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-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/auth.c4
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/vfs.c3
-rw-r--r--fs/open.c2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/cred.h65
-rw-r--r--kernel/cred.c250
-rw-r--r--kernel/exit.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c6
-rw-r--r--kernel/kmod.c1
-rw-r--r--lib/Kconfig.debug15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c6
11 files changed, 346 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
index 5573508f707f..36fcabbf5186 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
int ret;
+ validate_process_creds();
+
/* discard any old override before preparing the new set */
revert_creds(get_cred(current->real_cred));
new = prepare_creds();
@@ -86,8 +88,10 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
else
new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
new->cap_permitted);
+ validate_process_creds();
put_cred(override_creds(new));
put_cred(new);
+ validate_process_creds();
return 0;
oom:
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
index 492c79b7800b..24d58adfe5fd 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfssvc.c
@@ -496,7 +496,9 @@ nfsd(void *vrqstp)
/* Lock the export hash tables for reading. */
exp_readlock();
+ validate_process_creds();
svc_process(rqstp);
+ validate_process_creds();
/* Unlock export hash tables */
exp_readunlock();
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 23341c1063bc..8fa09bfbcba7 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -684,6 +684,8 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
__be32 err;
int host_err;
+ validate_process_creds();
+
/*
* If we get here, then the client has already done an "open",
* and (hopefully) checked permission - so allow OWNER_OVERRIDE
@@ -740,6 +742,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type,
out_nfserr:
err = nfserrno(host_err);
out:
+ validate_process_creds();
return err;
}
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 40d1fa25f5aa..31191bf513e4 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -959,6 +959,8 @@ struct file *dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags,
int error;
struct file *f;
+ validate_creds(cred);
+
/*
* We must always pass in a valid mount pointer. Historically
* callers got away with not passing it, but we must enforce this at
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index b3c76e815d66..85439abdbc80 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -114,6 +114,13 @@ struct thread_group_cred {
*/
struct cred {
atomic_t usage;
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+ atomic_t subscribers; /* number of processes subscribed */
+ void *put_addr;
+ unsigned magic;
+#define CRED_MAGIC 0x43736564
+#define CRED_MAGIC_DEAD 0x44656144
+#endif
uid_t uid; /* real UID of the task */
gid_t gid; /* real GID of the task */
uid_t suid; /* saved UID of the task */
@@ -143,6 +150,7 @@ struct cred {
};
extern void __put_cred(struct cred *);
+extern void exit_creds(struct task_struct *);
extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long);
extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void);
@@ -158,6 +166,60 @@ extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern void __init cred_init(void);
+/*
+ * check for validity of credentials
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+extern void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *, const char *, unsigned);
+extern void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *,
+ const char *, unsigned);
+
+static inline bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
+ return true;
+ if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) < atomic_read(&cred->subscribers))
+ return true;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+ if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
+ return true;
+ if ((*(u32*)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
+ (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
+ return true;
+#endif
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline void __validate_creds(const struct cred *cred,
+ const char *file, unsigned line)
+{
+ if (unlikely(creds_are_invalid(cred)))
+ __invalid_creds(cred, file, line);
+}
+
+#define validate_creds(cred) \
+do { \
+ __validate_creds((cred), __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+} while(0)
+
+#define validate_process_creds() \
+do { \
+ __validate_process_creds(current, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+} while(0)
+
+extern void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *);
+#else
+static inline void validate_creds(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+}
+static inline void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+}
+static inline void validate_process_creds(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
/**
* get_new_cred - Get a reference on a new set of credentials
* @cred: The new credentials to reference
@@ -187,6 +249,7 @@ static inline struct cred *get_new_cred(struct cred *cred)
static inline const struct cred *get_cred(const struct cred *cred)
{
struct cred *nonconst_cred = (struct cred *) cred;
+ validate_creds(cred);
return get_new_cred(nonconst_cred);
}
@@ -205,7 +268,7 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
- BUG_ON(atomic_read(&(cred)->usage) <= 0);
+ validate_creds(cred);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(cred)->usage))
__put_cred(cred);
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 1bb4d7e5d616..24dd2f5104b1 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -18,6 +18,18 @@
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
#include "cred-internals.h"
+#if 0
+#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
+ printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
+#else
+static inline __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
+void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+}
+#define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
+ no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
+#endif
+
static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
/*
@@ -36,6 +48,10 @@ static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
*/
struct cred init_cred = {
.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+ .subscribers = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
+ .magic = CRED_MAGIC,
+#endif
.securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
.cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET,
.cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET,
@@ -48,6 +64,31 @@ struct cred init_cred = {
#endif
};
+static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+ atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+ return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers);
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
+
+ atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers);
