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authorFlorian Westphal2019-03-25 23:11:54 +0100
committerPablo Neira Ayuso2019-04-13 14:52:57 +0200
commit1025ce75212bf06d93910297a03ed6a4d41d8213 (patch)
tree38878fa5efc99fc5e2014706d0266161514edd8f /include
parentbecf2319f320cae43e20cf179cc51a355a0deb5f (diff)
netfilter: conntrack: don't set related state for different outer address
Luca Moro says: ------ The issue lies in the filtering of ICMP and ICMPv6 errors that include an inner IP datagram. For these packets, icmp_error_message() extract the ICMP error and inner layer to search of a known state. If a state is found the packet is tagged as related (IP_CT_RELATED). The problem is that there is no correlation check between the inner and outer layer of the packet. So one can encapsulate an error with an inner layer matching a known state, while its outer layer is directed to a filtered host. In this case the whole packet will be tagged as related. This has various implications from a rule bypass (if a rule to related trafic is allow), to a known state oracle. Unfortunately, we could not find a real statement in a RFC on how this case should be filtered. The closest we found is RFC5927 (Section 4.3) but it is not very clear. A possible fix would be to check that the inner IP source is the same than the outer destination. We believed this kind of attack was not documented yet, so we started to write a blog post about it. You can find it attached to this mail (sorry for the extract quality). It contains more technical details, PoC and discussion about the identified behavior. We discovered later that https://www.gont.com.ar/papers/filtering-of-icmp-error-messages.pdf described a similar attack concept in 2004 but without the stateful filtering in mind. ----- This implements above suggested fix: In icmp(v6) error handler, take outer destination address, then pass that into the common function that does the "related" association. After obtaining the nf_conn of the matching inner-headers connection, check that the destination address of the opposite direction tuple is the same as the outer address and only set RELATED if thats the case. Reported-by: Luca Moro <luca.moro@synacktiv.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r--include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h6
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h
index 778087591983..a49edfdf47e8 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h
@@ -75,6 +75,12 @@ bool nf_conntrack_invert_icmp_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
bool nf_conntrack_invert_icmpv6_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *orig);
+int nf_conntrack_inet_error(struct nf_conn *tmpl, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ unsigned int dataoff,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state,
+ u8 l4proto,
+ union nf_inet_addr *outer_daddr);
+
int nf_conntrack_icmpv4_error(struct nf_conn *tmpl,
struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int dataoff,