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authorJuergen Gross2018-12-18 16:06:19 +0100
committerDavid S. Miller2018-12-18 21:59:20 -0800
commitd81c5054a5d1d4999c7cdead7636b6cd4af83d36 (patch)
treea71c61affa5fb01ed77eab347654f4b29f9384b3 /drivers/net
parent8742beb50f2db903d3b6d69ddd81d67ce9914453 (diff)
xen/netfront: tolerate frags with no data
At least old Xen net backends seem to send frags with no real data sometimes. In case such a fragment happens to occur with the frag limit already reached the frontend will BUG currently even if this situation is easily recoverable. Modify the BUG_ON() condition accordingly. Tested-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net')
-rw-r--r--drivers/net/xen-netfront.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index f17f602e6171..5b97cc946d70 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
unsigned int pull_to = NETFRONT_SKB_CB(skb)->pull_to;
- BUG_ON(pull_to <= skb_headlen(skb));
+ BUG_ON(pull_to < skb_headlen(skb));
__pskb_pull_tail(skb, pull_to - skb_headlen(skb));
}
if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {