diff options
| author | Stephen Smalley | 2015-08-06 15:46:55 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds | 2015-08-07 04:39:41 +0300 |
| commit | e1832f2923ec92d0e590e496c8890675457f8568 (patch) | |
| tree | f5f26b0a8d599988d7cec9cdb257b96309c52394 /mm/shmem.c | |
| parent | e298ff75f133f2524bb6a9a305b17c5f6ff1a6b2 (diff) | |
ipc: use private shmem or hugetlbfs inodes for shm segments.
The shm implementation internally uses shmem or hugetlbfs inodes for shm
segments. As these inodes are never directly exposed to userspace and
only accessed through the shm operations which are already hooked by
security modules, mark the inodes with the S_PRIVATE flag so that inode
security initialization and permission checking is skipped.
This was motivated by the following lockdep warning:
======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
4.2.0-0.rc3.git0.1.fc24.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G W
-------------------------------------------------------
httpd/1597 is trying to acquire lock:
(&ids->rwsem){+++++.}, at: shm_close+0x34/0x130
but task is already holding lock:
(&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: SyS_shmdt+0x4b/0x180
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #3 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}:
lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
__might_fault+0x7a/0xa0
filldir+0x9e/0x130
xfs_dir2_block_getdents.isra.12+0x198/0x1c0 [xfs]
xfs_readdir+0x1b4/0x330 [xfs]
xfs_file_readdir+0x2b/0x30 [xfs]
iterate_dir+0x97/0x130
SyS_getdents+0x91/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
-> #2 (&xfs_dir_ilock_class){++++.+}:
lock_acquire+0xc7/0x270
down_read_nested+0x57/0xa0
xfs_ilock+0x167/0x350 [xfs]
xfs_ilock_attr_map_shared+0x38/0x50 [xfs]
xfs_attr_get+0xbd/0x190 [xfs]
xfs_xattr_get+0x3d/0x70 [xfs]
generic_getxattr+0x4f/0x70
inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x162/0x670
sb_finish_set_opts+0xd9/0x230
selinux_set_mnt_opts+0x35c/0x660
superblock_doinit+0x77/0xf0
delayed_superblock_init+0x10/0x20
iterate_supers+0xb3/0x110
selinux_complete_init+0x2f/0x40
security_load_policy+0x103/0x600
sel_write_load+0xc1/0x750
__vfs_write+0x37/0x100
vfs_write+0xa9/0x1a0
SyS_write+0x58/0xd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76
...
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reported-by: Morten Stevens <mstevens@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/shmem.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | mm/shmem.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 4caf8ed24d65..dbe0c1e8349c 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -3363,8 +3363,8 @@ put_path: * shmem_kernel_file_setup - get an unlinked file living in tmpfs which must be * kernel internal. There will be NO LSM permission checks against the * underlying inode. So users of this interface must do LSM checks at a - * higher layer. The one user is the big_key implementation. LSM checks - * are provided at the key level rather than the inode level. + * higher layer. The users are the big_key and shm implementations. LSM + * checks are provided at the key or shm level rather than the inode. * @name: name for dentry (to be seen in /proc/<pid>/maps * @size: size to be set for the file * @flags: VM_NORESERVE suppresses pre-accounting of the entire object size |