR) .Ldone_hash: diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx2-asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx2-asm.S index f08496cd6870..24973f42c43f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx2-asm.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha512-avx2-asm.S @@ -680,6 +680,7 @@ SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START(sha512_transform_rorx) pop %r12 pop %rbx + vzeroupper RET SYM_FUNC_END(sha512_transform_rorx) |