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-rw-r--r--include/linux/ima.h4
-rw-r--r--kernel/kexec_file.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h73
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c8
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c41
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c20
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c240
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c7
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h13
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity_audit.c11
14 files changed, 286 insertions, 143 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 9164e1534ec9..d15100de6cdd 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size);
-extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size);
+extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size);
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
-static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) {}
+static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 09cc78df53c6..94661d2d13ad 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
goto out;
}
- ima_kexec_cmdline(image->cmdline_buf,
+ ima_kexec_cmdline(kernel_fd, image->cmdline_buf,
image->cmdline_buf_len - 1);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 4e0d6778277e..cfa4127d0518 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
struct public_key_signature pks;
struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
struct key *key;
- int ret = -ENOMEM;
+ int ret;
if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr))
return -EBADMSG;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index edde88dbe576..080c53545ff0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
config IMA_LSM_RULES
bool
- depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
+ depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_APPARMOR)
default y
help
Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
- depends on IMA_APPRAISE && !IMA_ARCH_POLICY
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE
default y
help
This option enables the different "ima_appraise=" modes
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 9d94080bdad8..38043074ce5e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -186,27 +186,43 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE;
}
-#define __ima_hooks(hook) \
- hook(NONE) \
- hook(FILE_CHECK) \
- hook(MMAP_CHECK) \
- hook(BPRM_CHECK) \
- hook(CREDS_CHECK) \
- hook(POST_SETATTR) \
- hook(MODULE_CHECK) \
- hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK) \
- hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \
- hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \
- hook(POLICY_CHECK) \
- hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE) \
- hook(KEY_CHECK) \
- hook(MAX_CHECK)
-#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM,
+#define __ima_hooks(hook) \
+ hook(NONE, none) \
+ hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \
+ hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap) \
+ hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm) \
+ hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds) \
+ hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr) \
+ hook(MODULE_CHECK, module) \
+ hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware) \
+ hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel) \
+ hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs) \
+ hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \
+ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \
+ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \
+ hook(MAX_CHECK, none)
+
+#define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM,
+#define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg)
+#define __ima_hook_measuring_stringify(ENUM, str) \
+ (__ima_stringify(measuring_ ##str)),
enum ima_hooks {
__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_enumify)
};
+static const char * const ima_hooks_measure_str[] = {
+ __ima_hooks(__ima_hook_measuring_stringify)
+};
+
+static inline const char *func_measure_str(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+ if (func >= MAX_CHECK)
+ return ima_hooks_measure_str[NONE];
+
+ return ima_hooks_measure_str[func];
+}
+
extern const char *const func_tokens[];
struct modsig;
@@ -249,7 +265,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr,
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
-void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
+void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *keyring);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -356,7 +372,6 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG
-bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
struct modsig **modsig);
void ima_collect_modsig(struct modsig *modsig, const void *buf, loff_t size);
@@ -366,11 +381,6 @@ int ima_get_raw_modsig(const struct modsig *modsig, const void **data,
u32 *data_len);
void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig);
#else
-static inline bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
-{
- return false;
-}
-
static inline int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf,
loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig)
{
@@ -403,19 +413,24 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
-#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
-#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
+#define ima_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
+#define ima_filter_rule_free security_audit_rule_free
+#define ima_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
#else
-static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
-static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index bf22de8b7ce0..4f39fb93f278 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ err_out:
/**
* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy.
- * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
+ * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
* @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
* @secid: secid of the task being validated
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index a9649b04b9f1..372d16382960 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@
static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
+ if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
+ str);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
ima_appraise = 0;
else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
@@ -328,7 +334,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
rc = is_binary_blacklisted(digest, digestsize);
if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE))
- process_buffer_measurement(digest, digestsize,
+ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize,
"blacklisted-hash", NONE,
pcr, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
index aaae80c4e376..1c68c500c26f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
* if the IMA policy is configured to measure a key linked
* to the given keyring.
