diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds | 2019-01-04 12:56:09 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds | 2019-01-04 12:56:09 -0800 |
| commit | 594cc251fdd0d231d342d88b2fdff4bc42fb0690 (patch) | |
| tree | 259269a399e6504a7cf8739201cf172d1cbb197a /drivers | |
| parent | 0b2c8f8b6b0c7530e2866c95862546d0da2057b0 (diff) | |
make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'
Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
direct (optimized) user access.
But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
actually been range-checked.
If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But
nothing really forces the range check.
By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people
trying to avoid them.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c index 55d8f9b8777f..485b259127c3 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_gem_execbuffer.c @@ -1624,7 +1624,9 @@ end_user: * happened we would make the mistake of assuming that the * relocations were valid. */ - user_access_begin(); + if (!user_access_begin(urelocs, size)) + goto end_user; + for (copied = 0; copied < nreloc; copied++) unsafe_put_user(-1, &urelocs[copied].presumed_offset, @@ -2606,7 +2608,16 @@ i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, unsigned int i; /* Copy the new buffer offsets back to the user's exec list. */ - user_access_begin(); + /* + * Note: count * sizeof(*user_exec_list) does not overflow, + * because we checked 'count' in check_buffer_count(). + * + * And this range already got effectively checked earlier + * when we did the "copy_from_user()" above. + */ + if (!user_access_begin(user_exec_list, count * sizeof(*user_exec_list))) + goto end_user; + for (i = 0; i < args->buffer_count; i++) { if (!(exec2_list[i].offset & UPDATE)) continue; |