diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst | 14 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst index f2bb28cff439..ccf649cabdcd 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ vulnerability is not present on: - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6 - A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft, - Penwell, Pineview, Slivermont, Airmont, Merrifield) + Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield) - The Intel Core Duo Yonah variants (2006 - 2008) @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Attack scenarios deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact are described in the next sections. - The default mitigations and the rationale for chosing them are explained + The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`. .. _l1tf_sys_info: @@ -191,15 +191,15 @@ Guest mitigation mechanisms - unconditional ('always') The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute - only audited code pathes before the corresponding VMENTER. These code - pathes have beed verified that they cannot expose secrets or other + only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code + paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the address space layout of the hypervisor. Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the - work load scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs. + workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs. The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel defaults to conditional mode on affected processors. @@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ Guest mitigation mechanisms Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some - of the interrupts it can be assumed that they wont expose interesting + of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there is no way to make general assumptions. @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ Guest mitigation mechanisms to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down again. "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface. - nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt' but it does not allow to + nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface. =========== ========================================================== |