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authorNikolaus Voss2022-10-19 18:38:20 +0200
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman2022-12-21 17:48:11 +0100
commit1d1a710c1983819bdceaaae83cda309a84f51ea7 (patch)
tree879075a4e3163b1d0b05ac60ab5366c27e25e4c6 /security
parente8d16a54842d609fd4a3ed2d81d4333d6329aa94 (diff)
KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data
commit 5adedd42245af0860ebda8fe0949f24f5204c1b1 upstream. Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data. The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead. Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a small shell script, e.g.: BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32) keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u However, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long. The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input range to hex-ascii and using memcpy() instead of hex2bin(). It could have been fixed either by allowing binary input or using hex2bin() (and doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter. The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been fixed (see link below). Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@mail.steuer-voss.de/ Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss <nikolaus.voss@haag-streit.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index e05cfc2e49ae..1e313982af02 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
pr_err("encrypted key: instantiation of keys using provided decrypted data is disabled since CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA is set to false\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
- if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) {
+ if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen * 2) {
pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
@@ -791,8 +791,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv);
} else if (decrypted_data) {
get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
- memcpy(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data,
- epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+ ret = hex2bin(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data,
+ epayload->decrypted_datalen);
} else {
get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);