Merge tag 'net-5.16-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski:
 "Networking fixes, including fixes from mac80211, wifi, bpf.

  Relatively large batches of fixes from BPF and the WiFi stack, calm in
  general networking.

  Current release - regressions:

   - dpaa2-eth: fix buffer overrun when reporting ethtool statistics

  Current release - new code bugs:

   - bpf: fix incorrect state pruning for <8B spill/fill

   - iavf:
       - add missing unlocks in iavf_watchdog_task()
       - do not override the adapter state in the watchdog task (again)

   - mlxsw: spectrum_router: consolidate MAC profiles when possible

  Previous releases - regressions:

   - mac80211 fixes:
       - rate control, avoid driver crash for retransmitted frames
       - regression in SSN handling of addba tx
       - a memory leak where sta_info is not freed
       - marking TX-during-stop for TX in in_reconfig, prevent stall

   - cfg80211: acquire wiphy mutex on regulatory work

   - wifi drivers: fix build regressions and LED config dependency

   - virtio_net: fix rx_drops stat for small pkts

   - dsa: mv88e6xxx: unforce speed & duplex in mac_link_down()

  Previous releases - always broken:

   - bpf fixes:
       - kernel address leakage in atomic fetch
       - kernel address leakage in atomic cmpxchg's r0 aux reg
       - signed bounds propagation after mov32
       - extable fixup offset
       - extable address check

   - mac80211:
       - fix the size used for building probe request
       - send ADDBA requests using the tid/queue of the aggregation
         session
       - agg-tx: don't schedule_and_wake_txq() under sta->lock, avoid
         deadlocks
       - validate extended element ID is present

   - mptcp:
       - never allow the PM to close a listener subflow (null-defer)
       - clear 'kern' flag from fallback sockets, prevent crash
       - fix deadlock in __mptcp_push_pending()

   - inet_diag: fix kernel-infoleak for UDP sockets

   - xsk: do not sleep in poll() when need_wakeup set

   - smc: avoid very long waits in smc_release()

   - sch_ets: don't remove idle classes from the round-robin list

   - netdevsim:
       - zero-initialize memory for bpf map's value, prevent info leak
       - don't let user space overwrite read only (max) ethtool parms

   - ixgbe: set X550 MDIO speed before talking to PHY

   - stmmac:
       - fix null-deref in flower deletion w/ VLAN prio Rx steering
       - dwmac-rk: fix oob read in rk_gmac_setup

   - ice: time stamping fixes

   - systemport: add global locking for descriptor life cycle"

* tag 'net-5.16-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (89 commits)
  bpf, selftests: Fix racing issue in btf_skc_cls_ingress test
  selftest/bpf: Add a test that reads various addresses.
  bpf: Fix extable address check.
  bpf: Fix extable fixup offset.
  bpf, selftests: Add test case trying to taint map value pointer
  bpf: Make 32->64 bounds propagation slightly more robust
  bpf: Fix signed bounds propagation after mov32
  sit: do not call ipip6_dev_free() from sit_init_net()
  net: systemport: Add global locking for descriptor lifecycle
  net/smc: Prevent smc_release() from long blocking
  net: Fix double 0x prefix print in SKB dump
  virtio_net: fix rx_drops stat for small pkts
  dsa: mv88e6xxx: fix debug print for SPEED_UNFORCED
  sfc_ef100: potential dereference of null pointer
  net: stmmac: dwmac-rk: fix oob read in rk_gmac_setup
  net: usb: lan78xx: add Allied Telesis AT29M2-AF
  net/packet: rx_owner_map depends on pg_vec
  netdevsim: Zero-initialize memory for new map's value in function nsim_bpf_map_alloc
  dpaa2-eth: fix ethtool statistics
  ixgbe: set X550 MDIO speed before talking to PHY
  ...

1 files changed, 36 insertions, 17 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index f3001937bbb9..b532f1058d35 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1366,22 +1366,28 @@ static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 	reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off);
 }
 
+static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a)
+{
+	return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX;
+}
+
 static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 {
 	reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value;
 	reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value;
-	/* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds
-	 * but must be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds
-	 * and refine later from tnum.
+
+	/* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must
+	 * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later
+	 * from tnum.
 	 */
-	if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && reg->s32_max_value >= 0)
-		reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value;
-	else
-		reg->smax_value = U32_MAX;
-	if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0)
+	if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) &&
+	    __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) {
 		reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value;
-	else
+		reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value;
+	} else {
 		reg->smin_value = 0;
+		reg->smax_value = U32_MAX;
+	}
 }
 
 static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
@@ -2379,8 +2385,6 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
 		 */
 		if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP)
 			return 0;
-		if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW)
-			return 0;
 
 		/* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack.
 		 * that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be
@@ -2403,8 +2407,6 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
 		/* scalars can only be spilled into stack */
 		if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP)
 			return 0;
-		if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW)
-			return 0;
 		spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
 		if (spi >= 64) {
 			verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi);
@@ -4551,9 +4553,16 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_i
 
 	if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) {
 		/* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */
-		err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
+		const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0;
+
+		err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
+
+		if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
@@ -4588,13 +4597,19 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_i
 		load_reg = -1;
 	}
 
-	/* check whether we can read the memory */
+	/* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch
+	 * case to simulate the register fill.
+	 */
 	err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
-			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, true);
+			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true);
+	if (!err && load_reg >= 0)
+		err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
+				       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg,
+				       true);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	/* check whether we can write into the same memory */
+	/* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */
 	err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
 			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
 	if (err)
@@ -8308,6 +8323,10 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 							 insn->dst_reg);
 				}
 				zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
+
+				__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
+				__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
+				__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
 			}
 		} else {
 			/* case: R = imm