diff options
| author | Chriz Chow | 2018-04-20 15:46:24 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Marcel Holtmann | 2018-05-18 06:37:51 +0200 |
| commit | ee6493462f74013c6f365429401b716500aff838 (patch) | |
| tree | 29fed836bb393f20e99c2e3c9f3876db58602144 /net/bluetooth | |
| parent | 2cc6d0794cbab470b2d82d5a7547c865fd61e0f3 (diff) | |
Bluetooth: Prevent buffer overflow for large advertisement data
There are some controllers sending out advertising data with illegal
length value which is longer than HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH, causing the
buffer last_adv_data overflows. To avoid these controllers from
overflowing the buffer, we do not process the advertisement data
if its length is incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Chriz Chow <chriz.chow@aminocom.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index 139707cd9d35..235b5aaab23d 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -4942,10 +4942,14 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb) struct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr; s8 rssi; - rssi = ev->data[ev->length]; - process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr, - ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi, - ev->data, ev->length); + if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH) { + rssi = ev->data[ev->length]; + process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr, + ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi, + ev->data, ev->length); + } else { + bt_dev_err(hdev, "Dropping invalid advertising data"); + } ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length + 1; } |