diff options
author | Vitaly Chikunov | 2019-04-11 18:51:15 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Herbert Xu | 2019-04-18 22:15:02 +0800 |
commit | c7381b01287240abe942a081729203e26782d981 (patch) | |
tree | f70bd59c5b8b110b9116d1660d5fe03033ed3596 /crypto | |
parent | 3ecc97259934489e7e03cbeb1d70f6a23cccb3ae (diff) |
crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.
Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 34 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 34 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 29 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/testmgr.c | 50 |
4 files changed, 69 insertions, 78 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c index 5d4c270463f6..4e5b6fb57a94 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c @@ -744,12 +744,11 @@ static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key, struct crypto_wait cwait; struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; struct akcipher_request *req; - struct scatterlist sig_sg, digest_sg; + struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; uint8_t der_pub_key[PUB_KEY_BUF_SIZE]; uint32_t der_pub_key_len; - void *output; - unsigned int outlen; + void *digest; int ret; pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); @@ -782,35 +781,22 @@ static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key, goto error_free_tfm; ret = -ENOMEM; - outlen = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); - output = kmalloc(outlen, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!output) + digest = kmemdup(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) goto error_free_req; - sg_init_one(&sig_sg, sig->s, sig->s_size); - sg_init_one(&digest_sg, output, outlen); - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sig_sg, &digest_sg, sig->s_size, - outlen); + sg_init_table(src_sg, 2); + sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size); + sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], digest, sig->digest_size); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, + sig->digest_size); crypto_init_wait(&cwait); akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, crypto_req_done, &cwait); - - /* Perform the verification calculation. This doesn't actually do the - * verification, but rather calculates the hash expected by the - * signature and returns that to us. - */ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait); - if (ret) - goto out_free_output; - - /* Do the actual verification step. */ - if (req->dst_len != sig->digest_size || - memcmp(sig->digest, output, sig->digest_size) != 0) - ret = -EKEYREJECTED; -out_free_output: - kfree(output); + kfree(digest); error_free_req: akcipher_request_free(req); error_free_tfm: diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index f5d85b47fcc6..0c069fe8a59c 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -227,10 +227,9 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, struct crypto_wait cwait; struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; struct akcipher_request *req; - struct scatterlist sig_sg, digest_sg; + struct scatterlist src_sg[2]; char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; - void *output; - unsigned int outlen; + void *digest; int ret; pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); @@ -264,35 +263,22 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey, goto error_free_req; ret = -ENOMEM; - outlen = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); - output = kmalloc(outlen, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!output) + digest = kmemdup(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) goto error_free_req; - sg_init_one(&sig_sg, sig->s, sig->s_size); - sg_init_one(&digest_sg, output, outlen); - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sig_sg, &digest_sg, sig->s_size, - outlen); + sg_init_table(src_sg, 2); + sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size); + sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], digest, sig->digest_size); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size, + sig->digest_size); crypto_init_wait(&cwait); akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, crypto_req_done, &cwait); - - /* Perform the verification calculation. This doesn't actually do the - * verification, but rather calculates the hash expected by the - * signature and returns that to us. - */ ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait); - if (ret) - goto out_free_output; - - /* Do the actual verification step. */ - if (req->dst_len != sig->digest_size || - memcmp(sig->digest, output, sig->digest_size) != 0) - ret = -EKEYREJECTED; -out_free_output: - kfree(output); + kfree(digest); error_free_req: akcipher_request_free(req); error_free_tfm: diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c index 94382fa2c6ac..29c336068dc0 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c @@ -488,14 +488,21 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) err = 0; - if (req->dst_len < dst_len - pos) - err = -EOVERFLOW; - req->dst_len = dst_len - pos; - - if (!err) - sg_copy_from_buffer(req->dst, - sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->dst_len), - out_buf + pos, req->dst_len); + if (req->dst_len != dst_len - pos) { + err = -EKEYREJECTED; + req->dst_len = dst_len - pos; + goto done; + } + /* Extract appended digest. */ + sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src, + sg_nents_for_len(req->src, + req->src_len + req->dst_len), + req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, + req->dst_len, ctx->key_size); + /* Do the actual verification step. */ + if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos, + req->dst_len) != 0) + err = -EKEYREJECTED; done: kzfree(req_ctx->out_buf); @@ -532,10 +539,12 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req); int err; - if (!ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size) + if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || + WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) || + !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size) return -EINVAL; - req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size, GFP_KERNEL); + req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!req_ctx->out_buf) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c index 0f6bfb6ce6a4..21b27996508a 100644 --- a/crypto/testmgr.c +++ b/crypto/testmgr.c @@ -2595,7 +2595,7 @@ static int test_akcipher_one(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, struct crypto_wait wait; unsigned int out_len_max, out_len = 0; int err = -ENOMEM; - struct scatterlist src, dst, src_tab[2]; + struct scatterlist src, dst, src_tab[3]; const char *m, *c; unsigned int m_size, c_size; const char *op; @@ -2618,13 +2618,12 @@ static int test_akcipher_one(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, if (err) goto free_req; - err = -ENOMEM; - out_len_max = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); - /* * First run test which do not require a private key, such as * encrypt or verify. */ + err = -ENOMEM; + out_len_max = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); outbuf_enc = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL); if (!outbuf_enc) goto free_req; @@ -2650,12 +2649,20 @@ static int test_akcipher_one(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, goto free_all; memcpy(xbuf[0], m, m_size); - sg_init_table(src_tab, 2); + sg_init_table(src_tab, 3); sg_set_buf(&src_tab[0], xbuf[0], 8); sg_set_buf(&src_tab[1], xbuf[0] + 8, m_size - 8); - sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_enc, out_len_max); - akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, &dst, m_size, - out_len_max); + if (vecs->siggen_sigver_test) { + if (WARN_ON(c_size > PAGE_SIZE)) + goto free_all; + memcpy(xbuf[1], c, c_size); + sg_set_buf(&src_tab[2], xbuf[1], c_size); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, NULL, m_size, c_size); + } else { + sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_enc, out_len_max); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, &dst, m_size, + out_len_max); + } akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, crypto_req_done, &wait); @@ -2668,18 +2675,21 @@ static int test_akcipher_one(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. err %d\n", op, err); goto free_all; } - if (req->dst_len != c_size) { - pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output len\n", - op); - err = -EINVAL; - goto free_all; - } - /* verify that encrypted message is equal to expected */ - if (memcmp(c, outbuf_enc, c_size)) { - pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output\n", op); - hexdump(outbuf_enc, c_size); - err = -EINVAL; - goto free_all; + if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test) { + if (req->dst_len != c_size) { + pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output len\n", + op); + err = -EINVAL; + goto free_all; + } + /* verify that encrypted message is equal to expected */ + if (memcmp(c, outbuf_enc, c_size) != 0) { + pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output\n", + op); + hexdump(outbuf_enc, c_size); + err = -EINVAL; + goto free_all; + } } /* |