*/
- process_buffer_measurement(payload, payload_len,
+ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len,
keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0,
keyring->description);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c1583d98c5e5..8a91711ca79b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
/*
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
+ * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
* @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
* @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
@@ -735,11 +736,12 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
*
* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
*/
-void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
+void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
int pcr, const char *keyring)
{
int ret = 0;
+ const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
@@ -767,7 +769,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
*/
if (func) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
- action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
&pcr, &template, keyring);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
@@ -794,37 +796,54 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ audit_cause = "hashing_error";
goto out;
+ }
ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
goto out;
+ }
ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
-
- if (ret < 0)
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ audit_cause = "store_entry";
ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+ }
out:
if (ret < 0)
- pr_devel("%s: failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
+ func_measure_str(func),
+ audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
return;
}
/**
* ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
+ * @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded
* @buf: pointer to buffer
* @size: size of buffer
*
* Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
*/
-void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
+void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
{
- if (buf && size != 0)
- process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline",
- KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
+ struct fd f;
+
+ if (!buf || !size)
+ return;
+
+ f = fdget(kernel_fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return;
+
+ process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size,
+ "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL);
+ fdput(f);
}
static int __init init_ima(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
index d106885cc495..fb25723c65bc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c
@@ -32,26 +32,6 @@ struct modsig {
u8 raw_pkcs7[];
};
-/**
- * ima_hook_supports_modsig - can the policy allow modsig for this hook?
- *
- * modsig is only supported by hooks using ima_post_read_file(), because only
- * they preload the contents of the file in a buffer. FILE_CHECK does that in
- * some cases, but not when reached from vfs_open(). POLICY_CHECK can support
- * it, but it's not useful in practice because it's a text file so deny.
- */
-bool ima_hook_supports_modsig(enum ima_hooks func)
-{
- switch (func) {
- case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
- case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
- case MODULE_CHECK:
- return true;
- default:
- return false;
- }
-}
-
/*
* ima_read_modsig - Read modsig from buf.
*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e493063a3c34..07f033634b27 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
int pcr;
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
- void *args_p; /* audit value */
+ char *args_p; /* audit value */
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
char *fsname;
@@ -258,9 +258,24 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- kfree(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
+}
+
+static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+ if (!entry)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * entry->template->fields may be allocated in ima_parse_rule() but that
+ * reference is owned by the corresponding ima_template_desc element in
+ * the defined_templates list and cannot be freed here
+ */
+ kfree(entry->fsname);
+ kfree(entry->keyrings);
+ ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
kfree(entry);
}
@@ -285,24 +300,22 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
continue;
nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
- nentry->lsm[i].args_p = kstrdup(entry->lsm[i].args_p,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
- goto out_err;
-
- security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
- Audit_equal,
- nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p;
+ /*
+ * Remove the reference from entry so that the associated
+ * memory will not be freed during a later call to
+ * ima_lsm_free_rule(entry).
+ */
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
+
+ ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
+ nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
- (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+ nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
return nentry;
-
-out_err:
- ima_lsm_free_rule(nentry);
- return NULL;
}
static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
@@ -315,11 +328,29 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
synchronize_rcu();
+ /*
+ * ima_lsm_copy_rule() shallow copied all references, except for the
+ * LSM references, from entry to nentry so we only want to free the LSM
+ * references and the entry itself. All other memory refrences will now
+ * be owned by nentry.
+ */
ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
+ kfree(entry);
return 0;
}
+static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ if (entry->lsm[i].args_p)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
* to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
@@ -328,17 +359,10 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *e;
- int i, result, needs_update;
+ int result;
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
- needs_update = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (entry->lsm[i].args_p) {
- needs_update = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!needs_update)
+ if (!ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
continue;
result = ima_lsm_update_rule(entry);
@@ -418,13 +442,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
{
int i;
- if ((func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) || (func == KEY_CHECK)) {
- if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func)) {
- if (func == KEY_CHECK)
- return ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
- return true;
- }
- return false;
+ if (func == KEY_CHECK) {
+ return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) &&
+ ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
}
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
(rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
@@ -474,18 +494,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
- rule->lsm[i].type,
- Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+ Audit_equal,
+ rule->lsm[i].rule);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
- rule->lsm[i].type,
- Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
+ Audit_equal,
+ rule->lsm[i].rule);
default:
break;
}
@@ -880,16 +898,16 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
return -ENOMEM;
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
- result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
- Audit_equal,
- entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+ result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
+ entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
- (char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+ entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+ entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL;
result = -EINVAL;
} else
result = 0;
@@ -949,6 +967,96 @@ static void check_template_modsig(const struct ima_template_desc *template)
#undef MSG
}
+static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+ /* Ensure that the action is set and is compatible with the flags */
+ if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
+ return false;
+
+ if (entry->action != MEASURE && entry->flags & IMA_PCR)
+ return false;
+
+ if (entry->action != APPRAISE &&
+ entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * The IMA_FUNC bit must be set if and only if there's a valid hook
+ * function specified, and vice versa. Enforcing this property allows
+ * for the NONE case below to validate a rule without an explicit hook
+ * function.
