diff options
| author | Bruno E. O. Meneguele | 2017-10-24 15:37:01 -0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mimi Zohar | 2017-11-08 15:16:36 -0500 |
| commit | 7c9bc0983f890ed9782e755a0e070930cd979333 (patch) | |
| tree | ec73590d9c6cee188bdd2a1a29971cd9c472d756 /security/integrity | |
| parent | fda784e50aace694ec2e4e16e2de07b91a938563 (diff) | |
ima: check signature enforcement against cmdline param instead of CONFIG
When the user requests MODULE_CHECK policy and its kernel is compiled
with CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE not set, all modules would not load, just
those loaded in initram time. One option the user would have would be
set a kernel cmdline param (module.sig_enforce) to true, but the IMA
module check code doesn't rely on this value, it checks just
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE.
This patch solves this problem checking for the exported value of
module.sig_enforce cmdline param intead of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE,
which holds the effective value (CONFIG || param).
Signed-off-by: Bruno E. O. Meneguele <brdeoliv@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index d6ddaad91e82..770654694efc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -362,12 +362,12 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) */ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { + bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); + if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE - if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && + if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ -#endif return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ } return 0; |