diff options
author | Linus Torvalds | 2019-07-08 11:42:09 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds | 2019-07-08 11:42:09 -0700 |
commit | 0d37dde70655be73575d011be1bffaf0e3b16ea9 (patch) | |
tree | 415c1ee2d66489a032c90039bd8f263821cc3ca7 /arch | |
parent | 0902d5011cfaabd6a09326299ef77e1c8735fb89 (diff) | |
parent | 7f0a5e0755832301e7b010eab46fb715c483ba60 (diff) |
Merge branch 'x86-entry-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 vsyscall updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Further hardening of the legacy vsyscall by providing support for
execute only mode and switching the default to it.
This prevents a certain class of attacks which rely on the vsyscall
page being accessible at a fixed address in the canonical kernel
address space"
* 'x86-entry-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
selftests/x86: Add a test for process_vm_readv() on the vsyscall page
x86/vsyscall: Add __ro_after_init to global variables
x86/vsyscall: Change the default vsyscall mode to xonly
selftests/x86/vsyscall: Verify that vsyscall=none blocks execution
x86/vsyscall: Document odd SIGSEGV error code for vsyscalls
x86/vsyscall: Show something useful on a read fault
x86/vsyscall: Add a new vsyscall=xonly mode
Documentation/admin: Remove the vsyscall=native documentation
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig | 35 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 37 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 18 |
4 files changed, 74 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 51a98d6eae8e..fbabf59692ff 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2288,7 +2288,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO choice prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications" depends on X86_64 - default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE + default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY help Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in @@ -2296,23 +2296,38 @@ choice it can be used to assist security vulnerability exploitation. This setting can be changed at boot time via the kernel command - line parameter vsyscall=[emulate|none]. + line parameter vsyscall=[emulate|xonly|none]. On a system with recent enough glibc (2.14 or newer) and no static binaries, you can say None without a performance penalty to improve security. - If unsure, select "Emulate". + If unsure, select "Emulate execution only". config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE - bool "Emulate" + bool "Full emulation" help - The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed - vsyscall address mapping. This makes the mapping - non-executable, but it still contains known contents, - which could be used in certain rare security vulnerability - exploits. This configuration is recommended when userspace - still uses the vsyscall area. + The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed vsyscall + address mapping. This makes the mapping non-executable, but + it still contains readable known contents, which could be + used in certain rare security vulnerability exploits. This + configuration is recommended when using legacy userspace + that still uses vsyscalls along with legacy binary + instrumentation tools that require code to be readable. + + An example of this type of legacy userspace is running + Pin on an old binary that still uses vsyscalls. + + config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY + bool "Emulate execution only" + help + The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed vsyscall + address mapping and does not allow reads. This + configuration is recommended when userspace might use the + legacy vsyscall area but support for legacy binary + instrumentation of legacy code is not needed. It mitigates + certain uses of the vsyscall area as an ASLR-bypassing + buffer. config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE bool "None" diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c index d9d81ad7a400..07003f3f1bfc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c @@ -42,9 +42,11 @@ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include "vsyscall_trace.h" -static enum { EMULATE, NONE } vsyscall_mode = +static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode __ro_after_init = #ifdef CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE NONE; +#elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY) + XONLY; #else EMULATE; #endif @@ -54,6 +56,8 @@ static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str) if (str) { if (!strcmp("emulate", str)) vsyscall_mode = EMULATE; + else if (!strcmp("xonly", str)) + vsyscall_mode = XONLY; else if (!strcmp("none", str)) vsyscall_mode = NONE; else @@ -113,7 +117,8 @@ static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size) } } -bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) +bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code, + struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) { struct task_struct *tsk; unsigned long caller; @@ -122,6 +127,22 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) long ret; unsigned long orig_dx; + /* Write faults or kernel-privilege faults never get fixed up. */ + if ((error_code & (X86_PF_WRITE | X86_PF_USER)) != X86_PF_USER) + return false; + + if (!(error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)) { + /* Failed vsyscall read */ + if (vsyscall_mode == EMULATE) + return false; + + /* + * User code tried and failed to read the vsyscall page. + */ + warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs, "vsyscall read attempt denied -- look up the vsyscall kernel parameter if you need a workaround"); + return false; + } + /* * No point in checking CS -- the only way to get here is a user mode * trap to a high address, which means that we're in 64-bit user code. @@ -284,7 +305,7 @@ static const char *gate_vma_name(struct vm_area_struct *vma) static const struct vm_operations_struct gate_vma_ops = { .name = gate_vma_name, }; -static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma = { +static struct vm_area_struct gate_vma __ro_after_init = { .vm_start = VSYSCALL_ADDR, .vm_end = VSYSCALL_ADDR + PAGE_SIZE, .vm_page_prot = PAGE_READONLY_EXEC, @@ -357,12 +378,20 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void) extern char __vsyscall_page; unsigned long physaddr_vsyscall = __pa_symbol(&__vsyscall_page); - if (vsyscall_mode != NONE) { + /* + * For full emulation, the page needs to exist for real. In + * execute-only mode, there is no PTE at all backing the vsyscall + * page. + */ + if (vsyscall_mode == EMULATE) { __set_fixmap(VSYSCALL_PAGE, physaddr_vsyscall, PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR); set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir); } + if (vsyscall_mode == XONLY) + gate_vma.vm_flags = VM_EXEC; + BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) != (unsigned long)VSYSCALL_ADDR); } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h index b986b2ca688a..ab60a71a8dcb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vsyscall.h @@ -13,10 +13,12 @@ extern void set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(pgd_t *root); * Called on instruction fetch fault in vsyscall page. * Returns true if handled. */ -extern bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address); +extern bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code, + struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address); #else static inline void map_vsyscall(void) {} -static inline bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) +static inline bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code, + struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address) { return false; } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 46df4c6aae46..58e4f1f00bbc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -710,6 +710,10 @@ static void set_signal_archinfo(unsigned long address, * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page * table layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to * kernel addresses are always protection faults. + * + * NB: This means that failed vsyscalls with vsyscall=none + * will have the PROT bit. This doesn't leak any + * information and does not appear to cause any problems. */ if (address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) error_code |= X86_PF_PROT; @@ -1369,16 +1373,18 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* - * Instruction fetch faults in the vsyscall page might need - * emulation. The vsyscall page is at a high address - * (>PAGE_OFFSET), but is considered to be part of the user - * address space. + * Faults in the vsyscall page might need emulation. The + * vsyscall page is at a high address (>PAGE_OFFSET), but is + * considered to be part of the user address space. * * The vsyscall page does not have a "real" VMA, so do this * emulation before we go searching for VMAs. + * + * PKRU never rejects instruction fetches, so we don't need + * to consider the PF_PK bit. */ - if ((hw_error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) && is_vsyscall_vaddr(address)) { - if (emulate_vsyscall(regs, address)) + if (is_vsyscall_vaddr(address)) { + if (emulate_vsyscall(hw_error_code, regs, address)) return; } #endif |