x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation

commit 553a5c03e90a6087e88f8ff878335ef0621536fb upstream

The Gather Data Sampling (GDS) vulnerability allows malicious software
to infer stale data previously stored in vector registers. This may
include sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. GDS is mitigated in
microcode, and systems with up-to-date microcode are protected by
default. However, any affected system that is running with older
microcode will still be vulnerable to GDS attacks.

Since the gather instructions used by the attacker are part of the
AVX2 and AVX512 extensions, disabling these extensions prevents gather
instructions from being executed, thereby mitigating the system from
GDS. Disabling AVX2 is sufficient, but we don't have the granularity
to do this. The XCR0[2] disables AVX, with no option to just disable
AVX2.

Add a kernel parameter gather_data_sampling=force that will enable the
microcode mitigation if available, otherwise it will disable AVX on
affected systems.

This option will be ignored if cmdline mitigations=off.

This is a *big* hammer.  It is known to break buggy userspace that
uses incomplete, buggy AVX enumeration.  Unfortunately, such userspace
does exist in the wild:

	https://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg33046.html

[ dhansen: add some more ominous warnings about disabling AVX ]

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 19 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 62e67922d340..9de9b61cbb71 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse_cmdline);
 enum gds_mitigations {
 	GDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
 	GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE,
 	GDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
 	GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED,
 	GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
@@ -662,6 +663,7 @@ static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL
 static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
 	[GDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
 	[GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+	[GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE]		= "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode",
 	[GDS_MITIGATION_FULL]		= "Mitigation: Microcode",
 	[GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED]	= "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)",
 	[GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR]	= "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
@@ -687,6 +689,7 @@ void update_gds_msr(void)
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
 		mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS;
 		break;
+	case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE:
 	case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
 	case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR:
 		return;
@@ -721,10 +724,23 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
 
 	/* No microcode */
 	if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
-		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+		if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
+			/*
+			 * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
+			 * here rather than in update_gds_msr()
+			 */
+			setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX);
+			pr_warn("Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation.\n");
+		} else {
+			gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+		}
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	/* Microcode has mitigation, use it */
+	if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE)
+		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
 	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
 	if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) {
 		if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
@@ -755,6 +771,8 @@ static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 
 	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
 		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "force"))
+		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
 
 	return 0;
 }