diff options
author | Josh Poimboeuf | 2022-02-25 14:32:28 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Borislav Petkov | 2022-03-05 09:30:47 +0100 |
commit | 0de05d056afdb00eca8c7bbb0c79a3438daf700c (patch) | |
tree | 5d7e315e4956d1294428564823b3a0e01fa25609 /kernel/entry | |
parent | eafd987d4a82c7bb5aa12f0e3b4f8f3dea93e678 (diff) |
x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT
The commit
44a3918c8245 ("x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting")
added a warning for the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" combination, which
has been shown to be vulnerable against Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.
However, there's no warning about the "eIBRS + LFENCE retpoline +
unprivileged eBPF" combo. The LFENCE adds more protection by shortening
the speculation window after a mispredicted branch. That makes an attack
significantly more difficult, even with unprivileged eBPF. So at least
for now the logic doesn't warn about that combination.
But if you then add SMT into the mix, the SMT attack angle weakens the
effectiveness of the LFENCE considerably.
So extend the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" warning to also include the
"eIBRS + LFENCE + unprivileged eBPF + SMT" case.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Suggested-by: Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/entry')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions