diff options
author | Linus Torvalds | 2019-12-01 20:36:41 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds | 2019-12-01 20:36:41 -0800 |
commit | 596cf45cbf6e4fa7bcb0df33e373a7d062b644b5 (patch) | |
tree | 3f24095d65cbdaaae8e89ff02b87df373ada1bfb /lib | |
parent | c3bfc5dd73c6f519ff0636d4e709515f06edef78 (diff) | |
parent | 937790699be9c8100e5358625e7dfa8b32bd33f2 (diff) |
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge updates from Andrew Morton:
"Incoming:
- a small number of updates to scripts/, ocfs2 and fs/buffer.c
- most of MM
I still have quite a lot of material (mostly not MM) staged after
linux-next due to -next dependencies. I'll send those across next week
as the preprequisites get merged up"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (135 commits)
mm/page_io.c: annotate refault stalls from swap_readpage
mm/Kconfig: fix trivial help text punctuation
mm/Kconfig: fix indentation
mm/memory_hotplug.c: remove __online_page_set_limits()
mm: fix typos in comments when calling __SetPageUptodate()
mm: fix struct member name in function comments
mm/shmem.c: cast the type of unmap_start to u64
mm: shmem: use proper gfp flags for shmem_writepage()
mm/shmem.c: make array 'values' static const, makes object smaller
userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK
fs/userfaultfd.c: wp: clear VM_UFFD_MISSING or VM_UFFD_WP during userfaultfd_register()
userfaultfd: wrap the common dst_vma check into an inlined function
userfaultfd: remove unnecessary WARN_ON() in __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb()
userfaultfd: use vma_pagesize for all huge page size calculation
mm/madvise.c: use PAGE_ALIGN[ED] for range checking
mm/madvise.c: replace with page_size() in madvise_inject_error()
mm/mmap.c: make vma_merge() comment more easy to understand
mm/hwpoison-inject: use DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE to define debugfs fops
autonuma: reduce cache footprint when scanning page tables
autonuma: fix watermark checking in migrate_balanced_pgdat()
...
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/Kconfig.kasan | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/test_kasan.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | lib/vsprintf.c | 40 |
3 files changed, 71 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan index 6c9682ce0254..81f5464ea9e1 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_SW_TAGS bool +config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC + bool + config CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address) @@ -142,6 +145,19 @@ config KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY (use-after-free or out-of-bounds) at the cost of increased memory consumption. +config KASAN_VMALLOC + bool "Back mappings in vmalloc space with real shadow memory" + depends on KASAN && HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC + help + By default, the shadow region for vmalloc space is the read-only + zero page. This means that KASAN cannot detect errors involving + vmalloc space. + + Enabling this option will hook in to vmap/vmalloc and back those + mappings with real shadow memory allocated on demand. This allows + for KASAN to detect more sorts of errors (and to support vmapped + stacks), but at the cost of higher memory usage. + config TEST_KASAN tristate "Module for testing KASAN for bug detection" depends on m && KASAN diff --git a/lib/test_kasan.c b/lib/test_kasan.c index 49cc4d570a40..328d33beae36 100644 --- a/lib/test_kasan.c +++ b/lib/test_kasan.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <asm/page.h> @@ -748,6 +749,30 @@ static noinline void __init kmalloc_double_kzfree(void) kzfree(ptr); } +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC +static noinline void __init vmalloc_oob(void) +{ + void *area; + + pr_info("vmalloc out-of-bounds\n"); + + /* + * We have to be careful not to hit the guard page. + * The MMU will catch that and crash us. + */ + area = vmalloc(3000); + if (!area) { + pr_err("Allocation failed\n"); + return; + } + + ((volatile char *)area)[3100]; + vfree(area); +} +#else +static void __init vmalloc_oob(void) {} +#endif + static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void) { /* @@ -793,6 +818,7 @@ static int __init kmalloc_tests_init(void) kasan_strings(); kasan_bitops(); kmalloc_double_kzfree(); + vmalloc_oob(); kasan_restore_multi_shot(multishot); diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c index dee8fc467fcf..7c488a1ce318 100644 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -761,11 +761,38 @@ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void) early_initcall(initialize_ptr_random); /* Maps a pointer to a 32 bit unique identifier. */ +static inline int __ptr_to_hashval(const void *ptr, unsigned long *hashval_out) +{ + unsigned long hashval; + + if (static_branch_unlikely(¬_filled_random_ptr_key)) + return -EAGAIN; + +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key); + /* + * Mask off the first 32 bits, this makes explicit that we have + * modified the address (and 32 bits is plenty for a unique ID). + */ + hashval = hashval & 0xffffffff; +#else + hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u32((u32)ptr, &ptr_key); +#endif + *hashval_out = hashval; + return 0; +} + +int ptr_to_hashval(const void *ptr, unsigned long *hashval_out) +{ + return __ptr_to_hashval(ptr, hashval_out); +} + static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec) { const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)"; unsigned long hashval; + int ret; /* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash. */ if (unlikely(debug_boot_weak_hash)) { @@ -773,22 +800,13 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec); } - if (static_branch_unlikely(¬_filled_random_ptr_key)) { + ret = __ptr_to_hashval(ptr, &hashval); + if (ret) { spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); /* string length must be less than default_width */ return error_string(buf, end, str, spec); } -#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT - hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key); - /* - * Mask off the first 32 bits, this makes explicit that we have - * modified the address (and 32 bits is plenty for a unique ID). - */ - hashval = hashval & 0xffffffff; -#else - hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u32((u32)ptr, &ptr_key); -#endif return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec); } |