diff options
author | Artem Bityutskiy | 2010-10-29 08:34:50 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Artem Bityutskiy | 2011-02-06 19:19:41 +0200 |
commit | fef2deb31f6523203a3fa1af485a5f1fef19cf6b (patch) | |
tree | d29f44eeb247b72329e0e16e19399dd4b83e5e26 /drivers/mtd/ubi | |
parent | 6c1e875ca6f3a47b40dce715bd07fdfdb8388d55 (diff) |
UBI: cleanup comments about corrupted PEBs
Just make them a bit more readable and explanatory.
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <Artem.Bityutskiy@nokia.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/mtd/ubi')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/mtd/ubi/scan.c | 54 |
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/ubi/scan.c b/drivers/mtd/ubi/scan.c index 0028bf283930..b65cc088fde5 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/ubi/scan.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/ubi/scan.c @@ -39,32 +39,46 @@ * eraseblocks are put to the @free list and the physical eraseblock to be * erased are put to the @erase list. * + * About corruptions + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + * + * UBI protects EC and VID headers with CRC-32 checksums, so it can detect + * whether the headers are corrupted or not. Sometimes UBI also protects the + * data with CRC-32, e.g., when it executes the atomic LEB change operation, or + * when it moves the contents of a PEB for wear-leveling purposes. + * * UBI tries to distinguish between 2 types of corruptions. - * 1. Corruptions caused by power cuts. These are harmless and expected - * corruptions and UBI tries to handle them gracefully, without printing too - * many warnings and error messages. The idea is that we do not lose - * important data in these case - we may lose only the data which was being - * written to the media just before the power cut happened, and the upper - * layers (e.g., UBIFS) are supposed to handle these situations. UBI puts - * these PEBs to the head of the @erase list and they are scheduled for - * erasure. + * + * 1. Corruptions caused by power cuts. These are expected corruptions and UBI + * tries to handle them gracefully, without printing too many warnings and + * error messages. The idea is that we do not lose important data in these case + * - we may lose only the data which was being written to the media just before + * the power cut happened, and the upper layers (e.g., UBIFS) are supposed to + * handle such data losses (e.g., by using the FS journal). + * + * When UBI detects a corruption (CRC-32 mismatch) in a PEB, and it looks like + * the reason is a power cut, UBI puts this PEB to the @erase list, and all + * PEBs in the @erase list are scheduled for erasure later. * * 2. Unexpected corruptions which are not caused by power cuts. During - * scanning, such PEBs are put to the @corr list and UBI preserves them. - * Obviously, this lessens the amount of available PEBs, and if at some - * point UBI runs out of free PEBs, it switches to R/O mode. UBI also loudly - * informs about such PEBs every time the MTD device is attached. + * scanning, such PEBs are put to the @corr list and UBI preserves them. + * Obviously, this lessens the amount of available PEBs, and if at some point + * UBI runs out of free PEBs, it switches to R/O mode. UBI also loudly informs + * about such PEBs every time the MTD device is attached. * * However, it is difficult to reliably distinguish between these types of - * corruptions and UBI's strategy is as follows. UBI assumes (2.) if the VID - * header is corrupted and the data area does not contain all 0xFFs, and there - * were not bit-flips or integrity errors while reading the data area. Otherwise - * UBI assumes (1.). The assumptions are: - * o if the data area contains only 0xFFs, there is no data, and it is safe - * to just erase this PEB. - * o if the data area has bit-flips and data integrity errors (ECC errors on + * corruptions and UBI's strategy is as follows. UBI assumes corruption type 2 + * if the VID header is corrupted and the data area does not contain all 0xFFs, + * and there were no bit-flips or integrity errors while reading the data area. + * Otherwise UBI assumes corruption type 1. So the decision criteria are as + * follows. + * o If the data area contains only 0xFFs, there is no data, and it is safe + * to just erase this PEB - this is corruption type 1. + * o If the data area has bit-flips or data integrity errors (ECC errors on * NAND), it is probably a PEB which was being erased when power cut - * happened. + * happened, so this is corruption type 1. However, this is just a guess, + * which might be wrong. + * o Otherwise this it corruption type 2. */ #include <linux/err.h> |