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authorLinus Torvalds2021-12-16 15:02:14 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds2021-12-16 15:02:14 -0800
commit180f3bcfe3622bb78307dcc4fe1f8f4a717ee0ba (patch)
treed80cf7043e1371dcd6bba88ee303d7d8c4e6d6cd /kernel
parent93db8300f6870ecc523919ec20c397f12c289975 (diff)
parent0c3e2474605581375d808bb3b9ce0927ed3eef70 (diff)
Merge tag 'net-5.16-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski: "Networking fixes, including fixes from mac80211, wifi, bpf. Relatively large batches of fixes from BPF and the WiFi stack, calm in general networking. Current release - regressions: - dpaa2-eth: fix buffer overrun when reporting ethtool statistics Current release - new code bugs: - bpf: fix incorrect state pruning for <8B spill/fill - iavf: - add missing unlocks in iavf_watchdog_task() - do not override the adapter state in the watchdog task (again) - mlxsw: spectrum_router: consolidate MAC profiles when possible Previous releases - regressions: - mac80211 fixes: - rate control, avoid driver crash for retransmitted frames - regression in SSN handling of addba tx - a memory leak where sta_info is not freed - marking TX-during-stop for TX in in_reconfig, prevent stall - cfg80211: acquire wiphy mutex on regulatory work - wifi drivers: fix build regressions and LED config dependency - virtio_net: fix rx_drops stat for small pkts - dsa: mv88e6xxx: unforce speed & duplex in mac_link_down() Previous releases - always broken: - bpf fixes: - kernel address leakage in atomic fetch - kernel address leakage in atomic cmpxchg's r0 aux reg - signed bounds propagation after mov32 - extable fixup offset - extable address check - mac80211: - fix the size used for building probe request - send ADDBA requests using the tid/queue of the aggregation session - agg-tx: don't schedule_and_wake_txq() under sta->lock, avoid deadlocks - validate extended element ID is present - mptcp: - never allow the PM to close a listener subflow (null-defer) - clear 'kern' flag from fallback sockets, prevent crash - fix deadlock in __mptcp_push_pending() - inet_diag: fix kernel-infoleak for UDP sockets - xsk: do not sleep in poll() when need_wakeup set - smc: avoid very long waits in smc_release() - sch_ets: don't remove idle classes from the round-robin list - netdevsim: - zero-initialize memory for bpf map's value, prevent info leak - don't let user space overwrite read only (max) ethtool parms - ixgbe: set X550 MDIO speed before talking to PHY - stmmac: - fix null-deref in flower deletion w/ VLAN prio Rx steering - dwmac-rk: fix oob read in rk_gmac_setup - ice: time stamping fixes - systemport: add global locking for descriptor life cycle" * tag 'net-5.16-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (89 commits) bpf, selftests: Fix racing issue in btf_skc_cls_ingress test selftest/bpf: Add a test that reads various addresses. bpf: Fix extable address check. bpf: Fix extable fixup offset. bpf, selftests: Add test case trying to taint map value pointer bpf: Make 32->64 bounds propagation slightly more robust bpf: Fix signed bounds propagation after mov32 sit: do not call ipip6_dev_free() from sit_init_net() net: systemport: Add global locking for descriptor lifecycle net/smc: Prevent smc_release() from long blocking net: Fix double 0x prefix print in SKB dump virtio_net: fix rx_drops stat for small pkts dsa: mv88e6xxx: fix debug print for SPEED_UNFORCED sfc_ef100: potential dereference of null pointer net: stmmac: dwmac-rk: fix oob read in rk_gmac_setup net: usb: lan78xx: add Allied Telesis AT29M2-AF net/packet: rx_owner_map depends on pg_vec netdevsim: Zero-initialize memory for new map's value in function nsim_bpf_map_alloc dpaa2-eth: fix ethtool statistics ixgbe: set X550 MDIO speed before talking to PHY ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c53
1 files changed, 36 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index f3001937bbb9..b532f1058d35 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1366,22 +1366,28 @@ static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
reg->var_off = tnum_or(tnum_clear_subreg(var64_off), var32_off);
}
+static bool __reg32_bound_s64(s32 a)
+{
+ return a >= 0 && a <= S32_MAX;
+}
+
static void __reg_assign_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value;
reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value;
- /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds
- * but must be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds
- * and refine later from tnum.
+
+ /* Attempt to pull 32-bit signed bounds into 64-bit bounds but must
+ * be positive otherwise set to worse case bounds and refine later
+ * from tnum.
*/
- if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0 && reg->s32_max_value >= 0)
- reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value;
- else
- reg->smax_value = U32_MAX;
- if (reg->s32_min_value >= 0)
+ if (__reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_min_value) &&
+ __reg32_bound_s64(reg->s32_max_value)) {
reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value;
- else
+ reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value;
+ } else {
reg->smin_value = 0;
+ reg->smax_value = U32_MAX;
+ }
}
static void __reg_combine_32_into_64(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
@@ -2379,8 +2385,6 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
*/
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP)
return 0;
- if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW)
- return 0;
/* dreg = *(u64 *)[fp - off] was a fill from the stack.
* that [fp - off] slot contains scalar that needs to be
@@ -2403,8 +2407,6 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
/* scalars can only be spilled into stack */
if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP)
return 0;
- if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW)
- return 0;
spi = (-insn->off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (spi >= 64) {
verbose(env, "BUG spi %d\n", spi);
@@ -4551,9 +4553,16 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_i
if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG) {
/* Check comparison of R0 with memory location */
- err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
+ const u32 aux_reg = BPF_REG_0;
+
+ err = check_reg_arg(env, aux_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
+
+ if (is_pointer_value(env, aux_reg)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", aux_reg);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
}
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
@@ -4588,13 +4597,19 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_i
load_reg = -1;
}
- /* check whether we can read the memory */
+ /* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch
+ * case to simulate the register fill.
+ */
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
- BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg, true);
+ BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true);
+ if (!err && load_reg >= 0)
+ err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
+ BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg,
+ true);
if (err)
return err;
- /* check whether we can write into the same memory */
+ /* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
if (err)
@@ -8308,6 +8323,10 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
insn->dst_reg);
}
zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
+
+ __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
+ __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
+ __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm