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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Fix out-of-sync IVs in self-test for IPsec AEAD algorithms
Algorithms:
- Use formally verified implementation of x86/curve25519
Drivers:
- Enhance hwrng support in caam
- Use crypto_engine for skcipher/aead/rsa/hash in caam
- Add Xilinx AES driver
- Add uacce driver
- Register zip engine to uacce in hisilicon
- Add support for OCTEON TX CPT engine in marvell"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits)
crypto: af_alg - bool type cosmetics
crypto: arm[64]/poly1305 - add artifact to .gitignore files
crypto: caam - limit single JD RNG output to maximum of 16 bytes
crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG
bus: fsl-mc: add api to retrieve mc version
crypto: caam - invalidate entropy register during RNG initialization
crypto: caam - check if RNG job failed
crypto: caam - simplify RNG implementation
crypto: caam - drop global context pointer and init_done
crypto: caam - use struct hwrng's .init for initialization
crypto: caam - allocate RNG instantiation descriptor with GFP_DMA
crypto: ccree - remove duplicated include from cc_aead.c
crypto: chelsio - remove set but not used variable 'adap'
crypto: marvell - enable OcteonTX cpt options for build
crypto: marvell - add the Virtual Function driver for CPT
crypto: marvell - add support for OCTEON TX CPT engine
crypto: marvell - create common Kconfig and Makefile for Marvell
crypto: arm/neon - memzero_explicit aes-cbc key
crypto: bcm - Use scnprintf() for avoiding potential buffer overflow
crypto: atmel-i2c - Fix wakeup fail
...
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When the module is being removed, the module state is set to
MODULE_STATE_GOING. At this point, try_module_get() fails.
And when {full/open}_proxy_open() is being called,
it calls try_module_get() to try to hold module reference count.
If it fails, it warns about the possibility of debugfs file leak.
If {full/open}_proxy_open() is called while the module is being removed,
it fails to hold the module.
So, It warns about debugfs file leak. But it is not the debugfs file
leak case. So, this patch just adds module state checking routine
in the {full/open}_proxy_open().
Test commands:
#SHELL1
while :
do
modprobe netdevsim
echo 1 > /sys/bus/netdevsim/new_device
modprobe -rv netdevsim
done
#SHELL2
while :
do
cat /sys/kernel/debug/netdevsim/netdevsim1/ports/0/ipsec
done
Splat looks like:
[ 298.766738][T14664] debugfs file owner did not clean up at exit: ipsec
[ 298.766766][T14664] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 14664 at fs/debugfs/file.c:312 full_proxy_open+0x10f/0x650
[ 298.768595][T14664] Modules linked in: netdevsim(-) openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 n][ 298.771343][T14664] CPU: 2 PID: 14664 Comm: cat Tainted: G W 5.5.0+ #1
[ 298.772373][T14664] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[ 298.773545][T14664] RIP: 0010:full_proxy_open+0x10f/0x650
[ 298.774247][T14664] Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 c1 04 00 00 49 8b 3c 24 e8 e4 b5 78 ff 84 c0 75 2d 4c 89 ee 48
[ 298.776782][T14664] RSP: 0018:ffff88805b7df9b8 EFLAGS: 00010282[ 298.777583][T14664] RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: ffff8880511725c0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 298.778610][T14664] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: ffff8880540c5c14
[ 298.779637][T14664] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: fffffbfff15235ad R09: 0000000000000000
[ 298.780664][T14664] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffc06b5000
[ 298.781702][T14664] R13: ffff88804c234a88 R14: ffff88804c22dd00 R15: ffffffff8a1b5660
[ 298.782722][T14664] FS: 00007fafa13a8540(0000) GS:ffff88806c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 298.783845][T14664] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 298.784672][T14664] CR2: 00007fafa0e9cd10 CR3: 000000004b286005 CR4: 00000000000606e0
[ 298.785739][T14664] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 298.786769][T14664] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 298.787785][T14664] Call Trace:
[ 298.788237][T14664] do_dentry_open+0x63c/0xf50
[ 298.788872][T14664] ? open_proxy_open+0x270/0x270
[ 298.789524][T14664] ? __x64_sys_fchdir+0x180/0x180
[ 298.790169][T14664] ? inode_permission+0x65/0x390
[ 298.790832][T14664] path_openat+0xc45/0x2680
[ 298.791425][T14664] ? save_stack+0x69/0x80
[ 298.791988][T14664] ? save_stack+0x19/0x80
[ 298.792544][T14664] ? path_mountpoint+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 298.793233][T14664] ? check_chain_key+0x236/0x5d0
[ 298.793910][T14664] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x170
[ 298.794527][T14664] ? find_held_lock+0x39/0x1d0
[ 298.795153][T14664] do_filp_open+0x16a/0x260
[ ... ]
Fixes: 9fd4dcece43a ("debugfs: prevent access to possibly dead file_operations at file open")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200218043150.29447-1-ap420073@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Hardware registers of devices under control of power management cannot
be accessed at all times. If such a device is suspended, register
accesses may lead to undefined behavior, like reading bogus values, or
causing exceptions or system lock-ups.
Extend struct debugfs_regset32 with an optional field to let device
drivers specify the device the registers in the set belong to. This
allows debugfs_show_regset32() to make sure the device is resumed while
its registers are being read.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund@ragnatech.se>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_regset32(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191122104453.GA2017837@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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When lockdown is enabled, debugfs_is_locked_down returns 1. It will then
trigger the following:
WARNING: CPU: 48 PID: 3747
CPU: 48 PID: 3743 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.4.0-1946.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X7-2/ASM, MB, X7-2, BIOS 41060400 05/20/2019
RIP: 0010:do_dentry_open+0x343/0x3a0
Code: 00 40 08 00 45 31 ff 48 c7 43 28 40 5b e7 89 e9 02 ff ff ff 48 8b 53 28 4c 8b 72 70 4d 85 f6 0f 84 10 fe ff ff e9 f5 fd ff ff <0f> 0b 41 bf ea ff ff ff e9 3b ff ff ff 41 bf e6 ff ff ff e9 b4 fe
RSP: 0018:ffffb8740dde7ca0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: ffffffff89e88a40 RBX: ffff928c8e6b6f00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff928dbfd97778 RDI: ffff9285cff685c0
RBP: ffffb8740dde7cc8 R08: 0000000000000821 R09: 0000000000000030
R10: 0000000000000057 R11: ffffb8740dde7a98 R12: ffff926ec781c900
R13: ffff928c8e6b6f10 R14: ffffffff8936e190 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f45f6777740(0000) GS:ffff928dbfd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fff95e0d5d8 CR3: 0000001ece562006 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
vfs_open+0x2d/0x30
path_openat+0x2d4/0x1680
? tty_mode_ioctl+0x298/0x4c0
do_filp_open+0x93/0x100
? strncpy_from_user+0x57/0x1b0
? __alloc_fd+0x46/0x150
do_sys_open+0x182/0x230
__x64_sys_openat+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x170/0x1d5
RIP: 0033:0x7f45f5e5ce02
Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 4c 48 8d 05 25 59 2d 00 8b 00 85 c0 75 6d 89 f2 b8 01 01 00 00 48 89 fe bf 9c ff ff ff 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 a2 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c 25
RSP: 002b:00007fff95e0d2e0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561178c069b0 RCX: 00007f45f5e5ce02
RDX: 0000000000000241 RSI: 0000561178c08800 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
RBP: 00007fff95e0d3e0 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 0000000000000005
R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000561178c08800
Change the return type to int and return -EPERM when lockdown is enabled
to remove the warning above. Also rename debugfs_is_locked_down to
debugfs_locked_down to make it sound less like it returns a boolean.
Fixes: 5496197f9b08 ("debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down")
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191207161603.35907-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Fix the following warnings:
fs/debugfs/inode.c:423: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/inode.c:502: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/inode.c:534: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/inode.c:627: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/file.c:496: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/file.c:502: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/file.c:581: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/file.c:587: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/file.c:846: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/file.c:852: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/file.c:899: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/file.c:905: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/file.c:1091: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
fs/debugfs/file.c:1097: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string
By replacing %ERR_PTR with ERR_PTR.
Signed-off-by: Daniel W. S. Almeida <dwlsalmeida@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191227010035.854913-1-dwlsalmeida@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_atomic_t(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191016130332.GA28240@kroah.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_x8(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191011132931.1186197-5-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_x64(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191011132931.1186197-8-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_x32(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191011132931.1186197-7-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_x16(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191011132931.1186197-6-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_size_t(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191011132931.1186197-4-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_u64(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191011132931.1186197-3-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_u16(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191011132931.1186197-2-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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No one checks the return value of debugfs_create_u8(), as it's not
needed, so make the return value void, so that no one tries to do so in
the future.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191011132931.1186197-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
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Disallow opening of debugfs files that might be used to muck around when
the kernel is locked down as various drivers give raw access to hardware
through debugfs. Given the effort of auditing all 2000 or so files and
manually fixing each one as necessary, I've chosen to apply a heuristic
instead. The following changes are made:
(1) chmod and chown are disallowed on debugfs objects (though the root dir
can be modified by mount and remount, but I'm not worried about that).
(2) When the kernel is locked down, only files with the following criteria
are permitted to be opened:
- The file must have mode 00444
- The file must not have ioctl methods
- The file must not have mmap
(3) When the kernel is locked down, files may only be opened for reading.
Normal device interaction should be done through configfs, sysfs or a
miscdev, not debugfs.
Note that this makes it unnecessary to specifically lock down show_dsts(),
show_devs() and show_call() in the asus-wmi driver.
I would actually prefer to lock down all files by default and have the
the files unlocked by the creator. This is tricky to manage correctly,
though, as there are 19 creation functions and ~1600 call sites (some of
them in loops scanning tables).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
cc: acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The single user of debugfs_create_u32_array() does not care about the
return value of it, so make it return void as there is no need to do
anything with the return value.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Since commit ff9fb72bc077 ("debugfs: return error values, not NULL")
these helper functions do not return NULL anymore (with the exception
of debugfs_create_u32_array()).
Fixes: ff9fb72bc077 ("debugfs: return error values, not NULL")
Signed-off-by: Ronald Tschalär <ronald@innovation.ch>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Re-use kstrtobool_from_user() instead of open coded variant.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This is the mindless scripted replacement of kernel use of POLL*
variables as described by Al, done by this script:
for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\<POLL$V\>\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
done
with de-mangling cleanups yet to come.
NOTE! On almost all architectures, the EPOLL* constants have the same
values as the POLL* constants do. But they keyword here is "almost".
For various bad reasons they aren't the same, and epoll() doesn't
actually work quite correctly in some cases due to this on Sparc et al.
The next patch from Al will sort out the final differences, and we
should be all done.
Scripted-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The only place that has any business including asm/poll.h
is linux/poll.h. Fortunately, asm/poll.h had only been
included in 3 places beyond that one, and all of them
are trivial to switch to using linux/poll.h.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Now that the SPDX tag is in all debugfs files, that identifies the
license in a specific and legally-defined manner. So the extra GPL text
wording can be removed as it is no longer needed at all.
This is done on a quest to remove the 700+ different ways that files in
the kernel describe the GPL license text. And there's unneeded stuff
like the address (sometimes incorrect) for the FSF which is never
needed.
No copyright headers or other non-license-description text was removed.
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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It's good to have SPDX identifiers in all files to make it easier to
audit the kernel tree for correct licenses.
Update the debugfs files files with the correct SPDX license identifier
based on the license text in the file itself. The SPDX identifier is a
legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler
plate text.
This work is based on a script and data from Thomas Gleixner, Philippe
Ombredanne, and Kate Stewart.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Currently, __debugfs_create_file allocates one struct debugfs_fsdata
instance for every file created. However, there are potentially many
debugfs file around, most of which are never touched by userspace.
Thus, defer the allocations to the first usage, i.e. to the first
debugfs_file_get().
A dentry's ->d_fsdata starts out to point to the "real", user provided
fops. After a debugfs_fsdata instance has been allocated (and the real
fops pointer has been moved over into its ->real_fops member),
->d_fsdata is changed to point to it from then on. The two cases are
distinguished by setting BIT(0) for the real fops case.
struct debugfs_fsdata's foremost purpose is to track active users and to
make debugfs_remove() block until they are done. Since no debugfs_fsdata
instance means no active users, make debugfs_remove() return immediately
in this case.
Take care of possible races between debugfs_file_get() and
debugfs_remove(): either debugfs_remove() must see a debugfs_fsdata
instance and thus wait for possible active users or debugfs_file_get() must
see a dead dentry and return immediately.
Make a dentry's ->d_release(), i.e. debugfs_release_dentry(), check whether
->d_fsdata is actually a debugfs_fsdata instance before kfree()ing it.
Similarly, make debugfs_real_fops() check whether ->d_fsdata is actually
a debugfs_fsdata instance before returning it, otherwise emit a warning.
The set of possible error codes returned from debugfs_file_get() has grown
from -EIO to -EIO and -ENOMEM. Make open_proxy_open() and full_proxy_open()
pass the -ENOMEM onwards to their callers.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The current implementation of debugfs_real_fops() relies on a
debugfs_fsdata instance to be installed at ->d_fsdata.
With future patches introducing lazy allocation of these, this requirement
will be guaranteed to be fullfilled only inbetween a
debugfs_file_get()/debugfs_file_put() pair.
The full proxies' fops implemented by debugfs happen to be the only
offenders. Fix them up by moving their debugfs_real_fops() calls past those
to debugfs_file_get().
full_proxy_release() is special as it doesn't invoke debugfs_file_get() at
all. Leave it alone for now.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Purge the SRCU based file removal race protection in favour of the new,
refcount based debugfs_file_get()/debugfs_file_put() API.
Fixes: 49d200deaa68 ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data")
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Convert all calls to the now obsolete debugfs_use_file_start() and
debugfs_use_file_finish() from the debugfs core itself to the new
debugfs_file_get() and debugfs_file_put() API.
Fixes: 49d200deaa68 ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data")
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Currently, debugfs_real_fops() is annotated with a
__must_hold(&debugfs_srcu) sparse annotation.
With the conversion of the SRCU based protection of users against
concurrent file removals to a per-file refcount based scheme, this becomes
wrong.
Drop this annotation.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Since commit 49d200deaa68 ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files'
private data"), accesses to a file's private data are protected from
concurrent removal by covering all file_operations with a SRCU read section
and sychronizing with those before returning from debugfs_remove() by means
of synchronize_srcu().
As pointed out by Johannes Berg, there are debugfs files with forever
blocking file_operations. Their corresponding SRCU read side sections would
block any debugfs_remove() forever as well, even unrelated ones. This
results in a livelock. Because a remover can't cancel any indefinite
blocking within foreign files, this is a problem.
Resolve this by introducing support for more granular protection on a
per-file basis.
This is implemented by introducing an 'active_users' refcount_t to the
per-file struct debugfs_fsdata state. At file creation time, it is set to
one and a debugfs_remove() will drop that initial reference. The new
debugfs_file_get() and debugfs_file_put(), intended to be used in place of
former debugfs_use_file_start() and debugfs_use_file_finish(), increment
and decrement it respectively. Once the count drops to zero,
debugfs_file_put() will signal a completion which is possibly being waited
for from debugfs_remove().
Thus, as long as there is a debugfs_file_get() not yet matched by a
corresponding debugfs_file_put() around, debugfs_remove() will block.
Actual users of debugfs_use_file_start() and -finish() will get converted
to the new debugfs_file_get() and debugfs_file_put() by followup patches.
Fixes: 49d200deaa68 ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private data")
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Currently, the user provided fops, "real_fops", are stored directly into
->d_fsdata.
In order to be able to store more per-file state and thus prepare for more
granular file removal protection, wrap the real_fops into a dynamically
allocated container struct, debugfs_fsdata.
A struct debugfs_fsdata gets allocated at file creation and freed from the
newly intoduced ->d_release().
Finally, move the implementation of debugfs_real_fops() out of the public
debugfs header such that struct debugfs_fsdata's declaration can be kept
private.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The filesystem documentation was moved from DocBook to
Documentation/filesystems/. Update it at the sources.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
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The result was being ignored and 0 was always returned.
Return the actual result instead.
Signed-off-by: Eric Engestrom <eric.engestrom@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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This patch introduces an accessor which can be used
by the users of debugfs (drivers, fs, ...) to get the
original file_operations struct. It also removes the
REAL_FOPS_DEREF macro in file.c and converts the code
to use the public version.
Previously, REAL_FOPS_DEREF was only available within
the file.c of debugfs. But having a public getter
available for debugfs users is important as some
drivers (carl9170 and b43) use the pointer of the
original file_operations in conjunction with container_of()
within their debugfs implementations.
Reviewed-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Debugfs' open_proxy_open(), the ->open() installed at all inodes created
through debugfs_create_file_unsafe(),
- grabs a reference to the original file_operations instance passed to
debugfs_create_file_unsafe() via fops_get(),
- installs it at the file's ->f_op by means of replace_fops()
- and calls fops_put() on it.
Since the semantics of replace_fops() are such that the reference's
ownership is transferred, the subsequent fops_put() will result in a double
release when the file is eventually closed.
Currently, this is not an issue since fops_put() basically does a
module_put() on the file_operations' ->owner only and there don't exist any
modules calling debugfs_create_file_unsafe() yet. This is expected to
change in the future though, c.f. commit c64688081490 ("debugfs: add
support for self-protecting attribute file fops").
Remove the call to fops_put() from open_proxy_open().
Fixes: 9fd4dcece43a ("debugfs: prevent access to possibly dead
file_operations at file open")
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Debugfs' full_proxy_open(), the ->open() installed at all inodes created
through debugfs_create_file(),
- grabs a reference to the original struct file_operations instance passed
to debugfs_create_file(),
- dynamically allocates a proxy struct file_operations instance wrapping
the original
- and installs this at the file's ->f_op.
Afterwards, it calls the original ->open() and passes its return value back
to the VFS layer.
Now, if that return value indicates failure, the VFS layer won't ever call
->release() and thus, neither the reference to the original file_operations
nor the memory for the proxy file_operations will get released, i.e. both
are leaked.
Upon failure of the original fops' ->open(), undo the proxy installation.
That is:
- Set the struct file ->f_op to what it had been when full_proxy_open()
was entered.
- Drop the reference to the original file_operations.
- Free the memory holding the proxy file_operations.
Fixes: 49d200deaa68 ("debugfs: prevent access to removed files' private
data")
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The struct file_operations u32_array_fops associated with files created
through debugfs_create_u32_array() has been lifetime aware already:
everything needed for subsequent operation is copied to a ->f_private
buffer at file opening time in u32_array_open(). Now, ->open() is always
protected against file removal issues by the debugfs core.
There is no need for the debugfs core to wrap the u32_array_fops
with a file lifetime managing proxy.
Make debugfs_create_u32_array() create its files in non-proxying operation
mode by means of debugfs_create_file_unsafe().
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Currently, the struct file_operations fops_blob associated with files
created through the debugfs_create_blob() helpers are not file
lifetime aware.
Thus, a lifetime managing proxy is created around fops_blob each time such
a file is opened which is an unnecessary waste of resources.
Implement file lifetime management for the fops_bool file_operations.
Namely, make read_file_blob() safe gainst file removals by means of
debugfs_use_file_start() and debugfs_use_file_finish().
Make debugfs_create_blob() create its files in non-proxying operation mode
by means of debugfs_create_file_unsafe().
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Currently, the struct file_operations fops_bool associated with files
created through the debugfs_create_bool() helpers are not file
lifetime aware.
Thus, a lifetime managing proxy is created around fops_bool each time such
a file is opened which is an unnecessary waste of resources.
Implement file lifetime management for the fops_bool file_operations.
Namely, make debugfs_read_file_bool() and debugfs_write_file_bool() safe
against file removals by means of debugfs_use_file_start() and
debugfs_use_file_finish().
Make debugfs_create_bool() create its files in non-proxying operation mode
through debugfs_create_mode_unsafe().
Finally, purge debugfs_create_mode() as debugfs_create_bool() had been its
last user.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Currently, the struct file_operations associated with the integer attribute
style files created through the debugfs_create_*() helpers are not file
lifetime aware as they are defined by means of DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE().
Thus, a lifetime managing proxy is created around the original fops each
time such a file is opened which is an unnecessary waste of resources.
Migrate all usages of DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE() within debugfs itself
to DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE() in order to implement file lifetime managing
within the struct file_operations thus defined.
Introduce the debugfs_create_mode_unsafe() helper, analogous to
debugfs_create_mode(), but distinct in that it creates the files in
non-proxying operation mode through debugfs_create_file_unsafe().
Feed all struct file_operations migrated to DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE()
into debugfs_create_mode_unsafe() instead of former debugfs_create_mode().
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In order to protect them against file removal issues, debugfs_create_file()
creates a lifetime managing proxy around each struct file_operations
handed in.
In cases where this struct file_operations is able to manage file lifetime
by itself already, the proxy created by debugfs is a waste of resources.
The most common class of struct file_operations given to debugfs are those
defined by means of the DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE() macro.
Introduce a DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE() macro to allow any
struct file_operations of this class to be easily made file lifetime aware
and thus, to be operated unproxied.
Specifically, introduce debugfs_attr_read() and debugfs_attr_write()
which wrap simple_attr_read() and simple_attr_write() under the protection
of a debugfs_use_file_start()/debugfs_use_file_finish() pair.
Make DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE() set the defined struct file_operations'
->read() and ->write() members to these wrappers.
Export debugfs_create_file_unsafe() in order to allow debugfs users to
create their files in non-proxying operation mode.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Upon return of debugfs_remove()/debugfs_remove_recursive(), it might
still be attempted to access associated private file data through
previously opened struct file objects. If that data has been freed by
the caller of debugfs_remove*() in the meanwhile, the reading/writing
process would either encounter a fault or, if the memory address in
question has been reassigned again, unrelated data structures could get
overwritten.
However, since debugfs files are seldomly removed, usually from module
exit handlers only, the impact is very low.
Currently, there are ~1000 call sites of debugfs_create_file() spread
throughout the whole tree and touching all of those struct file_operations
in order to make them file removal aware by means of checking the result of
debugfs_use_file_start() from within their methods is unfeasible.
Instead, wrap the struct file_operations by a lifetime managing proxy at
file open:
- In debugfs_create_file(), the original fops handed in has got stashed
away in ->d_fsdata already.
- In debugfs_create_file(), install a proxy file_operations factory,
debugfs_full_proxy_file_operations, at ->i_fop.
This proxy factory has got an ->open() method only. It carries out some
lifetime checks and if successful, dynamically allocates and sets up a new
struct file_operations proxy at ->f_op. Afterwards, it forwards to the
->open() of the original struct file_operations in ->d_fsdata, if any.
The dynamically set up proxy at ->f_op has got a lifetime managing wrapper
set for each of the methods defined in the original struct file_operations
in ->d_fsdata.
Its ->release()er frees the proxy again and forwards to the original
->release(), if any.
In order not to mislead the VFS layer, it is strictly necessary to leave
those fields blank in the proxy that have been NULL in the original
struct file_operations also, i.e. aren't supported. This is why there is a
need for dynamically allocated proxies. The choice made not to allocate a
proxy instance for every dentry at file creation, but for every
struct file object instantiated thereof is justified by the expected usage
pattern of debugfs, namely that in general very few files get opened more
than once at a time.
The wrapper methods set in the struct file_operations implement lifetime
managing by means of the SRCU protection facilities already in place for
debugfs:
They set up a SRCU read side critical section and check whether the dentry
is still alive by means of debugfs_use_file_start(). If so, they forward
the call to the original struct file_operation stored in ->d_fsdata, still
under the protection of the SRCU read side critical section.
This SRCU read side critical section prevents any pending debugfs_remove()
and friends to return to their callers. Since a file's private data must
only be freed after the return of debugfs_remove(), the ongoing proxied
call is guarded against any file removal race.
If, on the other hand, the initial call to debugfs_use_file_start() detects
that the dentry is dead, the wrapper simply returns -EIO and does not
forward the call. Note that the ->poll() wrapper is special in that its
signature does not allow for the return of arbitrary -EXXX values and thus,
POLLHUP is returned here.
In order not to pollute debugfs with wrapper definitions that aren't ever
needed, I chose not to define a wrapper for every struct file_operations
method possible. Instead, a wrapper is defined only for the subset of
methods which are actually set by any debugfs users.
Currently, these are:
->llseek()
->read()
->write()
->unlocked_ioctl()
->poll()
The ->release() wrapper is special in that it does not protect the original
->release() in any way from dead files in order not to leak resources.
Thus, any ->release() handed to debugfs must implement file lifetime
management manually, if needed.
For only 33 out of a total of 434 releasers handed in to debugfs, it could
not be verified immediately whether they access data structures that might
have been freed upon a debugfs_remove() return in the meanwhile.
Export debugfs_use_file_start() and debugfs_use_file_finish() in order to
allow any ->release() to manually implement file lifetime management.
For a set of common cases of struct file_operations implemented by the
debugfs_core itself, future patches will incorporate file lifetime
management directly within those in order to allow for their unproxied
operation. Rename the original, non-proxying "debugfs_create_file()" to
"debugfs_create_file_unsafe()" and keep it for future internal use by
debugfs itself. Factor out code common to both into the new
__debugfs_create_file().
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Nothing prevents a dentry found by path lookup before a return of
__debugfs_remove() to actually get opened after that return. Now, after
the return of __debugfs_remove(), there are no guarantees whatsoever
regarding the memory the corresponding inode's file_operations object
had been kept in.
Since __debugfs_remove() is seldomly invoked, usually from module exit
handlers only, the race is hard to trigger and the impact is very low.
A discussion of the problem outlined above as well as a suggested
solution can be found in the (sub-)thread rooted at
http://lkml.kernel.org/g/20130401203445.GA20862@ZenIV.linux.org.uk
("Yet another pipe related oops.")
Basically, Greg KH suggests to introduce an intermediate fops and
Al Viro points out that a pointer to the original ones may be stored in
->d_fsdata.
Follow this line of reasoning:
- Add SRCU as a reverse dependency of DEBUG_FS.
- Introduce a srcu_struct object for the debugfs subsystem.
- In debugfs_create_file(), store a pointer to the original
file_operations object in ->d_fsdata.
- Make debugfs_remove() and debugfs_remove_recursive() wait for a
SRCU grace period after the dentry has been delete()'d and before they
return to their callers.
- Introduce an intermediate file_operations object named
"debugfs_open_proxy_file_operations". It's ->open() functions checks,
under the protection of a SRCU read lock, whether the dentry is still
alive, i.e. has not been d_delete()'d and if so, tries to acquire a
reference on the owning module.
On success, it sets the file object's ->f_op to the original
file_operations and forwards the ongoing open() call to the original
->open().
- For clarity, rename the former debugfs_file_operations to
debugfs_noop_file_operations -- they are in no way canonical.
The choice of SRCU over "normal" RCU is justified by the fact, that the
former may also be used to protect ->i_private data from going away
during the execution of a file's readers and writers which may (and do)
sleep.
Finally, introduce the fs/debugfs/internal.h header containing some
declarations internal to the debugfs implementation.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Add debugfs_create_ulong() for the users of type 'unsigned long'. These
will be 32 bits long on a 32 bit machine and 64 bits long on a 64 bit
machine.
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There aren't any read-only or write-only bool file ops, but there
is a caller of debugfs_create_bool() that calls it with mode
equal to 0400. This leads to the possibility of userspace
modifying the file, so let's use the newly created
debugfs_create_mode() helper here to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There aren't any read-only or write-only size_t file ops, but there
is a caller of debugfs_create_size_t() that calls it with mode
equal to 0400. This leads to the possibility of userspace
modifying the file, so let's use the newly created
debugfs_create_mode() helper here to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There aren't any read-only or write-only x64 file ops, but there
is a caller of debugfs_create_x64() that calls it with mode equal
to S_IRUGO. This leads to the possibility of userspace modifying
the file, so let's use the newly created debugfs_create_mode()
helper here to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The code that creates debugfs file with different file ops based
on the file mode is duplicated in each debugfs_create_*() API.
Consolidate that code into debugfs_create_mode(), that takes
three file ops structures so that we don't have to keep
copy/pasting that logic.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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