diff options
author | Marcin Kozlowski | 2022-04-06 10:05:37 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller | 2022-04-06 15:22:49 +0100 |
commit | afb8e246527536848b9b4025b40e613edf776a9d (patch) | |
tree | bba65f00616ac85cf4ab5c512261802781d2fd7e /drivers/net | |
parent | 4e910dbe36508654a896d5735b318c0b88172570 (diff) |
net: usb: aqc111: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup
aqc111_rx_fixup() contains several out-of-bounds accesses that can be
triggered by a malicious (or defective) USB device, in particular:
- The metadata array (desc_offset..desc_offset+2*pkt_count) can be out of bounds,
causing OOB reads and (on big-endian systems) OOB endianness flips.
- A packet can overlap the metadata array, causing a later OOB
endianness flip to corrupt data used by a cloned SKB that has already
been handed off into the network stack.
- A packet SKB can be constructed whose tail is far beyond its end,
causing out-of-bounds heap data to be considered part of the SKB's
data.
Found doing variant analysis. Tested it with another driver (ax88179_178a), since
I don't have a aqc111 device to test it, but the code looks very similar.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Kozlowski <marcinguy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c b/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c index ea06d10e1c21..ca409d450a29 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c @@ -1102,10 +1102,15 @@ static int aqc111_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) if (start_of_descs != desc_offset) goto err; - /* self check desc_offset from header*/ - if (desc_offset >= skb_len) + /* self check desc_offset from header and make sure that the + * bounds of the metadata array are inside the SKB + */ + if (pkt_count * 2 + desc_offset >= skb_len) goto err; + /* Packets must not overlap the metadata array */ + skb_trim(skb, desc_offset); + if (pkt_count == 0) goto err; |