diff options
author | Paul Moore | 2023-03-17 12:43:07 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Paul Moore | 2023-03-20 12:34:23 -0400 |
commit | f22f9aaf6c3d92ebd5ad9e67acc03afebaaeb289 (patch) | |
tree | c47a7b91ce9f53aebcc8398582a5232d640b5c65 /security/landlock | |
parent | a7e4676e8e2cb158a4d24123de778087955e1b36 (diff) |
selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality
After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several
years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux
runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation
notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it:
The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at
runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If
disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until
the system is rebooted.
The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0"
boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to
make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not
allow for easy modification of the kernel command line.
Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes
it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the
"__ro_after_init" feature.
It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening,
which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the
diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all
the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level.
From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you
continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear
that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state.
If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux
come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot.
It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is
always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing
to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an
error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written.
Finally, in the several years where we have been working on
deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of
someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular
case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround
documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel
command line) resolved the issue without problem.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/landlock')
-rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/cred.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/fs.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/ptrace.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/setup.c | 4 |
4 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c index ec6c37f04a19..13dff2a31545 100644 --- a/security/landlock/cred.c +++ b/security/landlock/cred.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static void hook_cred_free(struct cred *const cred) landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(dom); } -static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, hook_cred_prepare), LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, hook_cred_free), }; diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c index adcea0fe7e68..1c0c198f6fdb 100644 --- a/security/landlock/fs.c +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c @@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ static int hook_file_truncate(struct file *const file) return -EACCES; } -static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete), diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c index 4c5b9cd71286..8a06d6c492bf 100644 --- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c +++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent) return task_ptrace(parent, current); } -static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme), }; diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c index 3f196d2ce4f9..0f6113528fa4 100644 --- a/security/landlock/setup.c +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c @@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ #include "ptrace.h" #include "setup.h" -bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false; +bool landlock_initialized __ro_after_init = false; -struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { +struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct landlock_file_security), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security), |