diff options
| author | Darrick J. Wong | 2019-10-30 20:29:48 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jens Axboe | 2019-11-01 08:43:20 -0600 |
| commit | efcfec579f6139528c9e6925eca2bc4a36da65c6 (patch) | |
| tree | fcb52fe28df557856d7d4f78204d8952f85a9693 /drivers/block | |
| parent | a4414aedf4bc923c1faa24d72d14f14c2b93e48f (diff) | |
loop: fix no-unmap write-zeroes request behavior
Currently, if the loop device receives a WRITE_ZEROES request, it asks
the underlying filesystem to punch out the range. This behavior is
correct if unmapping is allowed. However, a NOUNMAP request means that
the caller doesn't want us to free the storage backing the range, so
punching out the range is incorrect behavior.
To satisfy a NOUNMAP | WRITE_ZEROES request, loop should ask the
underlying filesystem to FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE, which is (according to
the fallocate documentation) required to ensure that the entire range is
backed by real storage, which suffices for our purposes.
Fixes: 19372e2769179dd ("loop: implement REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/block')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/block/loop.c | 26 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/block/loop.c b/drivers/block/loop.c index f6f77eaa7217..ef6e251857c8 100644 --- a/drivers/block/loop.c +++ b/drivers/block/loop.c @@ -417,18 +417,20 @@ out_free_page: return ret; } -static int lo_discard(struct loop_device *lo, struct request *rq, loff_t pos) +static int lo_fallocate(struct loop_device *lo, struct request *rq, loff_t pos, + int mode) { /* - * We use punch hole to reclaim the free space used by the - * image a.k.a. discard. However we do not support discard if - * encryption is enabled, because it may give an attacker - * useful information. + * We use fallocate to manipulate the space mappings used by the image + * a.k.a. discard/zerorange. However we do not support this if + * encryption is enabled, because it may give an attacker useful + * information. */ struct file *file = lo->lo_backing_file; - int mode = FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE; int ret; + mode |= FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE; + if ((!file->f_op->fallocate) || lo->lo_encrypt_key_size) { ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; goto out; @@ -596,9 +598,17 @@ static int do_req_filebacked(struct loop_device *lo, struct request *rq) switch (req_op(rq)) { case REQ_OP_FLUSH: return lo_req_flush(lo, rq); - case REQ_OP_DISCARD: case REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES: - return lo_discard(lo, rq, pos); + /* + * If the caller doesn't want deallocation, call zeroout to + * write zeroes the range. Otherwise, punch them out. + */ + return lo_fallocate(lo, rq, pos, + (rq->cmd_flags & REQ_NOUNMAP) ? + FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE : + FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE); + case REQ_OP_DISCARD: + return lo_fallocate(lo, rq, pos, FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE); case REQ_OP_WRITE: if (lo->transfer) return lo_write_transfer(lo, rq, pos); |