diff options
| author | Juergen Gross | 2018-12-18 16:06:19 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller | 2018-12-18 21:59:20 -0800 |
| commit | d81c5054a5d1d4999c7cdead7636b6cd4af83d36 (patch) | |
| tree | a71c61affa5fb01ed77eab347654f4b29f9384b3 /drivers/net | |
| parent | 8742beb50f2db903d3b6d69ddd81d67ce9914453 (diff) | |
xen/netfront: tolerate frags with no data
At least old Xen net backends seem to send frags with no real data
sometimes. In case such a fragment happens to occur with the frag limit
already reached the frontend will BUG currently even if this situation
is easily recoverable.
Modify the BUG_ON() condition accordingly.
Tested-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c index f17f602e6171..5b97cc946d70 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue, if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) { unsigned int pull_to = NETFRONT_SKB_CB(skb)->pull_to; - BUG_ON(pull_to <= skb_headlen(skb)); + BUG_ON(pull_to < skb_headlen(skb)); __pskb_pull_tail(skb, pull_to - skb_headlen(skb)); } if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) { |