diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 9b8a6e79d858..421f7438d3c8 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -697,6 +697,15 @@ out: static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); } +static inline bool __is_real(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred) +{ return uid_eq(cred->uid, uid); } + +static inline bool __is_eff(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred) +{ return uid_eq(cred->euid, uid); } + +static inline bool __is_suid(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred) +{ return !__is_real(uid, cred) && __is_eff(uid, cred); } + /* * handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds @@ -722,7 +731,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. */ - if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) { + if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) { warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename); return; } @@ -731,7 +740,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, * executables under compatibility mode, we override the * capability sets for the file. */ - if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) { + if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) { /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */ new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset, old->cap_inheritable); @@ -739,7 +748,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, /* * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit. */ - if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) + if (__is_eff(root_uid, new)) *effective = true; } @@ -749,6 +758,13 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, !cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source) #define __cap_full(field, cred) \ cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field) + +static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); } + +static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); } + /** * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds @@ -785,7 +801,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. */ - is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); + is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old); if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) && ((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) || @@ -839,7 +855,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { if (!__cap_full(effective, new) || - !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || + !__is_eff(root_uid, new) || !__is_real(root_uid, new) || !root_privileged()) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); if (ret < 0) @@ -856,7 +872,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) bprm->cap_elevated = 0; if (is_setid) { bprm->cap_elevated = 1; - } else if (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) { + } else if (!__is_real(root_uid, new)) { if (effective || __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new)) bprm->cap_elevated = 1; |