diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 24 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/xfrm.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/key/af_key.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/dummy.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 53 |
10 files changed, 62 insertions, 49 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 9b5fea81f55e..b200b9856f32 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -882,7 +882,8 @@ struct request_sock; * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing * XFRMs on a packet. The hook is called when selecting either a * per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy. - * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno + * on other errors. * @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match: * @x contains the state to match. * @xp contains the policy to check for a match. @@ -891,6 +892,7 @@ struct request_sock; * @xfrm_flow_state_match: * @fl contains the flow key to match. * @xfrm points to the xfrm_state to match. + * @xp points to the xfrm_policy to match. * Return 1 if there is a match. * @xfrm_decode_session: * @skb points to skb to decode. @@ -1388,7 +1390,8 @@ struct security_operations { int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl); - int (*xfrm_flow_state_match)(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm); + int (*xfrm_flow_state_match)(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm, + struct xfrm_policy *xp); int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ @@ -3120,11 +3123,6 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(xp, sec_ctx, NULL); } -static inline int security_xfrm_sock_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sock *sk) -{ - return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(xp, NULL, sk); -} - static inline int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new) { return security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security(old, new); @@ -3175,9 +3173,10 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl); } -static inline int security_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm) +static inline int security_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, + struct xfrm_state *xfrm, struct xfrm_policy *xp) { - return security_ops->xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, xfrm); + return security_ops->xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, xfrm, xp); } static inline int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) @@ -3197,11 +3196,6 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm return 0; } -static inline int security_xfrm_sock_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sock *sk) -{ - return 0; -} - static inline int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new) { return 0; @@ -3249,7 +3243,7 @@ static inline int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, } static inline int security_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, - struct xfrm_state *xfrm) + struct xfrm_state *xfrm, struct xfrm_policy *xp) { return 1; } diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h index 1e2a4ddec96e..737fdb2ee8a4 100644 --- a/include/net/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h @@ -995,7 +995,8 @@ struct xfrm_state * xfrm_find_acq(u8 mode, u32 reqid, u8 proto, int create, unsigned short family); extern void xfrm_policy_flush(u8 type); extern int xfrm_sk_policy_insert(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct xfrm_policy *pol); -extern int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_dst *xdst, struct flowi *fl, int family, int strict); +extern int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_policy *pol, struct xfrm_dst *xdst, + struct flowi *fl, int family, int strict); extern void xfrm_init_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst); extern wait_queue_head_t km_waitq; diff --git a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c index 7a7a00147e55..1bed0cdf53e3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c +++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ __xfrm4_find_bundle(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_policy *policy) xdst->u.rt.fl.fl4_dst == fl->fl4_dst && xdst->u.rt.fl.fl4_src == fl->fl4_src && xdst->u.rt.fl.fl4_tos == fl->fl4_tos && - xfrm_bundle_ok(xdst, fl, AF_INET, 0)) { + xfrm_bundle_ok(policy, xdst, fl, AF_INET, 0)) { dst_clone(dst); break; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c index 6a252e2134d1..73cee2ec07e8 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c +++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ __xfrm6_find_bundle(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_policy *policy) xdst->u.rt6.rt6i_src.plen); if (ipv6_addr_equal(&xdst->u.rt6.rt6i_dst.addr, &fl_dst_prefix) && ipv6_addr_equal(&xdst->u.rt6.rt6i_src.addr, &fl_src_prefix) && - xfrm_bundle_ok(xdst, fl, AF_INET6, + xfrm_bundle_ok(policy, xdst, fl, AF_INET6, (xdst->u.rt6.rt6i_dst.plen != 128 || xdst->u.rt6.rt6i_src.plen != 128))) { dst_clone(dst); diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index ff98e70b0931..20ff7cca1d07 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -2928,11 +2928,6 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *pfkey_compile_policy(struct sock *sk, int opt, if (*dir) goto out; } - else { - *dir = security_xfrm_sock_policy_alloc(xp, sk); - if (*dir) - goto out; - } *dir = pol->sadb_x_policy_dir-1; return xp; diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index fffdd34f3baf..695761ff1321 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ static struct dst_entry *xfrm_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie) static int stale_bundle(struct dst_entry *dst) { - return !xfrm_bundle_ok((struct xfrm_dst *)dst, NULL, AF_UNSPEC, 0); + return !xfrm_bundle_ok(NULL, (struct xfrm_dst *)dst, NULL, AF_UNSPEC, 0); } void xfrm_dst_ifdown(struct dst_entry *dst, struct net_device *dev) @@ -1866,7 +1866,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_init_pmtu); * still valid. */ -int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_dst *first, struct flowi *fl, int family, int strict) +int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_policy *pol, struct xfrm_dst *first, + struct flowi *fl, int family, int strict) { struct dst_entry *dst = &first->u.dst; struct xfrm_dst *last; @@ -1883,7 +1884,7 @@ int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_dst *first, struct flowi *fl, int family, int str if (fl && !xfrm_selector_match(&dst->xfrm->sel, fl, family)) return 0; - if (fl && !security_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, dst->xfrm)) + if (fl && !security_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, dst->xfrm, pol)) return 0; if (dst->xfrm->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID) return 0; diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index d54b3a70d5df..2b2e59d8ffbc 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -1992,15 +1992,6 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_compile_policy(struct sock *sk, int opt, xp->type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN; copy_templates(xp, ut, nr); - if (!xp->security) { - int err = security_xfrm_sock_policy_alloc(xp, sk); - if (err) { - kfree(xp); - *dir = err; - return NULL; - } - } - *dir = p->dir; return xp; diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index aeee70565509..43874c1e6e23 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -881,7 +881,8 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, return 1; } -static int dummy_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm) +static int dummy_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm, + struct xfrm_policy *xp) { return 1; } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 81eb59890162..526b28019aca 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x); int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir); int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl); -int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm); +int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm, + struct xfrm_policy *xp); /* diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 3e742b850af6..675b995a67c3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x) */ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) { - int rc = 0; - u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + int rc; + u32 sel_sid; struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ @@ -88,11 +88,21 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid; } + else + /* + * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an + * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This + * would prevent inadvertent "leaks". + */ + return 0; rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL); + if (rc == -EACCES) + rc = -ESRCH; + return rc; } @@ -108,15 +118,20 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy * u32 pol_sid; int err; - if (x->security) - state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid; - else - state_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; - - if (xp->security) + if (xp->security) { + if (!x->security) + /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */ + return 0; + else + state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid; pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid; - else - pol_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + } else + if (x->security) + /* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */ + return 0; + else + /* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */ + return 1; err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, @@ -125,7 +140,11 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy * if (err) return 0; - return selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(fl, x); + err = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, + ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, + NULL)? 0:1; + + return err; } /* @@ -133,12 +152,22 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy * * can use a given security association. */ -int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm) +int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm, + struct xfrm_policy *xp) { int rc = 0; u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; + if (!xp->security) + if (!xfrm->security) + return 1; + else + return 0; + else + if (!xfrm->security) + return 0; + /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */ if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) { if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx)) |