Merge tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull EFI updates from Borislav Petkov:
 "These got delayed due to a last minute ia64 build issue which got
  fixed in the meantime.

  EFI updates collected by Ard Biesheuvel:

   - Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor

   - Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode

   - Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64

   - Some fixes for the capsule loader

   - Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module

   - Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM

  with a few followup fixes:

   - fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader
     changes

   - suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
     EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM"

* tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  efi: arm: force use of unsigned type for EFI_PHYS_ALIGN
  efi: ia64: disable the capsule loader
  efi: stub: get rid of efi_get_max_fdt_addr()
  efi/efi_test: read RuntimeServicesSupported
  efi: arm: reduce minimum alignment of uncompressed kernel
  efi: capsule: clean scatter-gather entries from the D-cache
  efi: capsule: use atomic kmap for transient sglist mappings
  efi: x86/xen: switch to efi_get_secureboot_mode helper
  arm64/ima: add ima_arch support
  ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures
  efi: generalize efi_get_secureboot
  efi/libstub: EFI_GENERIC_STUB_INITRD_CMDLINE_LOADER should not default to yes
  efi/x86: Only copy the compressed kernel image in efi_relocate_kernel()
  efi/libstub/x86: simplify efi_is_native()

10 files changed, 61 insertions, 39 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
index d9895491ff34..2c3dac5ecb36 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Kconfig
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ config EFI_ARMSTUB_DTB_LOADER
 config EFI_GENERIC_STUB_INITRD_CMDLINE_LOADER
 	bool "Enable the command line initrd loader" if !X86
 	depends on EFI_STUB && (EFI_GENERIC_STUB || X86)
-	default y
+	default y if X86
 	depends on !RISCV
 	help
 	  Select this config option to add support for the initrd= command
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ config EFI_BOOTLOADER_CONTROL
 
 config EFI_CAPSULE_LOADER
 	tristate "EFI capsule loader"
-	depends on EFI
+	depends on EFI && !IA64
 	help
 	  This option exposes a loader interface "/dev/efi_capsule_loader" for
 	  users to load EFI capsules. This driver requires working runtime
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
index d6ca2da19339..467e94259679 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile
@@ -12,7 +12,10 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_runtime-wrappers.o	:= n
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT) 		+= efi-bgrt.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= efi.o vars.o reboot.o memattr.o tpm.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= capsule.o memmap.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= memmap.o
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_LOADER),)
+obj-$(CONFIG_EFI)			+= capsule.o
+endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_PARAMS_FROM_FDT)	+= fdtparams.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_VARS)			+= efivars.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_ESRT)			+= esrt.o
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c
index 598b7800d14e..768430293669 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/efi.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ int efi_capsule_update(efi_capsule_header_t *capsule, phys_addr_t *pages)
 	for (i = 0; i < sg_count; i++) {
 		efi_capsule_block_desc_t *sglist;
 
-		sglist = kmap(sg_pages[i]);
+		sglist = kmap_atomic(sg_pages[i]);
 
 		for (j = 0; j < SGLIST_PER_PAGE && count > 0; j++) {
 			u64 sz = min_t(u64, imagesize,
@@ -265,7 +266,18 @@ int efi_capsule_update(efi_capsule_header_t *capsule, phys_addr_t *pages)
 		else
 			sglist[j].data = page_to_phys(sg_pages[i + 1]);
 
-		kunmap(sg_pages[i]);
+#if defined(CONFIG_ARM) || defined(CONFIG_ARM64)
+		/*
+		 * At runtime, the firmware has no way to find out where the
+		 * sglist elements are mapped, if they are mapped in the first
+		 * place. Therefore, on architectures that can only perform
+		 * cache maintenance by virtual address, the firmware is unable
+		 * to perform this maintenance, and so it is up to the OS to do
+		 * it instead.
+		 */
+		efi_capsule_flush_cache_range(sglist, PAGE_SIZE);
+#endif
+		kunmap_atomic(sglist);
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&capsule_mutex);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c
index 914a343c7785..ec2f3985bef3 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c
@@ -273,7 +273,6 @@ efi_status_t __efiapi efi_pe_entry(efi_handle_t handle,
 	install_memreserve_table();
 
 	status = allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(handle, &fdt_addr,
-						efi_get_max_fdt_addr(image_addr),
 						initrd_addr, initrd_size,
 						cmdline_ptr, fdt_addr, fdt_size);
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
index 2d7abcd99de9..b50a6c67d9bd 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h
@@ -750,7 +750,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_exit_boot_services(void *handle,
 
 efi_status_t allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(void *handle,
 					    unsigned long *new_fdt_addr,
-					    unsigned long max_addr,
 					    u64 initrd_addr, u64 initrd_size,
 					    char *cmdline_ptr,
 					    unsigned long fdt_addr,
@@ -848,4 +847,6 @@ asmlinkage void __noreturn efi_enter_kernel(unsigned long entrypoint,
 
 void efi_handle_post_ebs_state(void);
 
+enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
index 368cd60000ee..365c3a43a198 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c
@@ -238,7 +238,6 @@ static efi_status_t exit_boot_func(struct efi_boot_memmap *map,
 
 efi_status_t allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(void *handle,
 					    unsigned long *new_fdt_addr,
-					    unsigned long max_addr,
 					    u64 initrd_addr, u64 initrd_size,
 					    char *cmdline_ptr,
 					    unsigned long fdt_addr,
@@ -275,7 +274,7 @@ efi_status_t allocate_new_fdt_and_exit_boot(void *handle,
 	efi_info("Exiting boot services and installing virtual address map...\n");
 
 	map.map = &memory_map;
-	status = efi_allocate_pages(MAX_FDT_SIZE, new_fdt_addr, max_addr);
+	status = efi_allocate_pages(MAX_FDT_SIZE, new_fdt_addr, ULONG_MAX);
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
 		efi_err("Unable to allocate memory for new device tree.\n");
 		goto fail;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
index 5efc524b14be..8a18930f3eb6 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
@@ -12,44 +12,34 @@
 
 #include "efistub.h"
 
-/* BIOS variables */
-static const efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
-static const efi_char16_t efi_SecureBoot_name[] = L"SecureBoot";
-static const efi_char16_t efi_SetupMode_name[] = L"SetupMode";
-
 /* SHIM variables */
 static const efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
 static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] = L"MokSBState";
 
+static efi_status_t get_var(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor, u32 *attr,
+			    unsigned long *data_size, void *data)
+{
+	return get_efi_var(name, vendor, attr, data_size, data);
+}
+
 /*
  * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
- *
- * Please keep the logic in sync with
- * arch/x86/xen/efi.c:xen_efi_get_secureboot().
  */
 enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)
 {
 	u32 attr;
-	u8 secboot, setupmode, moksbstate;
 	unsigned long size;
+	enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
 	efi_status_t status;
+	u8 moksbstate;
 
-	size = sizeof(secboot);
-	status = get_efi_var(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid,
-			     NULL, &size, &secboot);
-	if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
-		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-		goto out_efi_err;
-
-	size = sizeof(setupmode);
-	status = get_efi_var(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid,
-			     NULL, &size, &setupmode);
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-		goto out_efi_err;
-
-	if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
-		return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+	mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(get_var);
+	if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown) {
+		efi_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+		return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+	}
+	if (mode != efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+		return mode;
 
 	/*
 	 * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the
@@ -69,8 +59,4 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)
 secure_boot_enabled:
 	efi_info("UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
 	return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
-
-out_efi_err:
-	efi_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
-	return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
index 3672539cb96e..f14c4ff5839f 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c
@@ -715,8 +715,11 @@ unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle,
 	    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && buffer_end > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)    ||
 	    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && buffer_end > MAXMEM_X86_64_4LEVEL) ||
 	    (image_offset == 0)) {
+		extern char _bss[];
+
 		status = efi_relocate_kernel(&bzimage_addr,
-					     hdr->init_size, hdr->init_size,
+					     (unsigned long)_bss - bzimage_addr,
+					     hdr->init_size,
 					     hdr->pref_address,
 					     hdr->kernel_alignment,
 					     LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c
index ddf9eae396fe..47d67bb0a516 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.c
@@ -663,6 +663,19 @@ out:
 	return rv;
 }
 
+static long efi_runtime_get_supported_mask(unsigned long arg)
+{
+	unsigned int __user *supported_mask;
+	int rv = 0;
+
+	supported_mask = (unsigned int *)arg;
+
+	if (put_user(efi.runtime_supported_mask, supported_mask))
+		rv = -EFAULT;
+
+	return rv;
+}
+
 static long efi_test_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 							unsigned long arg)
 {
@@ -699,6 +712,9 @@ static long efi_test_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 
 	case EFI_RUNTIME_RESET_SYSTEM:
 		return efi_runtime_reset_system(arg);
+
+	case EFI_RUNTIME_GET_SUPPORTED_MASK:
+		return efi_runtime_get_supported_mask(arg);
 	}
 
 	return -ENOTTY;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.h
index f2446aa1c2e3..117349e57993 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/test/efi_test.h
@@ -118,4 +118,7 @@ struct efi_resetsystem {
 #define EFI_RUNTIME_RESET_SYSTEM \
 	_IOW('p', 0x0B, struct efi_resetsystem)
 
+#define EFI_RUNTIME_GET_SUPPORTED_MASK \
+	_IOR('p', 0x0C, unsigned int)
+
 #endif /* _DRIVERS_FIRMWARE_EFI_TEST_H_ */