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-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h16
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c8
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c16
-rw-r--r--security/security.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c23
5 files changed, 31 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ebd2a53a3d07..4921163b2752 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ struct user_namespace;
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
* as the default capabilities functions
*/
-extern int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
+extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit);
extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
extern int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
@@ -1261,7 +1261,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
* @capable:
* Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
* credentials.
- * @tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
* @cred contains the credentials to use.
* @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
@@ -1385,8 +1384,8 @@ struct security_operations {
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit);
+ int (*capable) (const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit);
int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
int (*syslog) (int type);
@@ -1867,7 +1866,7 @@ static inline int security_capset(struct cred *new,
static inline int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns,
const struct cred *cred, int cap)
{
- return cap_capable(current, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
@@ -1875,7 +1874,7 @@ static inline int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_nam
int ret;
rcu_read_lock();
- ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ ret = cap_capable(__task_cred(tsk), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
@@ -1886,8 +1885,7 @@ int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace
int ret;
rcu_read_lock();
- ret = cap_capable(tsk, __task_cred(tsk), ns, cap,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ ret = cap_capable(__task_cred(tsk), ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 37832026e58a..ef4e2a8a33a5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -136,16 +136,16 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
return 0;
}
-static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
- int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+ int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (!error) {
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(profile))
- error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
+ error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit);
}
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index a93b3b733079..89f02ff66af9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @tsk: The task to query
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
@@ -80,8 +79,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
for (;;) {
/* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
@@ -222,9 +221,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
- current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
+ CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -870,7 +868,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
@@ -936,7 +934,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -963,7 +961,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
int ret = 0;
if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
- ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+ ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d9e153390926..9ae68c64455e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -157,8 +157,7 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
@@ -168,7 +167,7 @@ int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
int ret;
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ ret = security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
@@ -180,7 +179,7 @@ int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
int ret;
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ ret = security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e545b9f67072..c9605c4a2e08 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1414,8 +1414,7 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
#endif
/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
-static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
- const struct cred *cred,
+static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1426,7 +1425,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
int rc;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
- ad.tsk = tsk;
+ ad.tsk = current;
ad.u.cap = cap;
switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
@@ -1867,16 +1866,16 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
* the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
*/
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+ rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
- return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+ return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
}
static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -1953,8 +1952,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
- &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2858,8 +2856,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
- &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+ error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
@@ -2992,8 +2989,8 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case KDSKBENT:
case KDSKBSENT:
- error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
break;
/* default case assumes that the command will go
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-01 09:14:54 +0000