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authorDaniel Borkmann2021-12-15 22:02:19 +0000
committerDaniel Borkmann2021-12-16 19:45:46 +0100
commit3cf2b61eb06765e27fec6799292d9fb46d0b7e60 (patch)
treefd019252d9e2955dcb97d570b2225cc2b651ca28 /kernel
parente523102cb719cbad1673b6aa2a4d5c1fa6f13799 (diff)
bpf: Fix signed bounds propagation after mov32
For the case where both s32_{min,max}_value bounds are positive, the __reg_assign_32_into_64() directly propagates them to their 64 bit counterparts, otherwise it pessimises them into [0,u32_max] universe and tries to refine them later on by learning through the tnum as per comment in mentioned function. However, that does not always happen, for example, in mov32 operation we call zext_32_to_64(dst_reg) which invokes the __reg_assign_32_into_64() as is without subsequent bounds update as elsewhere thus no refinement based on tnum takes place. Thus, not calling into the __update_reg_bounds() / __reg_deduce_bounds() / __reg_bound_offset() triplet as we do, for example, in case of ALU ops via adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(), will lead to more pessimistic bounds when dumping the full register state: Before fix: 0: (b4) w0 = -1 1: R0_w=invP4294967295 (id=0,imm=ffffffff, smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295, umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295, var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0), s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1, u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1) 1: (bc) w0 = w0 2: R0_w=invP4294967295 (id=0,imm=ffffffff, smin_value=0,smax_value=4294967295, umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295, var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0), s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1, u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1) Technically, the smin_value=0 and smax_value=4294967295 bounds are not incorrect, but given the register is still a constant, they break assumptions about const scalars that smin_value == smax_value and umin_value == umax_value. After fix: 0: (b4) w0 = -1 1: R0_w=invP4294967295 (id=0,imm=ffffffff, smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295, umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295, var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0), s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1, u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1) 1: (bc) w0 = w0 2: R0_w=invP4294967295 (id=0,imm=ffffffff, smin_value=4294967295,smax_value=4294967295, umin_value=4294967295,umax_value=4294967295, var_off=(0xffffffff; 0x0), s32_min_value=-1,s32_max_value=-1, u32_min_value=-1,u32_max_value=-1) Without the smin_value == smax_value and umin_value == umax_value invariant being intact for const scalars, it is possible to leak out kernel pointers from unprivileged user space if the latter is enabled. For example, when such registers are involved in pointer arithmtics, then adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() will taint the destination register into an unknown scalar, and the latter can be exported and stored e.g. into a BPF map value. Fixes: 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking") Reported-by: Kuee K1r0a <liulin063@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c4
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 2d48159b58bd..0872b6c9fb33 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -8317,6 +8317,10 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
insn->dst_reg);
}
zext_32_to_64(dst_reg);
+
+ __update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
+ __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
+ __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm