diff options
author | Linus Torvalds | 2018-08-15 10:25:26 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds | 2018-08-15 10:25:26 -0700 |
commit | 92d4a03674b8c399c2f547580fa509db78226170 (patch) | |
tree | e5492e0214e31a10a79dbad6135a047f37721fc9 /kernel | |
parent | 1eb46908b35dfbac0ec1848d4b1e39667e0187e9 (diff) | |
parent | 87ea58433208d17295e200d56be5e2a4fe4ce7d6 (diff) |
Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers
- Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of
kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file
descriptor, from Mimi Zohar.
- Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than
just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from
Mimi.
- Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if
using signed firmware), from Mimi.
- Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be
measured by IMA, from Mimi.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()
security: export security_kernel_load_data function
ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)
module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
ima: add build time policy
ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback
ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/kexec.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/module.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 9 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec.c +++ b/kernel/kexec.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/list.h> @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ out: static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, unsigned long flags) { + int result; + /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) return -EPERM; + /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ + result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE); + if (result < 0) + return result; + /* * Verify we have a legal set of flags * This leaves us room for future extensions. diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index f475f30eed8c..a7615d661910 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2876,7 +2876,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr))) return -ENOEXEC; - err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); + err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE); if (err) return err; |