virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver

The SEV-SNP specification provides the guest a mechanism to communicate
with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to
read, alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver uses
snp_issue_guest_request() to issue GHCB SNP_GUEST_REQUEST or
SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST NAE events to submit the request to PSP.

The PSP requires that all communication should be encrypted using key
specified through a struct snp_guest_platform_data descriptor.

Userspace can use SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl() to query the guest attestation
report.

See SEV-SNP spec section Guest Messages for more details.

  [ bp: Remove the "what" from the commit message, massage. ]

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-44-brijesh.singh@amd.com

6 files changed, 725 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/virt/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/Kconfig
index 121b9293c737..7d3273cfab27 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/virt/Kconfig
@@ -47,4 +47,7 @@ source "drivers/virt/vboxguest/Kconfig"
 source "drivers/virt/nitro_enclaves/Kconfig"
 
 source "drivers/virt/acrn/Kconfig"
+
+source "drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig"
+
 endif
diff --git a/drivers/virt/Makefile b/drivers/virt/Makefile
index 108d0ffcc9aa..7b87a7ba1972 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/virt/Makefile
@@ -9,3 +9,4 @@ obj-y				+= vboxguest/
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_NITRO_ENCLAVES)	+= nitro_enclaves/
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_HSM)		+= acrn/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST)		+= coco/sevguest/
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..74ca1fe09437
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+config SEV_GUEST
+	tristate "AMD SEV Guest driver"
+	default m
+	depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	select CRYPTO_AEAD2
+	select CRYPTO_GCM
+	help
+	  SEV-SNP firmware provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with
+	  the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read,
+	  alter, drop or replay the messages sent. The driver provides
+	  userspace interface to communicate with the PSP to request the
+	  attestation report and more.
+
+	  If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called sevguest.
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b1ffb2b4177b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST) += sevguest.o
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..beda93cdeb4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,607 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) guest request interface
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SNP: GUEST: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/psp-sev.h>
+
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
+
+#include "sevguest.h"
+
+#define DEVICE_NAME	"sev-guest"
+#define AAD_LEN		48
+#define MSG_HDR_VER	1
+
+struct snp_guest_crypto {
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+	u8 *iv, *authtag;
+	int iv_len, a_len;
+};
+
+struct snp_guest_dev {
+	struct device *dev;
+	struct miscdevice misc;
+
+	struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto;
+	struct snp_guest_msg *request, *response;
+	struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;
+	struct snp_req_data input;
+	u32 *os_area_msg_seqno;
+	u8 *vmpck;
+};
+
+static u32 vmpck_id;
+module_param(vmpck_id, uint, 0444);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP.");
+
+/* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_cmd_mutex);
+
+static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+{
+	char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0};
+
+	if (snp_dev->vmpck)
+		return !memcmp(snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+{
+	memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
+	snp_dev->vmpck = NULL;
+}
+
+static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+{
+	u64 count;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+
+	/* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */
+	count = *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno;
+
+	return count + 1;
+}
+
+/* Return a non-zero on success */
+static u64 snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+{
+	u64 count = __snp_get_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
+
+	/*
+	 * The message sequence counter for the SNP guest request is a  64-bit
+	 * value but the version 2 of GHCB specification defines a 32-bit storage
+	 * for it. If the counter exceeds the 32-bit value then return zero.
+	 * The caller should check the return value, but if the caller happens to
+	 * not check the value and use it, then the firmware treats zero as an
+	 * invalid number and will fail the  message request.
+	 */
+	if (count >= UINT_MAX) {
+		dev_err(snp_dev->dev, "request message sequence counter overflow\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static void snp_inc_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The counter is also incremented by the PSP, so increment it by 2
+	 * and save in secrets page.
+	 */
+	*snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno += 2;
+}
+
+static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct miscdevice *dev = file->private_data;
+
+	return container_of(dev, struct snp_guest_dev, misc);
+}
+
+static struct snp_guest_crypto *init_crypto(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u8 *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto;
+
+	crypto = kzalloc(sizeof(*crypto), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!crypto)
+		return NULL;
+
+	crypto->tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(crypto->tfm))
+		goto e_free;
+
+	if (crypto_aead_setkey(crypto->tfm, key, keylen))
+		goto e_free_crypto;
+
+	crypto->iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(crypto->tfm);
+	crypto->iv = kmalloc(crypto->iv_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!crypto->iv)
+		goto e_free_crypto;
+
+	if (crypto_aead_authsize(crypto->tfm) > MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN) {
+		if (crypto_aead_setauthsize(crypto->tfm, MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN)) {
+			dev_err(snp_dev->dev, "failed to set authsize to %d\n", MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN);
+			goto e_free_iv;
+		}
+	}
+
+	crypto->a_len = crypto_aead_authsize(crypto->tfm);
+	crypto->authtag = kmalloc(crypto->a_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!crypto->authtag)
+		goto e_free_auth;
+
+	return crypto;
+
+e_free_auth:
+	kfree(crypto->authtag);
+e_free_iv:
+	kfree(crypto->iv);
+e_free_crypto:
+	crypto_free_aead(crypto->tfm);
+e_free:
+	kfree(crypto);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void deinit_crypto(struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto)
+{
+	crypto_free_aead(crypto->tfm);
+	kfree(crypto->iv);
+	kfree(crypto->authtag);
+	kfree(crypto);
+}
+
+static int enc_dec_message(struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto, struct snp_guest_msg *msg,
+			   u8 *src_buf, u8 *dst_buf, size_t len, bool enc)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr;
+	struct scatterlist src[3], dst[3];
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+	struct aead_request *req;
+	int ret;
+
+	req = aead_request_alloc(crypto->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * AEAD memory operations:
+	 * +------ AAD -------+------- DATA -----+---- AUTHTAG----+
+	 * |  msg header      |  plaintext       |  hdr->authtag  |
+	 * | bytes 30h - 5Fh  |    or            |                |
+	 * |                  |   cipher         |                |
+	 * +------------------+------------------+----------------+
+	 */
+	sg_init_table(src, 3);
+	sg_set_buf(&src[0], &hdr->algo, AAD_LEN);
+	sg_set_buf(&src[1], src_buf, hdr->msg_sz);
+	sg_set_buf(&src[2], hdr->authtag, crypto->a_len);
+
+	sg_init_table(dst, 3);
+	sg_set_buf(&dst[0], &hdr->algo, AAD_LEN);
+	sg_set_buf(&dst[1], dst_buf, hdr->msg_sz);
+	sg_set_buf(&dst[2], hdr->authtag, crypto->a_len);
+
+	aead_request_set_ad(req, AAD_LEN);
+	aead_request_set_tfm(req, crypto->tfm);
+	aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+	aead_request_set_crypt(req, src, dst, len, crypto->iv);
+	ret = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
+
+	aead_request_free(req);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_msg *msg,
+			 void *plaintext, size_t len)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
+	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr;
+
+	memset(crypto->iv, 0, crypto->iv_len);
+	memcpy(crypto->iv, &hdr->msg_seqno, sizeof(hdr->msg_seqno));
+
+	return enc_dec_message(crypto, msg, plaintext, msg->payload, len, true);
+}
+
+static int dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_msg *msg,
+		       void *plaintext, size_t len)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
+	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &msg->hdr;
+
+	/* Build IV with response buffer sequence number */
+	memset(crypto->iv, 0, crypto->iv_len);
+	memcpy(crypto->iv, &hdr->msg_seqno, sizeof(hdr->msg_seqno));
+
+	return enc_dec_message(crypto, msg, msg->payload, plaintext, len, false);
+}
+
+static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload, u32 sz)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
+	struct snp_guest_msg *resp = snp_dev->response;
+	struct snp_guest_msg *req = snp_dev->request;
+	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *req_hdr = &req->hdr;
+	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *resp_hdr = &resp->hdr;
+
+	dev_dbg(snp_dev->dev, "response [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n",
+		resp_hdr->msg_seqno, resp_hdr->msg_type, resp_hdr->msg_version, resp_hdr->msg_sz);
+
+	/* Verify that the sequence counter is incremented by 1 */
+	if (unlikely(resp_hdr->msg_seqno != (req_hdr->msg_seqno + 1)))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	/* Verify response message type and version number. */
+	if (resp_hdr->msg_type != (req_hdr->msg_type + 1) ||
+	    resp_hdr->msg_version != req_hdr->msg_version)
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the message size is greater than our buffer length then return
+	 * an error.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely((resp_hdr->msg_sz + crypto->a_len) > sz))
+		return -EBADMSG;
+
+	/* Decrypt the payload */
+	return dec_payload(snp_dev, resp, payload, resp_hdr->msg_sz + crypto->a_len);
+}
+
+static bool enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8 type,
+			void *payload, size_t sz)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_msg *req = snp_dev->request;
+	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *hdr = &req->hdr;
+
+	memset(req, 0, sizeof(*req));
+
+	hdr->algo = SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM;
+	hdr->hdr_version = MSG_HDR_VER;
+	hdr->hdr_sz = sizeof(*hdr);
