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authorLinus Torvalds2016-05-19 09:21:36 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds2016-05-19 09:21:36 -0700
commitf4f27d0028aabce57e44c16c2fdefccd6310d2f3 (patch)
tree09f25601316d22b64165c19042da51c101bde3c4 /fs/exec.c
parent2600a46ee0ed57c0e0a382c2a37ebac64d374d20 (diff)
parentb937190c40de0f6f07f592042e3097b16c6b0130 (diff)
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - A new LSM, "LoadPin", from Kees Cook is added, which allows forcing of modules and firmware to be loaded from a specific device (this is from ChromeOS, where the device as a whole is verified cryptographically via dm-verity). This is disabled by default but can be configured to be enabled by default (don't do this if you don't know what you're doing). - Keys: allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key. Lots of general fixes and updates. - SELinux: add restrictions for loading of kernel modules via finit_module(). Distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks. Apply execstack check on thread stacks" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (48 commits) LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG Yama: use atomic allocations when reporting seccomp: Fix comment typo ima: add support for creating files using the mknodat syscall ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr vfs: forbid write access when reading a file into memory fs: fix over-zealous use of "const" selinux: apply execstack check on thread stacks selinux: distinguish non-init user namespace capability checks LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions fs: define a string representation of the kernel_read_file_id enumeration Yama: consolidate error reporting string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_file string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable_cmdline string_helpers: add kstrdup_quotable selinux: check ss_initialized before revalidating an inode label selinux: delay inode label lookup as long as possible selinux: don't revalidate an inode's label when explicitly setting it selinux: Change bool variable name to index. KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command ...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/exec.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c29
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a98b21d47385..e92419fd78b3 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -850,15 +850,25 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
if (ret)
return ret;
+ ret = deny_write_access(file);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
- if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)
- return -EFBIG;
- if (i_size <= 0)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size) {
+ ret = -EFBIG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (i_size <= 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
*buf = vmalloc(i_size);
- if (!*buf)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!*buf) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
pos = 0;
while (pos < i_size) {
@@ -876,18 +886,21 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
if (pos != i_size) {
ret = -EIO;
- goto out;
+ goto out_free;
}
ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
if (!ret)
*size = pos;
-out:
+out_free:
if (ret < 0) {
vfree(*buf);
*buf = NULL;
}
+
+out:
+ allow_write_access(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);