Merge branch 'for-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetooth

2 files changed, 57 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index ca01d1861854..a7a27bc2c0b1 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -289,10 +289,20 @@ static void hci_conn_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct hci_conn *conn = container_of(work, struct hci_conn,
 					     disc_work.work);
+	int refcnt = atomic_read(&conn->refcnt);
 
 	BT_DBG("hcon %p state %s", conn, state_to_string(conn->state));
 
-	if (atomic_read(&conn->refcnt))
+	WARN_ON(refcnt < 0);
+
+	/* FIXME: It was observed that in pairing failed scenario, refcnt
+	 * drops below 0. Probably this is because l2cap_conn_del calls
+	 * l2cap_chan_del for each channel, and inside l2cap_chan_del conn is
+	 * dropped. After that loop hci_chan_del is called which also drops
+	 * conn. For now make sure that ACL is alive if refcnt is higher then 0,
+	 * otherwise drop it.
+	 */
+	if (refcnt > 0)
 		return;
 
 	switch (conn->state) {
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index f2829a7932e2..e33a982161c1 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -385,6 +385,16 @@ static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
 	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP     },
 };
 
+static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
+{
+	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */
+	if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
+	    remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
+		return JUST_WORKS;
+
+	return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
+}
+
 static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
 {
@@ -401,14 +411,11 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
 
 	/* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
-	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */
 	/* Otherwise, look up method from the table */
-	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
-	    local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
-	    remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
+	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
 		method = JUST_WORKS;
 	else
-		method = gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
+		method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
 
 	/* If not bonding, don't ask user to confirm a Zero TK */
 	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM)
@@ -669,7 +676,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
-	u8 key_size, auth;
+	u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
 	int ret;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@@ -695,7 +702,19 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
 	auth = req->auth_req;
 
-	conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+	sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+	if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
+		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+
+	/* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */
+	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
+		u8 method;
+
+		method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
+					 req->io_capability);
+		if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
+			return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+	}
 
 	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
 
@@ -743,6 +762,16 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
+	/* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */
+	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
+		u8 method;
+
+		method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
+					 rsp->io_capability);
+		if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
+			return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+	}
+
 	get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
 
 	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
@@ -838,6 +867,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	u8 sec_level;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
@@ -847,7 +877,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
-	hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
+	sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
+	if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
+		hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
 
 	if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
 		return 0;
@@ -901,9 +933,12 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))
 		return 1;
 
+	if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
+		hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
+
 	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
-		if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, sec_level))
-			goto done;
+		if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
+			return 0;
 
 	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
 		return 0;
@@ -918,7 +953,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 	 * requires it.
 	 */
 	if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
-	    sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+	    hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
 		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
 
 	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
@@ -937,9 +972,6 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 
 	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
 
-done:
-	hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
-
 	return 0;
 }