1 files changed, 317 insertions, 80 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index b7ad8003c4e6..f25b7c9c20ba 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -176,7 +176,6 @@ struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
 	struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
 };
 
-#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS	131072
 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK	1024
 #define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES	64
 
@@ -1092,7 +1091,7 @@ static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	 */
 	subprog[env->subprog_cnt].start = insn_cnt;
 
-	if (env->log.level > 1)
+	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
 		for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
 			verbose(env, "func#%d @%d\n", i, subprog[i].start);
 
@@ -1139,6 +1138,7 @@ static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			 struct bpf_reg_state *parent)
 {
 	bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */
+	int cnt = 0;
 
 	while (parent) {
 		/* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
@@ -1150,12 +1150,25 @@ static int mark_reg_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 				parent->var_off.value, parent->off);
 			return -EFAULT;
 		}
+		if (parent->live & REG_LIVE_READ)
+			/* The parentage chain never changes and
+			 * this parent was already marked as LIVE_READ.
+			 * There is no need to keep walking the chain again and
+			 * keep re-marking all parents as LIVE_READ.
+			 * This case happens when the same register is read
+			 * multiple times without writes into it in-between.
+			 */
+			break;
 		/* ... then we depend on parent's value */
 		parent->live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
 		state = parent;
 		parent = state->parent;
 		writes = true;
+		cnt++;
 	}
+
+	if (env->longest_mark_read_walk < cnt)
+		env->longest_mark_read_walk = cnt;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1413,7 +1426,7 @@ static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		char tn_buf[48];
 
 		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-		verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
+		verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d\n",
 			tn_buf, off, size);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
@@ -1426,6 +1439,28 @@ static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
+				 int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type)
+{
+	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
+	struct bpf_map *map = regs[regno].map_ptr;
+	u32 cap = bpf_map_flags_to_cap(map);
+
+	if (type == BPF_WRITE && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_WRITE)) {
+		verbose(env, "write into map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
+			map->value_size, off, size);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	if (type == BPF_READ && !(cap & BPF_MAP_CAN_READ)) {
+		verbose(env, "read from map forbidden, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
+			map->value_size, off, size);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
 static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
 			      int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
@@ -1455,7 +1490,7 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 	 * need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
 	 * to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
 	 */
-	if (env->log.level)
+	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
 		print_verifier_state(env, state);
 
 	/* The minimum value is only important with signed
@@ -2012,7 +2047,9 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
-
+		err = check_map_access_type(env, regno, off, size, t);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 		err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size, false);
 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
@@ -2158,6 +2195,29 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_ins
 				BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
 }
 
+static int __check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
+				  int off, int access_size,
+				  bool zero_size_allowed)
+{
+	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
+
+	if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
+	    access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
+		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+			verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
+				regno, off, access_size);
+		} else {
+			char tn_buf[48];
+
+			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+			verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d var_off=%s access_size=%d\n",
+				regno, tn_buf, access_size);
+		}
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
  * bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
  * and all elements of stack are initialized.
@@ -2170,7 +2230,7 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 {
 	struct bpf_reg_state *reg = reg_state(env, regno);
 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
-	int off, i, slot, spi;
+	int err, min_off, max_off, i, slot, spi;
 
 	if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
 		/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
@@ -2184,21 +2244,57 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-	/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
-	if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
-		char tn_buf[48];
+	if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+		min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + reg->off;
+		err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
+					     zero_size_allowed);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	} else {
+		/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
+		 * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
+		 * Spectre masking for stack ALU.
+		 * See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
+		 */
+		if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
+			char tn_buf[48];
 
-		tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
-		verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
-			regno, tn_buf);
-		return -EACCES;
-	}
-	off = reg->off + reg->var_off.value;
-	if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
-	    access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
-		verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
-			regno, off, access_size);
-		return -EACCES;
+			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+			verbose(env, "R%d indirect variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
+				regno, tn_buf);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+		/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
+		 * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
+		 * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on
+		 * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may
+		 * cause uninitialized stack leaking.
+		 */
+		if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
+			meta = NULL;
+
+		if (reg->smax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF ||
+		    reg->smax_value <= -BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d unbounded indirect variable offset stack access\n",
+				regno);
+			return -EACCES;
+		}
+		min_off = reg->smin_value + reg->off;
+		max_off = reg->smax_value + reg->off;
+		err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,
+					     zero_size_allowed);
+		if (err) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of stack bound\n",
+				regno);
+			return err;
+		}
+		err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, max_off, access_size,
+					     zero_size_allowed);
+		if (err) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of stack bound\n",
+				regno);
+			return err;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
@@ -2207,10 +2303,10 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
+	for (i = min_off; i < max_off + access_size; i++) {
 		u8 *stype;
 
-		slot = -(off + i) - 1;
+		slot = -i - 1;
 		spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
 		if (state->allocated_stack <= slot)
 			goto err;
@@ -2223,8 +2319,16 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 			goto mark;
 		}
 err:
-		verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
-			off, i, access_size);
+		if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+			verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
+				min_off, i - min_off, access_size);
+		} else {
+			char tn_buf[48];
+
+			tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+			verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack var_off %s+%d size %d\n",
+				tn_buf, i - min_off, access_size);
+		}
 		return -EACCES;
 mark:
 		/* reading any byte out of 8-byte 'spill_slot' will cause
@@ -2233,7 +2337,7 @@ mark:
 		mark_reg_read(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
 			      state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.parent);
 	}
-	return update_stack_depth(env, state, off);
+	return update_stack_depth(env, state, min_off);
 }
 
 static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
@@ -2248,6 +2352,10 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 		return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
 					   zero_size_allowed);
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+		if (check_map_access_type(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
+					  meta && meta->raw_mode ? BPF_WRITE :
+					  BPF_READ))
+			return -EACCES;
 		return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size,
 					zero_size_allowed);
 	default: /* scalar_value|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */
@@ -2906,7 +3014,7 @@ static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
 	/* and go analyze first insn of the callee */
 	*insn_idx = target_insn;
 
-	if (env->log.level) {
+	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
 		verbose(env, "caller:\n");
 		print_verifier_state(env, caller);
 		verbose(env, "callee:\n");
@@ -2946,7 +3054,7 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx)
 		return err;
 
 	*insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1;
-	if (env->log.level) {
+	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
 		verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n");
 		print_verifier_state(env, callee);
 		verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx);
@@ -2980,6 +3088,7 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
 		int func_id, int insn_idx)
 {
 	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
+	struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr;
 
 	if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
@@ -2990,11 +3099,24 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
 	    func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_peek_elem)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (meta->map_ptr == NULL) {
+	if (map == NULL) {
 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	/* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions
+	 * need to be applied in order to prevent altering the
+	 * state of the map from program side.
+	 */
+	if ((map->map_flags & BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG) &&
+	    (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem ||
+	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem ||
+	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_push_elem ||
+	     func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_pop_elem)) {
+		verbose(env, "write into map forbidden\n");
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
 	if (!BPF_MAP_PTR(aux->map_state))
 		bpf_map_ptr_store(aux, meta->map_ptr,
 				  meta->map_ptr->unpriv_array);
@@ -3285,6 +3407,9 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
 
 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
+		/* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in
+		 * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here.
+		 */
 		off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
 		if (mask_to_left)
 			*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
@@ -4969,23 +5094,17 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			insn->dst_reg);
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
-	if (env->log.level)
+	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
 		print_verifier_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]);
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* return the map pointer stored inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
-static struct bpf_map *ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(struct bpf_insn *insn)
-{
-	u64 imm64 = ((u64) (u32) insn[0].imm) | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32;
-
-	return (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) imm64;
-}
-
 /* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
 static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 {
+	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
+	struct bpf_map *map;
 	int err;
 
 	if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
@@ -5009,11 +5128,22 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	/* replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() should have caught bad ld_imm64 */
-	BUG_ON(insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD);
+	map = env->used_maps[aux->map_index];
+	mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
+	regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = map;
+
+	if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE) {
+		regs[insn->dst_reg].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
+		regs[insn->dst_reg].off = aux->map_off;
+		if (map_value_has_spin_lock(map))
+			regs[insn->dst_reg].id = ++env->id_gen;
+	} else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
+		regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
+	} else {
+		verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
-	regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
-	regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(insn);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -5267,13 +5397,13 @@ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	int ret = 0;
 	int i, t;
 
-	insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+	insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!insn_state)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
+	insn_stack = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!insn_stack) {
-		kfree(insn_state);
+		kvfree(insn_state);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
@@ -5371,8 +5501,8 @@ check_state:
 	ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
 
 err_free:
-	kfree(insn_state);
-	kfree(insn_stack);
+	kvfree(insn_state);
+	kvfree(insn_stack);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -6115,11 +6245,13 @@ static int propagate_liveness(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
 {
 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
-	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
+	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev;
 	struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new;
 	int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
 
-	sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
+	pprev = &env->explored_states[insn_idx];
+	sl = *pprev;
+
 	if (!sl)
 		/* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
 		 * be doing state search here
@@ -6130,6 +6262,7 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
 
 	while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
 		if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) {
+			sl->hit_cnt++;
 			/* reached equivalent register/stack state,
 			 * prune the search.
 			 * Registers read by the continuation are read by us.
@@ -6145,10 +6278,40 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
 				return err;
 			return 1;
 		}
-		sl = sl->next;
 		states_cnt++;
+		sl->miss_cnt++;
+		/* heuristic to determine whether this state is beneficial
+		 * to keep checking from state equivalence point of view.
+		 * Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time,
+		 * but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed.
+		 */
+		if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) {
+			/* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to
+			 * speed up verification
+			 */
+			*pprev = sl->next;
+			if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) {
+				free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
+				kfree(sl);
+				env->peak_states--;
+			} else {
+				/* cannot free this state, since parentage chain may
+				 * walk it later. Add it for free_list instead to
+				 * be freed at the end of verification
+				 */
+				sl->next = env->free_list;
+				env->free_list = sl;
+			}
+			sl = *pprev;
+			continue;
+		}
+		pprev = &sl->next;
+		sl = *pprev;
 	}
 
+	if (env->max_states_per_insn < states_cnt)
+		env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt;
+
 	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -6162,6 +6325,8 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
 	new_sl = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!new_sl)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	env->total_states++;
+	env->peak_states++;
 
 	/* add new state to the head of linked list */
 	new = &new_sl->state;
@@ -6246,8 +6411,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	struct bpf_verifier_state *state;
 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
 	struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
-	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len, i;
-	int insn_processed = 0;
+	int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
 	bool do_print_state = false;
 
 	env->prev_linfo = NULL;
@@ -6282,10 +6446,10 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		insn = &insns[env->insn_idx];
 		class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
 
-		if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
+		if (++env->insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
 			verbose(env,
 				"BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
-				insn_processed);
+				env->insn_processed);
 			return -E2BIG;
 		}
 
@@ -6294,7 +6458,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			return err;
 		if (err == 1) {
 			/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
-			if (env->log.level) {
+			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
 				if (do_print_state)
 					verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n",
 						env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
@@ -6312,8 +6476,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		if (need_resched())
 			cond_resched();
 
-		if (env->log.level > 1 || (env->log.level && do_print_state)) {
-			if (env->log.level > 1)
+		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 ||
+		    (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL && do_print_state)) {
+			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
 				verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx);
 			else
 				verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:",
@@ -6324,7 +6489,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			do_print_state = false;
 		}
 
-		if (env->log.level) {
+		if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
 			const struct bpf_insn_cbs cbs = {
 				.cb_print	= verbose,
 				.private_data	= env,
@@ -6589,16 +6754,6 @@ process_bpf_exit:
 		env->insn_idx++;
 	}
 
-	verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d), stack depth ",
-		insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS);
-	for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
-		u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
-
-		verbose(env, "%d", depth);
-		if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt)
-			verbose(env, "+");
-	}
-	verbose(env, "\n");
 	env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -6696,8 +6851,10 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		}
 
 		if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
+			struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
 			struct bpf_map *map;
 			struct fd f;
+			u64 addr;
 
 			if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
 			    insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
@@ -6706,13 +6863,19 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
-			if (insn->src_reg == 0)
+			if (insn[0].src_reg == 0)
 				/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
 				goto next_insn;
 
-			if (insn[0].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD ||
-			    insn[1].imm != 0) {
-				verbose(env, "unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
+			/* In final convert_pseudo_ld_imm64() step, this is
+			 * converted into regular 64-bit imm load insn.
+			 */
+			if ((insn[0].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD &&
+			     insn[0].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE) ||
+			    (insn[0].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD &&
+			     insn[1].imm != 0)) {
+				verbose(env,
+					"unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
@@ -6730,16 +6893,47 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				return err;
 			}
 
-			/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
-			insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
-			insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
+			aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i];
+			if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
+				addr = (unsigned long)map;
+			} else {
+				u32 off = insn[1].imm;
+
+				if (off >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
+					verbose(env, "direct value offset of %u is not allowed\n", off);
+					fdput(f);
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
+
+				if (!map->ops->map_direct_value_addr) {
+					verbose(env, "no direct value access support for this map type\n");
+					fdput(f);
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
+
+				err = map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(map, &addr, off);
+				if (err) {
+					verbose(env, "invalid access to map value pointer, value_size=%u off=%u\n",
+						map->value_size, off);
+					fdput(f);
+					return err;
+				}
+
+				aux->map_off = off;
+				addr += off;
+			}
+
+			insn[0].imm = (u32)addr;
+			insn[1].imm = addr >> 32;
 
 			/* check whether we recorded this map already */
-			for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
+			for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++) {
 				if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
+					aux->map_index = j;
 					fdput(f);
 					goto next_insn;
 				}
+			}
 
 			if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
 				fdput(f);
@@ -6756,6 +6950,8 @@ static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				fdput(f);
 				return PTR_ERR(map);
 			}
+
+			aux->map_index = env->used_map_cnt;
 			env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
 
 			if (bpf_map_is_cgroup_storage(map) &&
@@ -6861,8 +7057,13 @@ static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 of
 	struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
 
 	new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
-	if (!new_prog)
+	if (IS_ERR(new_prog)) {
+		if (PTR_ERR(new_prog) == -ERANGE)
+			verbose(env,
+				"insn %d cannot be patched due to 16-bit range\n",
+				env->insn_aux_data[off].orig_idx);
 		return NULL;
+	}
 	if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len))
 		return NULL;
 	adjust_subprog_starts(env, off, len);
@@ -7804,6 +8005,14 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
 	int i;
 
+	sl = env->free_list;
+	while (sl) {
+		sln = sl->next;
+		free_verifier_state(&sl->state, false);
+		kfree(sl);
+		sl = sln;
+	}
+
 	if (!env->explored_states)
 		return;
 
@@ -7819,12 +8028,37 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			}
 	}
 
-	kfree(env->explored_states);
+	kvfree(env->explored_states);
+}
+
+static void print_verification_stats(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_STATS) {
+		verbose(env, "verification time %lld usec\n",
+			div_u64(env->verification_time, 1000));
+		verbose(env, "stack depth ");
+		for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
+			u32 depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
+
+			verbose(env, "%d", depth);
+			if (i + 1 < env->subprog_cnt)
+				verbose(env, "+");
+		}
+		verbose(env, "\n");
+	}
+	verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d) max_states_per_insn %d "
+		"total_states %d peak_states %d mark_read %d\n",
+		env->insn_processed, BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS,
+		env->max_states_per_insn, env->total_states,
+		env->peak_states, env->longest_mark_read_walk);
 }
 
 int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 	      union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
 {
+	u64 start_time = ktime_get_ns();
 	struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
 	struct bpf_verifier_log *log;
 	int i, len, ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -7866,8 +8100,8 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		/* log attributes have to be sane */
-		if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
-		    !log->level || !log->ubuf)
+		if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 2 ||
+		    !log->level || !log->ubuf || log->level & ~BPF_LOG_MASK)
 			goto err_unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -7890,7 +8124,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
 			goto skip_full_check;
 	}
 
-	env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
+	env->explored_states = kvcalloc(env->prog->len,
 				       sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
 				       GFP_USER);
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -7948,6 +8182,9 @@ skip_full_check:
 	if (ret == 0)
 		ret = fixup_call_args(env);
 
+	env->verification_time = ktime_get_ns() - start_time;
+	print_verification_stats(env);
+
 	if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log))
 		ret = -ENOSPC;
 	if (log->level && !log->ubuf) {