+	hdr->msg_type = type;
+	hdr->msg_version = version;
+	hdr->msg_seqno = seqno;
+	hdr->msg_vmpck = vmpck_id;
+	hdr->msg_sz = sz;
+
+	/* Verify the sequence number is non-zero */
+	if (!hdr->msg_seqno)
+		return -ENOSR;
+
+	dev_dbg(snp_dev->dev, "request [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n",
+		hdr->msg_seqno, hdr->msg_type, hdr->msg_version, hdr->msg_sz);
+
+	return __enc_payload(snp_dev, req, payload, sz);
+}
+
+static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, int msg_ver,
+				u8 type, void *req_buf, size_t req_sz, void *resp_buf,
+				u32 resp_sz, __u64 *fw_err)
+{
+	unsigned long err;
+	u64 seqno;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Get message sequence and verify that its a non-zero */
+	seqno = snp_get_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
+	if (!seqno)
+		return -EIO;
+
+	memset(snp_dev->response, 0, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
+
+	/* Encrypt the userspace provided payload */
+	rc = enc_payload(snp_dev, seqno, msg_ver, type, req_buf, req_sz);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Call firmware to process the request */
+	rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err);
+	if (fw_err)
+		*fw_err = err;
+
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * The verify_and_dec_payload() will fail only if the hypervisor is
+	 * actively modifying the message header or corrupting the encrypted payload.
+	 * This hints that hypervisor is acting in a bad faith. Disable the VMPCK so that
+	 * the key cannot be used for any communication. The key is disabled to ensure
+	 * that AES-GCM does not use the same IV while encrypting the request payload.
+	 */
+	rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, resp_buf, resp_sz);
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_alert(snp_dev->dev,
+			  "Detected unexpected decode failure, disabling the vmpck_id %d\n",
+			  vmpck_id);
+		snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* Increment to new message sequence after payload decryption was successful. */
+	snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
+	struct snp_report_resp *resp;
+	struct snp_report_req req;
+	int rc, resp_len;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+
+	if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(req)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/*
+	 * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
+	 * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
+	 * authtag.
+	 */
+	resp_len = sizeof(resp->data) + crypto->a_len;
+	resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!resp)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, arg->msg_version,
+				  SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ, &req, sizeof(req), resp->data,
+				  resp_len, &arg->fw_err);
+	if (rc)
+		goto e_free;
+
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, resp, sizeof(*resp)))
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+
+e_free:
+	kfree(resp);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = to_snp_dev(file);
+	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+	struct snp_guest_request_ioctl input;
+	int ret = -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&input, argp, sizeof(input)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	input.fw_err = 0xff;
+
+	/* Message version must be non-zero */
+	if (!input.msg_version)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+
+	/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
+	if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
+		dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n");
+		mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+		return -ENOTTY;
+	}
+
+	switch (ioctl) {
+	case SNP_GET_REPORT:
+		ret = get_report(snp_dev, &input);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+
+	if (input.fw_err && copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(input)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void free_shared_pages(void *buf, size_t sz)
+{
+	unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!buf)
+		return;
+
+	ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)buf, npages);
+	if (ret) {
+		WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	__free_pages(virt_to_page(buf), get_order(sz));
+}
+
+static void *alloc_shared_pages(size_t sz)
+{
+	unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	struct page *page;
+	int ret;
+
+	page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, get_order(sz));
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return NULL;
+
+	ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)page_address(page), npages);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("failed to mark page shared, ret=%d\n", ret);
+		__free_pages(page, get_order(sz));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return page_address(page);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations snp_guest_fops = {
+	.owner	= THIS_MODULE,
+	.unlocked_ioctl = snp_guest_ioctl,
+};
+
+static u8 *get_vmpck(int id, struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout, u32 **seqno)
+{
+	u8 *key = NULL;
+
+	switch (id) {
+	case 0:
+		*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0;
+		key = layout->vmpck0;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_1;
+		key = layout->vmpck1;
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_2;
+		key = layout->vmpck2;
+		break;
+	case 3:
+		*seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_3;
