diff options
| author | David Windsor | 2017-08-24 16:58:35 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook | 2018-01-15 12:08:00 -0800 |
| commit | 93070d339d7bc6f6b07b64faf5134fd144e8ec48 (patch) | |
| tree | c70a1c368470efc884a8792e253695ead745a344 /net/caif | |
| parent | 8c2bc895a9347846b33c47124a75db624aa83677 (diff) | |
caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
The CAIF channel connection request parameters need to be copied to/from
userspace. In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region
in the struct proto slab cache in which userspace copy operations are
allowed.
example usage trace:
net/caif/caif_socket.c:
setsockopt(...):
...
copy_from_user(&cf_sk->conn_req.param.data, ..., ol)
This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: split from network patch, provide usage trace]
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/caif')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/caif/caif_socket.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/caif/caif_socket.c b/net/caif/caif_socket.c index 632d5a416d97..c76d513b9a7a 100644 --- a/net/caif/caif_socket.c +++ b/net/caif/caif_socket.c @@ -1032,6 +1032,8 @@ static int caif_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, static struct proto prot = {.name = "PF_CAIF", .owner = THIS_MODULE, .obj_size = sizeof(struct caifsock), + .useroffset = offsetof(struct caifsock, conn_req.param), + .usersize = sizeof_field(struct caifsock, conn_req.param) }; if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) |