diff options
| author | Kees Cook | 2013-01-11 14:32:05 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds | 2013-01-11 14:54:55 -0800 |
| commit | 7b9205bd775afc4439ed86d617f9042ee9e76a71 (patch) | |
| tree | cfb91447f15301d7daccc73bda12a63fde6a229d /kernel | |
| parent | 56ca9d98772c68368c929ab41d42108319a38da2 (diff) | |
audit: create explicit AUDIT_SECCOMP event type
The seccomp path was using AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND from when seccomp mode 1
could only kill a process. While we still want to make sure an audit
record is forced on a kill, this should use a separate record type since
seccomp mode 2 introduces other behaviors.
In the case of "handled" behaviors (process wasn't killed), only emit a
record if the process is under inspection. This change also fixes
userspace examination of seccomp audit events, since it was considered
malformed due to missing fields of the AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND event type.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index e37e6a12c5e3..3e46d1dec613 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -2675,7 +2675,7 @@ void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; } -static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr) +static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) { kuid_t auid, uid; kgid_t gid; @@ -2693,6 +2693,11 @@ static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr) audit_log_task_context(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); +} + +static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr) +{ + audit_log_task(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " reason="); audit_log_string(ab, reason); audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); @@ -2723,8 +2728,11 @@ void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); - audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr); + ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); + if (unlikely(!ab)) + return; + audit_log_task(ab); + audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall); audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task()); audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current)); |