diff options
| author | Jann Horn | 2016-06-01 11:55:07 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds | 2016-06-10 12:09:43 -0700 |
| commit | 29d6455178a09e1dc340380c582b13356227e8df (patch) | |
| tree | 7bdb5e5a818ab442e8b68213bb9d589fdf7cadf7 /kernel/sched/core.c | |
| parent | 2f36db71009304b3f0b95afacd8eba1f9f046b87 (diff) | |
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
Until now, hitting this BUG_ON caused a recursive oops (because oops
handling involves do_exit(), which calls into the scheduler, which in
turn raises an oops), which caused stuff below the stack to be
overwritten until a panic happened (e.g. via an oops in interrupt
context, caused by the overwritten CPU index in the thread_info).
Just panic directly.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/sched/core.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sched/core.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index d1f7149f8704..11546a6ed5df 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -3047,7 +3047,8 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev) static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev) { #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK - BUG_ON(task_stack_end_corrupted(prev)); + if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev)) + panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n"); #endif if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off())) { |