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-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/Kconfig11
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm.h7
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c79
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c206
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c18
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h1
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c18
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c19
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c70
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h2
13 files changed, 362 insertions, 83 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index e825e0ae78e7..d593346d0bba 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -42,6 +42,17 @@ config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+config EVM_ADD_XATTRS
+ bool "Add additional EVM extended attributes at runtime"
+ depends on EVM
+ default n
+ help
+ Allow userland to provide additional xattrs for HMAC calculation.
+
+ When this option is enabled, root can add additional xattrs to the
+ list used by EVM by writing them into
+ /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs.
+
config EVM_LOAD_X509
bool "Load an X509 certificate onto the '.evm' trusted keyring"
depends on EVM && INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 45c4a89c02ff..1257c3c24723 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@
#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE | \
EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
+struct xattr_list {
+ struct list_head list;
+ char *name;
+};
+
extern int evm_initialized;
#define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID 0x0001
@@ -40,7 +45,7 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
-extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
+extern struct list_head evm_config_xattrnames;
int evm_init_key(void);
int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index facf9cdd577d..b60524310855 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -192,8 +192,8 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
char type, char *digest)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct xattr_list *xattr;
struct shash_desc *desc;
- char **xattrname;
size_t xattr_size = 0;
char *xattr_value = NULL;
int error;
@@ -209,14 +209,14 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
return PTR_ERR(desc);
error = -ENODATA;
- for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
bool is_ima = false;
- if (strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
+ if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
is_ima = true;
if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
- && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) {
+ && !strcmp(xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) {
error = 0;
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
req_xattr_value_len);
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
ima_present = true;
continue;
}
- size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname,
+ size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, xattr->name,
&xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
if (size == -ENOMEM) {
error = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 9ea9c19a545c..f9eff5041e4c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -35,28 +35,29 @@ static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = {
};
int evm_hmac_attrs;
-char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
+static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
- XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+ {.name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
- XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+ {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACK},
#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
- XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC,
- XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
- XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP,
+ {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC},
+ {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE},
+ {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP},
#endif
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR,
+ {.name = XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
- XATTR_NAME_IMA,
+ {.name = XATTR_NAME_IMA},
#endif
- XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
- NULL
+ {.name = XATTR_NAME_CAPS},
};
+LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames);
+
static int evm_fixmode;
static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
{
@@ -68,6 +69,17 @@ __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
static void __init evm_init_config(void)
{
+ int i, xattrs;
+
+ xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(evm_config_default_xattrnames);
+
+ pr_info("Initialising EVM extended attributes:\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < xattrs; i++) {
+ pr_info("%s\n", evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].name);
+ list_add_tail(&evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].list,
+ &evm_config_xattrnames);
+ }
+
#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
#endif
@@ -82,15 +94,15 @@ static bool evm_key_loaded(void)
static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
- char **xattr;
+ struct xattr_list *xattr;
int error;
int count = 0;
if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- for (xattr = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattr != NULL; xattr++) {
- error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, *xattr, NULL, 0);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0);
if (error < 0) {
if (error == -ENODATA)
continue;
@@ -211,24 +223,25 @@ out:
static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
{
- char **xattrname;
int namelen;
int found = 0;
+ struct xattr_list *xattr;
namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name);
- for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) {
- if ((strlen(*xattrname) == namelen)
- && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, *xattrname, namelen) == 0)) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen)
+ && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
if (strncmp(req_xattr_name,
- *xattrname + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
+ xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN,
strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
+
return found;
}
@@ -544,35 +557,35 @@ void __init evm_load_x509(void)
static int __init init_evm(void)
{
int error;
+ struct list_head *pos, *q;
+ struct xattr_list *xattr;
evm_init_config();
error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM);
if (error)
- return error;
+ goto error;
error = evm_init_secfs();
if (error < 0) {
pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
- return error;
+ goto error;
}
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * evm_display_config - list the EVM protected security extended attributes
- */
-static int __init evm_display_config(void)
-{
- char **xattrname;
+error:
+ if (error != 0) {
+ if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) {
+ list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames) {
+ xattr = list_entry(pos, struct xattr_list,
+ list);
+ list_del(pos);
+ }
+ }
+ }
- for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++)
- pr_info("%s\n", *xattrname);
- return 0;
+ return error;
}
-pure_initcall(evm_display_config);
late_initcall(init_evm);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Extended Verification Module");
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index feba03bbedae..637eb999e340 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -15,11 +15,21 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include "evm.h"
+static struct dentry *evm_dir;
static struct dentry *evm_init_tpm;
+static struct dentry *evm_symlink;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ADD_XATTRS
+static struct dentry *evm_xattrs;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(xattr_list_mutex);
+static int evm_xattrs_locked;
+#endif
/**
* evm_read_key - read() for <securityfs>/evm
@@ -107,13 +117,203 @@ static const struct file_operations evm_key_ops = {
.write = evm_write_key,
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ADD_XATTRS
+/**
+ * evm_read_xattrs - read() for <securityfs>/evm_xattrs
+ *
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t evm_read_xattrs(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *temp;
+ int offset = 0;
+ ssize_t rc, size = 0;
+ struct xattr_list *xattr;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = mutex_lock_interruptible(&xattr_list_mutex);
+ if (rc)
+ return -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list)
+ size += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
+
+ temp = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!temp) {
+ mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ sprintf(temp + offset, "%s\n", xattr->name);
+ offset += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+ kfree(temp);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * evm_write_xattrs - write() for <securityfs>/evm_xattrs
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int len, err;
+ struct xattr_list *xattr, *tmp;
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ struct iattr newattrs;
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_xattrs_locked)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (count > XATTR_NAME_MAX)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR);
+ if (IS_ERR(ab))
+ return PTR_ERR(ab);
+
+ xattr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!xattr) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ xattr->name = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(xattr->name)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(xattr->name);
+ xattr->name = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Remove any trailing newline */
+ len = strlen(xattr->name);
+ if (len && xattr->name[len-1] == '\n')
+ xattr->name[len-1] = '\0';
+
+ if (strcmp(xattr->name, ".") == 0) {
+ evm_xattrs_locked = 1;
+ newattrs.ia_mode = S_IFREG | 0440;
+ newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
+ inode = evm_xattrs->d_inode;
+ inode_lock(inode);
+ err = simple_setattr(evm_xattrs, &newattrs);
+ inode_unlock(inode);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "locked");
+ if (!err)
+ err = count;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "xattr=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, xattr->name);
+
+ if (strncmp(xattr->name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+ XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) != 0) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Guard against races in evm_read_xattrs */
+ mutex_lock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry(tmp, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
+ if (strcmp(xattr->name, tmp->name) == 0) {
+ err = -EEXIST;
+ mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&xattr->list, &evm_config_xattrnames);
+ mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " res=0");
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ return count;
+out:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", err);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ if (xattr) {
+ kfree(xattr->name);
+ kfree(xattr);
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations evm_xattr_ops = {
+ .read = evm_read_xattrs,
+ .write = evm_write_xattrs,
+};
+
+static int evm_init_xattrs(void)
+{
+ evm_xattrs = securityfs_create_file("evm_xattrs", 0660, evm_dir, NULL,
+ &evm_xattr_ops);
+ if (!evm_xattrs || IS_ERR(evm_xattrs))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+static int evm_init_xattrs(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
int __init evm_init_secfs(void)
{
int error = 0;
- evm_init_tpm = securityfs_create_file("evm", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
- NULL, NULL, &evm_key_ops);
- if (!evm_init_tpm || IS_ERR(evm_init_tpm))
+ evm_dir = securityfs_create_dir("evm", integrity_dir);
+ if (!evm_dir || IS_ERR(evm_dir))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ evm_init_tpm = securityfs_create_file("evm", 0660,
+ evm_dir, NULL, &evm_key_ops);
+ if (!evm_init_tpm || IS_ERR(evm_init_tpm)) {
error = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ evm_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("evm", NULL,
+ "integrity/evm/evm", NULL);
+ if (!evm_symlink || IS_ERR(evm_symlink)) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (evm_init_xattrs() != 0) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+out:
+ securityfs_remove(evm_symlink);
+ securityfs_remove(evm_init_tpm);
+ securityfs_remove(evm_dir);
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index f266e4b3b7d4..149faa81f6f0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -21,12 +21,15 @@
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "integrity.h"
static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT;
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock);
static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
+struct dentry *integrity_dir;
+
/*
* __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode
*/
@@ -211,3 +214,18 @@ void __init integrity_load_keys(void)
ima_load_x509();
evm_load_x509();
}
+
+static int __init integrity_fs_init(void)
+{
+ integrity_dir = securityfs_create_dir("integrity", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(integrity_dir)) {
+ pr_err("Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: %ld\n",
+ PTR_ERR(integrity_dir));
+ integrity_dir = NULL;
+ return PTR_ERR(integrity_dir);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+late_initcall(integrity_fs_init)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 35fe91aa1fc9..354bb5716ce3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
extern int ima_policy_flag;
/* set during initialization */
-extern int ima_initialized;
extern int ima_used_chip;
extern int ima_hash_algo;
extern int ima_appraise;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index fa540c0469da..ae9d5c766a3c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
* implemenents security file system for reporting
* current measurement list and IMA statistics
*/
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -336,7 +339,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (data[0] == '/') {
result = ima_read_policy(data);
} else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) {
- pr_err("IMA: signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n");
+ pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n");
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
"policy_update", "signed policy required",
1, 0);
@@ -356,6 +359,7 @@ out:
}
static struct dentry *ima_dir;
+static struct dentry *ima_symlink;
static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements;
static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements;
static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
@@ -417,7 +421,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
valid_policy = 0;
}
- pr_info("IMA: policy update %s\n", cause);
+ pr_info("policy update %s\n", cause);
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
"policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0);
@@ -434,6 +438,8 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
ima_policy = NULL;
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
+ inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR;
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -448,10 +454,15 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
int __init ima_fs_init(void)
{
- ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", NULL);
+ ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
return -1;
+ ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", NULL, "integrity/ima",
+ NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(ima_symlink))
+ goto out;
+
binary_runtime_measurements =
securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements",
S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
@@ -491,6 +502,7 @@ out:
securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
+ securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
return -1;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
index e473eee913cb..16bd18747cfa 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 74d0bd7e76d7..dca44cf7838e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -32,8 +32,6 @@
#include "ima.h"
-int ima_initialized;
-
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
#else
@@ -61,14 +59,11 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
goto out;
}
- for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
- if (strcmp(str, hash_algo_name[i]) == 0) {
- ima_hash_algo = i;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+ i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, str);
+ if (i < 0)
return 1;
+
+ ima_hash_algo = i;
out:
hash_setup_done = 1;
return 1;
@@ -449,6 +444,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+ [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
[READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
[READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
@@ -517,10 +513,9 @@ static int __init init_ima(void)
error = ima_init();
}
- if (!error) {
- ima_initialized = 1;
+ if (!error)
ima_update_policy_flag();
- }
+
return error;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index d89bebf85421..cdcc9a7b4e24 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
#define IMA_EUID 0x0080
#define IMA_PCR 0x0100
+#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -74,6 +75,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
void *args_p; /* audit value */
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
+ char *fsname;
};
/*
@@ -273,6 +275,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
&& rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
return false;
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSNAME)
+ && strcmp(rule->fsname, inode->i_sb->s_type->name))
+ return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
!uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
return false;
@@ -435,6 +440,17 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
}
+static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
+{
+ if (func == MODULE_CHECK)
+ return IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
+ else if (func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
+ return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
+ else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
+ return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
*
@@ -473,9 +489,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
* Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to
* any other appraise rules.
*/
- for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++)
- list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list,
- &ima_default_rules);
+ for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) {
+ list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
+ temp_ima_appraise |=
+ ima_appraise_flag(secure_boot_rules[i].func);
+ }
for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
@@ -509,22 +527,9 @@ int ima_check_policy(void)
*/
void ima_update_policy(void)
{
- struct list_head *first, *last, *policy;
-
- /* append current policy with the new rules */
- first = (&ima_temp_rules)->next;
- last = (&ima_temp_rules)->prev;
- policy = &ima_policy_rules;
-
- synchronize_rcu();
+ struct list_head *policy = &ima_policy_rules;
- last->next = policy;
- rcu_assign_pointer(list_next_rcu(policy->prev), first);
- first->prev = policy->prev;
- policy->prev = last;
-
- /* prepare for the next policy rules addition */
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_temp_rules);
+ list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu);
if (ima_rules != policy) {
ima_policy_flag = 0;
@@ -540,7 +545,7 @@ enum {
Opt_audit, Opt_hash, Opt_dont_hash,
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
- Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
+ Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_fsname,
Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid_eq, Opt_euid_eq, Opt_fowner_eq,
Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
@@ -565,6 +570,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_func, "func=%s"},
{Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
+ {Opt_fsname, "fsname=%s"},
{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
{Opt_uid_eq, "uid=%s"},
{Opt_euid_eq, "euid=%s"},
@@ -776,6 +782,17 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
break;
+ case Opt_fsname:
+ ima_log_string(ab, "fsname", args[0].from);
+
+ entry->fsname = kstrdup(args[0].from, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entry->fsname) {
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ result = 0;
+ entry->flags |= IMA_FSNAME;
+ break;
case Opt_fsuuid:
ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
@@ -917,12 +934,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
}
if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
result = -EINVAL;
- else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK)
- temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
- else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
- temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
- else if (entry->func == POLICY_CHECK)
- temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ else if (entry->action == APPRAISE)
+ temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);
+
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
@@ -1104,6 +1118,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_FSNAME) {
+ snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%s", entry->fsname);
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_fsname), tbuf);
+ seq_puts(m, " ");
+ }
+
if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 5afaa53decc5..43752002c222 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
* Library of supported template fields.
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include "ima_template_lib.h"
static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 5e58e02ba8dc..0bb372eed62a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 2
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX 3
+extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen,
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-23 22:39:27 +0000