+		key = layout->vmpck3;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return key;
+}
+
+static int __init snp_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;
+	struct snp_guest_platform_data *data;
+	struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
+	struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev;
+	struct miscdevice *misc;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!dev->platform_data)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	data = (struct snp_guest_platform_data *)dev->platform_data;
+	layout = (__force void *)ioremap_encrypted(data->secrets_gpa, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (!layout)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!snp_dev)
+		goto e_unmap;
+
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	snp_dev->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, layout, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno);
+	if (!snp_dev->vmpck) {
+		dev_err(dev, "invalid vmpck id %d\n", vmpck_id);
+		goto e_unmap;
+	}
+
+	/* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */
+	if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "vmpck id %d is null\n", vmpck_id);
+		goto e_unmap;
+	}
+
+	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev);
+	snp_dev->dev = dev;
+	snp_dev->layout = layout;
+
+	/* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */
+	snp_dev->request = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
+	if (!snp_dev->request)
+		goto e_unmap;
+
+	snp_dev->response = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
+	if (!snp_dev->response)
+		goto e_free_request;
+
+	ret = -EIO;
+	snp_dev->crypto = init_crypto(snp_dev, snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
+	if (!snp_dev->crypto)
+		goto e_free_response;
+
+	misc = &snp_dev->misc;
+	misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
+	misc->name = DEVICE_NAME;
+	misc->fops = &snp_guest_fops;
+
+	/* initial the input address for guest request */
+	snp_dev->input.req_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->request);
+	snp_dev->input.resp_gpa = __pa(snp_dev->response);
+
+	ret =  misc_register(misc);
+	if (ret)
+		goto e_free_response;
+
+	dev_info(dev, "Initialized SNP guest driver (using vmpck_id %d)\n", vmpck_id);
+	return 0;
+
+e_free_response:
+	free_shared_pages(snp_dev->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
+e_free_request:
+	free_shared_pages(snp_dev->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
+e_unmap:
+	iounmap(layout);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int __exit snp_guest_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+	struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+
+	free_shared_pages(snp_dev->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
+	free_shared_pages(snp_dev->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
+	deinit_crypto(snp_dev->crypto);
+	misc_deregister(&snp_dev->misc);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct platform_driver snp_guest_driver = {
+	.remove		= __exit_p(snp_guest_remove),
+	.driver		= {
+		.name = "snp-guest",
+	},
+};
+
+module_platform_driver_probe(snp_guest_driver, snp_guest_probe);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_VERSION("1.0.0");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("AMD SNP Guest Driver");
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d39bdd013765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
+ *
+ * SEV-SNP API spec is available at https://developer.amd.com/sev
+ */
+
+#ifndef __VIRT_SEVGUEST_H__
+#define __VIRT_SEVGUEST_H__
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN		32
+
+/* See SNP spec SNP_GUEST_REQUEST section for the structure */
+enum msg_type {
+	SNP_MSG_TYPE_INVALID = 0,
+	SNP_MSG_CPUID_REQ,
+	SNP_MSG_CPUID_RSP,
+	SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ,
+	SNP_MSG_KEY_RSP,
+	SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ,
+	SNP_MSG_REPORT_RSP,
+	SNP_MSG_EXPORT_REQ,
+	SNP_MSG_EXPORT_RSP,
+	SNP_MSG_IMPORT_REQ,
+	SNP_MSG_IMPORT_RSP,
+	SNP_MSG_ABSORB_REQ,
+	SNP_MSG_ABSORB_RSP,
+	SNP_MSG_VMRK_REQ,
+	SNP_MSG_VMRK_RSP,
+
+	SNP_MSG_TYPE_MAX
+};
+
+enum aead_algo {
+	SNP_AEAD_INVALID,
+	SNP_AEAD_AES_256_GCM,
+};
+
+struct snp_guest_msg_hdr {
+	u8 authtag[MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN];
+	u64 msg_seqno;
+	u8 rsvd1[8];
+	u8 algo;
+	u8 hdr_version;
+	u16 hdr_sz;
+	u8 msg_type;
+	u8 msg_version;
+	u16 msg_sz;
+	u32 rsvd2;
+	u8 msg_vmpck;
+	u8 rsvd3[35];
+} __packed;
+
+struct snp_guest_msg {
+	struct snp_guest_msg_hdr hdr;
+	u8 payload[4000];
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * The secrets page contains 96-bytes of reserved field that can be used by
+ * the guest OS. The guest OS uses the area to save the message sequence
+ * number for each VMPCK.
+ *
+ * See the GHCB spec section Secret page layout for the format for this area.
+ */
+struct secrets_os_area {
+	u32 msg_seqno_0;
+	u32 msg_seqno_1;
+	u32 msg_seqno_2;
+	u32 msg_seqno_3;
+	u64 ap_jump_table_pa;
+	u8 rsvd[40];
+	u8 guest_usage[32];
+} __packed;
+
+#define VMPCK_KEY_LEN		32
+
+/* See the SNP spec version 0.9 for secrets page format */
+struct snp_secrets_page_layout {
+	u32 version;
+	u32 imien	: 1,
+	    rsvd1	: 31;
+	u32 fms;
+	u32 rsvd2;
+	u8 gosvw[16];
+	u8 vmpck0[VMPCK_KEY_LEN];
+	u8 vmpck1[VMPCK_KEY_LEN];
+	u8 vmpck2[VMPCK_KEY_LEN];
+	u8 vmpck3[VMPCK_KEY_LEN];
+	struct secrets_os_area os_area;
+	u8 rsvd3[3840];
+} __packed;
+
+#endif /* __VIRT_SEVGUEST_H__ */