+#endif
+}
+
/*
* Dispose of the shared task group credentials
*/
@@ -85,9 +126,22 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu);
+ kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+ if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD ||
+ atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 ||
+ read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0)
+ panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with"
+ " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n",
+ cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr,
+ atomic_read(&cred->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(cred));
+#else
if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0)
panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage));
+#endif
security_cred_free(cred);
key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
@@ -106,12 +160,47 @@ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
*/
void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
{
+ kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
+ atomic_read(&cred->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(cred));
+
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+ BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
+ cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
+ cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
+#endif
+ BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
+ BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);
call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
+/*
+ * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits
+ */
+void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct cred *cred;
+
+ kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
+ atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
+
+ cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
+ tsk->real_cred = NULL;
+ validate_creds(cred);
+ alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
+ put_cred(cred);
+
+ cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
+ tsk->cred = NULL;
+ validate_creds(cred);
+ alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
+ put_cred(cred);
+}
+
/**
* prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification
*
@@ -132,16 +221,19 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
const struct cred *old;
struct cred *new;
- BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 1);
+ validate_process_creds();
new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new)
return NULL;
+ kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
+
old = task->cred;
memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred));
atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+ set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
get_uid(new->user);
@@ -157,6 +249,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
goto error;
+ validate_creds(new);
return new;
error:
@@ -229,9 +322,12 @@ struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
if (!new)
return NULL;
+ kdebug("prepare_usermodehelper_creds() alloc %p", new);
+
memcpy(new, &init_cred, sizeof(struct cred));
atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+ set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
get_uid(new->user);
@@ -250,6 +346,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
#endif
if (security_prepare_creds(new, &init_cred, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
goto error;
+ validate_creds(new);
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) != 1);
return new;
@@ -286,6 +383,10 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
) {
p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
get_cred(p->cred);
+ alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2);
+ kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})",
+ p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(p->cred));
atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
return 0;
}
@@ -331,6 +432,8 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
+ alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
+ validate_creds(new);
return 0;
error_put:
@@ -355,13 +458,20 @@ error_put:
int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
- const struct cred *old;
+ const struct cred *old = task->real_cred;
- BUG_ON(task->cred != task->real_cred);
- BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 2);
+ kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
+ atomic_read(&new->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(new));
+
+ BUG_ON(task->cred != old);
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+ BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2);
+ validate_creds(old);
+ validate_creds(new);
+#endif
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
- old = task->real_cred;
security_commit_creds(new, old);
get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
@@ -390,12 +500,14 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
* cheaply with the new uid cache, so if it matters
* we should be checking for it. -DaveM
*/
+ alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2);
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
if (new->user != old->user)
atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
+ alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
sched_switch_user(task);
@@ -428,6 +540,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds);
*/
void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
{
+ kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
+ atomic_read(&new->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(new));
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+ BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0);
+#endif
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
put_cred(new);
}
@@ -444,7 +563,20 @@ const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
{
const struct cred *old = current->cred;
- rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, get_cred(new));
+ kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new,
+ atomic_read(&new->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(new));
+
+ validate_creds(old);
+ validate_creds(new);
+ get_cred(new);
+ alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new);
+ alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1);
+
+ kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old,
+ atomic_read(&old->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(old));
return old;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
@@ -460,7 +592,15 @@ void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
{
const struct cred *override = current->cred;
+ kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old,
+ atomic_read(&old->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(old));
+
+ validate_creds(old);
+ validate_creds(override);
+ alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1);
rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old);
+ alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1);
put_cred(override);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds);
@@ -502,11 +642,15 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
if (!new)
return NULL;
+ kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new);
+
if (daemon)
old = get_task_cred(daemon);
else
old = get_cred(&init_cred);
+ validate_creds(old);
+
*new = *old;
get_uid(new->user);
get_group_info(new->group_info);
@@ -526,7 +670,9 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
goto error;
atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+ set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
put_cred(old);
+ validate_creds(new);
return new;
error:
@@ -589,3 +735,95 @@ int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+
+/*
+ * dump invalid credentials
+ */
+static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label,
+ const struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n",
+ label, cred,
+ cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "",
+ cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "",
+ cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : "");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n",
+ cred->magic, cred->put_addr);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n",
+ atomic_read(&cred->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(cred));
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
+ cred->uid, cred->euid, cred->suid, cred->fsuid);
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n",
+ cred->gid, cred->egid, cred->sgid, cred->fsgid);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p\n", cred->security);
+ if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE &&
+ (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) !=
+ (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)))
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x}\n",
+ ((u32*)cred->security)[0],
+ ((u32*)cred->security)[1]);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * report use of invalid credentials
+ */
+void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line)
+{
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
+ dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current);
+ BUG();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds);
+
+/*
+ * check the credentials on a process
+ */
+void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ const char *file, unsigned line)
+{
+ if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) {
+ if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 ||
+ creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
+ goto invalid_creds;
+ } else {
+ if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 ||
+ read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 ||
+ creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) ||
+ creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred)))
+ goto invalid_creds;
+ }
+ return;
+
+invalid_creds:
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line);
+
+ dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk);
+ if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred)
+ dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk);
+ else
+ printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n");
+ BUG();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds);
+
+/*
+ * check creds for do_exit()
+ */
+void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})",
+ tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
+ atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
+ read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
+
+ __validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 869dc221733e..c98ff7a8025f 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -901,6 +901,8 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
tracehook_report_exit(&code);
+ validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
+
/*
* We're taking recursive faults here in do_exit. Safest is to just
* leave this task alone and wait for reboot.
@@ -1009,6 +1011,8 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
if (tsk->splice_pipe)
__free_pipe_info(tsk->splice_pipe);
+ validate_creds_for_do_exit(tsk);
+
preempt_disable();
/* causes final put_task_struct in finish_task_switch(). */
tsk->state = TASK_DEAD;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 144326b7af50..043b5d88049b 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -152,8 +152,7 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
WARN_ON(tsk == current);
- put_cred(tsk->real_cred);
- put_cred(tsk->cred);
+ exit_creds(tsk);
delayacct_tsk_free(tsk);
if (!profile_handoff_task(tsk))
@@ -1307,8 +1306,7 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_put_domain:
module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
bad_fork_cleanup_count:
atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
- put_cred(p->real_cred);
- put_cred(p->cred);
+ exit_creds(p);
bad_fork_free:
free_task(p);
fork_out:
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index 5a7ae57f983f..4e8cae2e9148 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -466,6 +466,7 @@ int call_usermodehelper_exec(struct subprocess_info *sub_info,
int retval = 0;
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&sub_info->cred->usage) != 1);
+ validate_creds(sub_info->cred);
helper_lock();
if (sub_info->path[0] == '\0')
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 12327b2bb785..fbb87cf138c5 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -653,6 +653,21 @@ config DEBUG_NOTIFIERS
This is a relatively cheap check but if you care about maximum
performance, say N.
+config DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+ bool "Debug credential management"
+ depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
+ help
+ Enable this to turn on some debug checking for credential
+ management. The additional code keeps track of the number of
+ pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to
+ see that this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred
+ struct.
+
+ Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, this also checks that the
+ security pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
#
# Select this config option from the architecture Kconfig, if it
# it is preferred to always offer frame pointers as a config
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 27b4c5527358..c3bb31ecc5aa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1531,6 +1531,8 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid;
+ validate_creds(cred);
+
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
@@ -3236,7 +3238,9 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
- cred->security = NULL;
+
+ BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
+ cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
kfree(tsec);
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-16 12:58:09 +0000