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authorLinus Torvalds2019-06-02 08:51:30 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds2019-06-02 08:51:30 -0700
commit7b3064f0e8deb55b8655dd8d36d9d1e8fb62b71b (patch)
treea991e83f2711bc4ee1ca7daa868fc269637b6d45 /kernel
parent3ab4436f688c2d2f221793953cd05435ca84261c (diff)
parente577c8b64d58fe307ea4d5149d31615df2d90861 (diff)
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton: "Various fixes and followups" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: mm, compaction: make sure we isolate a valid PFN include/linux/generic-radix-tree.h: fix kerneldoc comment kernel/signal.c: trace_signal_deliver when signal_group_exit drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c: fix variable 'iommu' set but not used spdxcheck.py: fix directory structures kasan: initialize tag to 0xff in __kasan_kmalloc z3fold: fix sheduling while atomic scripts/gdb: fix invocation when CONFIG_COMMON_CLK is not set mm/gup: continue VM_FAULT_RETRY processing even for pre-faults ocfs2: fix error path kobject memory leak memcg: make it work on sparse non-0-node systems mm, memcg: consider subtrees in memory.events prctl_set_mm: downgrade mmap_sem to read lock prctl_set_mm: refactor checks from validate_prctl_map kernel/fork.c: make max_threads symbol static arch/arm/boot/compressed/decompress.c: fix build error due to lz4 changes arch/parisc/configs/c8000_defconfig: remove obsoleted CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK mm/vmalloc.c: fix typo in comment lib/sort.c: fix kernel-doc notation warnings mm: fix Documentation/vm/hmm.rst Sphinx warnings
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c16
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/signal.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sys.c62
4 files changed, 51 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
index 217cec4e22c6..426a0026225c 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
@@ -1810,11 +1810,13 @@ int cgroup_show_path(struct seq_file *sf, struct kernfs_node *kf_node,
enum cgroup2_param {
Opt_nsdelegate,
+ Opt_memory_localevents,
nr__cgroup2_params
};
static const struct fs_parameter_spec cgroup2_param_specs[] = {
- fsparam_flag ("nsdelegate", Opt_nsdelegate),
+ fsparam_flag("nsdelegate", Opt_nsdelegate),
+ fsparam_flag("memory_localevents", Opt_memory_localevents),
{}
};
@@ -1837,6 +1839,9 @@ static int cgroup2_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param
case Opt_nsdelegate:
ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE;
return 0;
+ case Opt_memory_localevents:
+ ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_LOCAL_EVENTS;
+ return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1848,6 +1853,11 @@ static void apply_cgroup_root_flags(unsigned int root_flags)
cgrp_dfl_root.flags |= CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE;
else
cgrp_dfl_root.flags &= ~CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE;
+
+ if (root_flags & CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_LOCAL_EVENTS)
+ cgrp_dfl_root.flags |= CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_LOCAL_EVENTS;
+ else
+ cgrp_dfl_root.flags &= ~CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_LOCAL_EVENTS;
}
}
@@ -1855,6 +1865,8 @@ static int cgroup_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct kernfs_root *kf_root
{
if (cgrp_dfl_root.flags & CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE)
seq_puts(seq, ",nsdelegate");
+ if (cgrp_dfl_root.flags & CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_LOCAL_EVENTS)
+ seq_puts(seq, ",memory_localevents");
return 0;
}
@@ -6325,7 +6337,7 @@ static struct kobj_attribute cgroup_delegate_attr = __ATTR_RO(delegate);
static ssize_t features_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
- return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "nsdelegate\n");
+ return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "nsdelegate\nmemory_localevents\n");
}
static struct kobj_attribute cgroup_features_attr = __ATTR_RO(features);
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index b2b87d450b80..75675b9bf6df 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@
unsigned long total_forks; /* Handle normal Linux uptimes. */
int nr_threads; /* The idle threads do not count.. */
-int max_threads; /* tunable limit on nr_threads */
+static int max_threads; /* tunable limit on nr_threads */
DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, process_counts) = 0;
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index d7b9d14ac80d..328a01e1a2f0 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2485,6 +2485,8 @@ relock:
if (signal_group_exit(signal)) {
ksig->info.si_signo = signr = SIGKILL;
sigdelset(&current->pending.signal, SIGKILL);
+ trace_signal_deliver(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_NOINFO,
+ &sighand->action[SIGKILL - 1]);
recalc_sigpending();
goto fatal;
}
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index bdbfe8d37418..2969304c29fe 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1882,13 +1882,14 @@ exit_err:
}
/*
+ * Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses.
+ *
* WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful
* in what is allowed for modification from userspace.
*/
-static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
+static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
{
unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE;
- struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
int error = -EINVAL, i;
static const unsigned char offsets[] = {
@@ -1949,24 +1950,6 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
prctl_map->start_data))
goto out;
- /*
- * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector.
- */
- if (prctl_map->auxv_size) {
- if (!prctl_map->auxv || prctl_map->auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv))
- goto out;
- }
-
- /*
- * Finally, make sure the caller has the rights to
- * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should
- * be allowed to.
- */
- if (prctl_map->exe_fd != (u32)-1) {
- if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- goto out;
- }
-
error = 0;
out:
return error;
@@ -1993,11 +1976,18 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data
if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map)))
return -EFAULT;
- error = validate_prctl_map(&prctl_map);
+ error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
if (error)
return error;
if (prctl_map.auxv_size) {
+ /*
+ * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector.
+ */
+ if (!prctl_map.auxv ||
+ prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv));
if (copy_from_user(user_auxv,
(const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv,
@@ -2010,6 +2000,14 @@ static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data
}
if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure the caller has the rights to
+ * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should
+ * be allowed to.
+ */
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -2097,7 +2095,11 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
- struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map;
+ struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = {
+ .auxv = NULL,
+ .auxv_size = 0,
+ .exe_fd = -1,
+ };
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
int error;
@@ -2125,9 +2127,15 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
error = -EINVAL;
- down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ /*
+ * arg_lock protects concurent updates of arg boundaries, we need
+ * mmap_sem for a) concurrent sys_brk, b) finding VMA for addr
+ * validation.
+ */
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
+ spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock);
prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code;
prctl_map.end_code = mm->end_code;
prctl_map.start_data = mm->start_data;
@@ -2139,9 +2147,6 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
prctl_map.arg_end = mm->arg_end;
prctl_map.env_start = mm->env_start;
prctl_map.env_end = mm->env_end;
- prctl_map.auxv = NULL;
- prctl_map.auxv_size = 0;
- prctl_map.exe_fd = -1;
switch (opt) {
case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE:
@@ -2181,7 +2186,7 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
goto out;
}
- error = validate_prctl_map(&prctl_map);
+ error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
if (error)
goto out;
@@ -2218,7 +2223,8 @@ static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
error = 0;
out:
- up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock);
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return error;
}