aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/mm/memblock.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorHuang Ying2018-06-07 17:07:39 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds2018-06-07 17:34:36 -0700
commitab6ecf247a9321e3180e021a6a60164dee53ab2e (patch)
tree38799d423d5a69a3295aeb94887d96e2e20cf5e7 /mm/memblock.c
parent25cf23d7a95716fc6eb165208b5eb2e3b2e86f82 (diff)
mm: /proc/pid/pagemap: hide swap entries from unprivileged users
In commit ab676b7d6fbf ("pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace"), the /proc/PID/pagemap is restricted to be readable only by CAP_SYS_ADMIN to address some security issue. In commit 1c90308e7a77 ("pagemap: hide physical addresses from non-privileged users"), the restriction is relieved to make /proc/PID/pagemap readable, but hide the physical addresses for non-privileged users. But the swap entries are readable for non-privileged users too. This has some security issues. For example, for page under migrating, the swap entry has physical address information. So, in this patch, the swap entries are hided for non-privileged users too. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180508012745.7238-1-ying.huang@intel.com Fixes: 1c90308e7a77 ("pagemap: hide physical addresses from non-privileged users") Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Suggested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com> Cc: Zi Yan <zi.yan@cs.rutgers.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/memblock.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions