diff options
| author | Pawan Gupta | 2022-08-02 15:47:02 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Borislav Petkov | 2022-08-03 14:12:18 +0200 |
| commit | ba6e31af2be96c4d0536f2152ed6f7b6c11bca47 (patch) | |
| tree | 50fe01fb6f53af58083693c3d0a7eecf4703b45e /arch | |
| parent | 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 (diff) | |
x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence
RSB fill sequence does not have any protection for miss-prediction of
conditional branch at the end of the sequence. CPU can speculatively
execute code immediately after the sequence, while RSB filling hasn't
completed yet.
#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
mov $(nr/2), reg; \
771: \
ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
call 772f; \
773: /* speculation trap */ \
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 773b; \
772: \
ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
call 774f; \
775: /* speculation trap */ \
UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
pause; \
lfence; \
jmp 775b; \
774: \
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \
dec reg; \
jnz 771b; <----- CPU can miss-predict here.
Before RSB is filled, RETs that come in program order after this macro
can be executed speculatively, making them vulnerable to RSB-based
attacks.
Mitigate it by adding an LFENCE after the conditional branch to prevent
speculation while RSB is being filled.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 4c9ba49d9b3e..d3a3cc6772ee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ 774: \ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \ dec reg; \ - jnz 771b; + jnz 771b; \ + /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \ + lfence; #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ |