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-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/igmp.c9
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c42
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/ping.c12
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/route.c1
4 files changed, 45 insertions, 19 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/igmp.c b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
index 2ad3c7b42d6d..1d9e6d5e9a76 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/igmp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/igmp.c
@@ -2403,9 +2403,10 @@ int ip_mc_source(int add, int omode, struct sock *sk, struct
/* decrease mem now to avoid the memleak warning */
atomic_sub(struct_size(psl, sl_addr, psl->sl_max),
&sk->sk_omem_alloc);
- kfree_rcu(psl, rcu);
}
rcu_assign_pointer(pmc->sflist, newpsl);
+ if (psl)
+ kfree_rcu(psl, rcu);
psl = newpsl;
}
rv = 1; /* > 0 for insert logic below if sl_count is 0 */
@@ -2507,11 +2508,13 @@ int ip_mc_msfilter(struct sock *sk, struct ip_msfilter *msf, int ifindex)
/* decrease mem now to avoid the memleak warning */
atomic_sub(struct_size(psl, sl_addr, psl->sl_max),
&sk->sk_omem_alloc);
- kfree_rcu(psl, rcu);
- } else
+ } else {
(void) ip_mc_del_src(in_dev, &msf->imsf_multiaddr, pmc->sfmode,
0, NULL, 0);
+ }
rcu_assign_pointer(pmc->sflist, newpsl);
+ if (psl)
+ kfree_rcu(psl, rcu);
pmc->sfmode = msf->imsf_fmode;
err = 0;
done:
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 17440840a791..a5d57fa679ca 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ not_unique:
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
-static u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
+static u64 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
@@ -726,15 +726,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
* Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
* because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
* property might be used by clever attacker.
- * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
- * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
- * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
+ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though
+ * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really
+ * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel
+ * memory.
*/
-#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
-static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT)
+static u32 *table_perturb;
int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
- struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
+ struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
struct sock *, __u16, struct inet_timewait_sock **))
{
@@ -774,10 +776,13 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
if (likely(remaining > 1))
remaining &= ~1U;
- net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
- index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
+ net_get_random_once(table_perturb,
+ INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb));
+ index = port_offset & (INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE - 1);
+
+ offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32);
+ offset %= remaining;
- offset = (READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset) % remaining;
/* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
* inet_csk_get_port() does the opposite choice.
*/
@@ -831,11 +836,12 @@ next_port:
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
ok:
- /* If our first attempt found a candidate, skip next candidate
- * in 1/16 of cases to add some noise.
+ /* Here we want to add a little bit of randomness to the next source
+ * port that will be chosen. We use a max() with a random here so that
+ * on low contention the randomness is maximal and on high contention
+ * it may be inexistent.
*/
- if (!i && !(prandom_u32() % 16))
- i = 2;
+ i = max_t(int, i, (prandom_u32() & 7) * 2);
WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
@@ -859,7 +865,7 @@ ok:
int inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk)
{
- u32 port_offset = 0;
+ u64 port_offset = 0;
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
port_offset = inet_sk_port_offset(sk);
@@ -909,6 +915,12 @@ void __init inet_hashinfo2_init(struct inet_hashinfo *h, const char *name,
low_limit,
high_limit);
init_hashinfo_lhash2(h);
+
+ /* this one is used for source ports of outgoing connections */
+ table_perturb = kmalloc_array(INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE,
+ sizeof(*table_perturb), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!table_perturb)
+ panic("TCP: failed to alloc table_perturb");
}
int inet_hashinfo2_init_mod(struct inet_hashinfo *h)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
index 3ee947557b88..aa9a11b20d18 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
@@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ static int ping_check_bind_addr(struct sock *sk, struct inet_sock *isk,
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) uaddr;
+ u32 tb_id = RT_TABLE_LOCAL;
int chk_addr_ret;
if (addr_len < sizeof(*addr))
@@ -318,7 +319,8 @@ static int ping_check_bind_addr(struct sock *sk, struct inet_sock *isk,
pr_debug("ping_check_bind_addr(sk=%p,addr=%pI4,port=%d)\n",
sk, &addr->sin_addr.s_addr, ntohs(addr->sin_port));
- chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->sin_addr.s_addr);
+ tb_id = l3mdev_fib_table_by_index(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if) ? : tb_id;
+ chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type_table(net, addr->sin_addr.s_addr, tb_id);
if (!inet_addr_valid_or_nonlocal(net, inet_sk(sk),
addr->sin_addr.s_addr,
@@ -355,6 +357,14 @@ static int ping_check_bind_addr(struct sock *sk, struct inet_sock *isk,
return -ENODEV;
}
}
+
+ if (!dev && sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
+ dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
+ if (!dev) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ }
has_addr = pingv6_ops.ipv6_chk_addr(net, &addr->sin6_addr, dev,
scoped);
rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c
index 98c6f3429593..57abd27e842c 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -1753,6 +1753,7 @@ static int ip_route_input_mc(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
#endif
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_slow_mc);
+ skb_dst_drop(skb);
skb_dst_set(skb, &rth->dst);
return 0;
}