+ */
+ if (((entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) && entry->func == NONE) ||
+ (!(entry->flags & IMA_FUNC) && entry->func != NONE))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that the hook function is compatible with the other
+ * components of the rule
+ */
+ switch (entry->func) {
+ case NONE:
+ case FILE_CHECK:
+ case MMAP_CHECK:
+ case BPRM_CHECK:
+ case CREDS_CHECK:
+ case POST_SETATTR:
+ case FIRMWARE_CHECK:
+ case POLICY_CHECK:
+ if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC |
+ IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
+ IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
+ IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+ IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
+ return false;
+
+ break;
+ case MODULE_CHECK:
+ case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK:
+ case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK:
+ if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC |
+ IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID |
+ IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR |
+ IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
+ IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED |
+ IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST))
+ return false;
+
+ break;
+ case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
+ if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+ return false;
+
+ if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_UID |
+ IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID | IMA_EUID |
+ IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME))
+ return false;
+
+ break;
+ case KEY_CHECK:
+ if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+ return false;
+
+ if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR |
+ IMA_KEYRINGS))
+ return false;
+
+ if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+ return false;
+
+ break;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure that combinations of flags are compatible with each other */
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST &&
+ !(entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -1126,8 +1234,6 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
keyrings_len = strlen(args[0].from) + 1;
if ((entry->keyrings) ||
- (entry->action != MEASURE) ||
- (entry->func != KEY_CHECK) ||
(keyrings_len < 2)) {
result = -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -1267,15 +1373,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
break;
case Opt_appraise_type:
- if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
- result = -EINVAL;
- break;
- }
-
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
- else if (ima_hook_supports_modsig(entry->func) &&
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0)
entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED |
IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED;
@@ -1284,17 +1385,16 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
break;
case Opt_appraise_flag:
ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_flag", args[0].from);
- if (strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG) &&
+ strstr(args[0].from, "blacklist"))
entry->flags |= IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST;
+ else
+ result = -EINVAL;
break;
case Opt_permit_directio:
entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
break;
case Opt_pcr:
- if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
- result = -EINVAL;
- break;
- }
ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from);
result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr);
@@ -1332,7 +1432,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
break;
}
}
- if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
+ if (!result && !ima_validate_rule(entry))
result = -EINVAL;
else if (entry->action == APPRAISE)
temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);
@@ -1381,7 +1481,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
if (result) {
- kfree(entry);
+ ima_free_rule(entry);
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
audit_info);
@@ -1402,19 +1502,15 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
void ima_delete_rules(void)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
- int i;
temp_ima_appraise = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) {
- for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
- kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
-
list_del(&entry->list);
- kfree(entry);
+ ima_free_rule(entry);
}
}
-#define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str),
+#define __ima_hook_stringify(func, str) (#func),
const char *const func_tokens[] = {
__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
@@ -1589,27 +1685,27 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
switch (i) {
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
- (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p);
break;
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_role),
- (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p);
break;
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_type),
- (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_user),
- (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_role),
- (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_subj_type),
- (char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p);
break;
}
seq_puts(m, " ");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
index cb3e3f501593..69a8626a35c0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
size_t payload_len)
{
int rc = 0;
+ const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
struct ima_key_entry *entry;
entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -88,6 +89,10 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring,
out:
if (rc) {
+ integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL,
+ keyring->description,
+ func_measure_str(KEY_CHECK),
+ audit_cause, rc, 0, rc);
ima_free_key_entry(entry);
entry = NULL;
}
@@ -153,7 +158,7 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) {
if (!timer_expired)
- process_buffer_measurement(entry->payload,
+ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, entry->payload,
entry->payload_len,
entry->keyring_name,
KEY_CHECK, 0,
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 16c1894c29bb..413c803c5208 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -239,6 +239,11 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int info);
+void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+ const char *cause, int result, int info,
+ int errno);
+
static inline struct audit_buffer *
integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
{
@@ -253,6 +258,14 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
{
}
+static inline void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname,
+ const char *op, const char *cause,
+ int result, int info, int errno)
+{
+}
+
static inline struct audit_buffer *
integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index 5109173839cc..f25e7df099c8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -29,6 +29,15 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
{
+ integrity_audit_message(audit_msgno, inode, fname, op, cause,
+ result, audit_info, 0);
+}
+
+void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+ const char *cause, int result, int audit_info,
+ int errno)
+{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
@@ -53,6 +62,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d errno=%d", !result, errno);
audit_log_end(ab);
}