Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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commit a0fc452a5d7fed986205539259df1d60546f536c upstream.
O_TMPFILE is actually __O_TMPFILE|O_DIRECTORY. This means that the old
fast-path check for RESOLVE_CACHED would reject all users passing
O_DIRECTORY with -EAGAIN, when in fact the intended test was to check
for __O_TMPFILE.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.12+
Fixes: 99668f618062 ("fs: expose LOOKUP_CACHED through openat2() RESOLVE_CACHED")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Message-Id: <20230806-resolve_cached-o_tmpfile-v1-1-7ba16308465e@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 43b450632676fb60e9faeddff285d9fac94a4f58 ]
After a couple of years and multiple LTS releases we received a report
that the behavior of O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT changed starting with v5.7.
On kernels prior to v5.7 combinations of O_DIRECTORY, O_CREAT, O_EXCL
had the following semantics:
(1) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT)
* d doesn't exist: create regular file
* d exists and is a regular file: ENOTDIR
* d exists and is a directory: EISDIR
(2) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: create regular file
* d exists and is a regular file: EEXIST
* d exists and is a directory: EEXIST
(3) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: ENOENT
* d exists and is a regular file: ENOTDIR
* d exists and is a directory: open directory
On kernels since to v5.7 combinations of O_DIRECTORY, O_CREAT, O_EXCL
have the following semantics:
(1) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT)
* d doesn't exist: ENOTDIR (create regular file)
* d exists and is a regular file: ENOTDIR
* d exists and is a directory: EISDIR
(2) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: ENOTDIR (create regular file)
* d exists and is a regular file: EEXIST
* d exists and is a directory: EEXIST
(3) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: ENOENT
* d exists and is a regular file: ENOTDIR
* d exists and is a directory: open directory
This is a fairly substantial semantic change that userspace didn't
notice until Pedro took the time to deliberately figure out corner
cases. Since no one noticed this breakage we can somewhat safely assume
that O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT combinations are likely unused.
The v5.7 breakage is especially weird because while ENOTDIR is returned
indicating failure a regular file is actually created. This doesn't make
a lot of sense.
Time was spent finding potential users of this combination. Searching on
codesearch.debian.net showed that codebases often express semantical
expectations about O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT which are completely contrary
to what our code has done and currently does.
The expectation often is that this particular combination would create
and open a directory. This suggests users who tried to use that
combination would stumble upon the counterintuitive behavior no matter
if pre-v5.7 or post v5.7 and quickly realize neither semantics give them
what they want. For some examples see the code examples in [1] to [3]
and the discussion in [4].
There are various ways to address this issue. The lazy/simple option
would be to restore the pre-v5.7 behavior and to just live with that bug
forever. But since there's a real chance that the O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT
quirk isn't relied upon we should try to get away with murder(ing bad
semantics) first. If we need to Frankenstein pre-v5.7 behavior later so
be it.
So let's simply return EINVAL categorically for O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT
combinations. In addition to cleaning up the old bug this also opens up
the possiblity to make that flag combination do something more intuitive
in the future.
Starting with this commit the following semantics apply:
(1) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT)
* d doesn't exist: EINVAL
* d exists and is a regular file: EINVAL
* d exists and is a directory: EINVAL
(2) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: EINVAL
* d exists and is a regular file: EINVAL
* d exists and is a directory: EINVAL
(3) open("/tmp/d", O_DIRECTORY | O_EXCL)
* d doesn't exist: ENOENT
* d exists and is a regular file: ENOTDIR
* d exists and is a directory: open directory
One additional note, O_TMPFILE is implemented as:
#define __O_TMPFILE 020000000
#define O_TMPFILE (__O_TMPFILE | O_DIRECTORY)
#define O_TMPFILE_MASK (__O_TMPFILE | O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT)
For older kernels it was important to return an explicit error when
O_TMPFILE wasn't supported. So O_TMPFILE requires that O_DIRECTORY is
raised alongside __O_TMPFILE. It also enforced that O_CREAT wasn't
specified. Since O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT could be used to create a regular
allowing that combination together with __O_TMPFILE would've meant that
false positives were possible, i.e., that a regular file was created
instead of a O_TMPFILE. This could've been used to trick userspace into
thinking it operated on a O_TMPFILE when it wasn't.
Now that we block O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT completely the check for O_CREAT
in the __O_TMPFILE branch via if ((flags & O_TMPFILE_MASK) != O_TMPFILE)
can be dropped. Instead we can simply check verify that O_DIRECTORY is
raised via if (!(flags & O_DIRECTORY)) and explain this in two comments.
As Aleksa pointed out O_PATH is unaffected by this change since it
always returned EINVAL if O_CREAT was specified - with or without
O_DIRECTORY.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230320071442.172228-1-pedro.falcato@gmail.com
Link: https://sources.debian.org/src/flatpak/1.14.4-1/subprojects/libglnx/glnx-dirfd.c/?hl=324#L324 [1]
Link: https://sources.debian.org/src/flatpak-builder/1.2.3-1/subprojects/libglnx/glnx-shutil.c/?hl=251#L251 [2]
Link: https://sources.debian.org/src/ostree/2022.7-2/libglnx/glnx-dirfd.c/?hl=324#L324 [3]
Link: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/11/26/14 [4]
Reported-by: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 47d586913f2abec4d240bae33417f537fda987ec ]
Currently, filp_close() and generic_shutdown_super() use printk() to log
messages when bugs are detected. This is problematic because infrastructure
like syzkaller has no idea that this message indicates a bug.
In addition, some people explicitly want their kernels to BUG() when kernel
data corruption has been detected (CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION).
And finally, when generic_shutdown_super() detects remaining inodes on a
system without CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION, it would be nice if later
accesses to a busy inode would at least crash somewhat cleanly rather than
walking through freed memory.
To address all three, use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() when kernel bugs are
detected.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit ed5a7047d2011cb6b2bf84ceb6680124cc6a7d95 upstream.
Currently setgid stripping in file_remove_privs()'s should_remove_suid()
helper is inconsistent with other parts of the vfs. Specifically, it only
raises ATTR_KILL_SGID if the inode is S_ISGID and S_IXGRP but not if the
inode isn't in the caller's groups and the caller isn't privileged over the
inode although we require this already in setattr_prepare() and
setattr_copy() and so all filesystem implement this requirement implicitly
because they have to use setattr_{prepare,copy}() anyway.
But the inconsistency shows up in setgid stripping bugs for overlayfs in
xfstests (e.g., generic/673, generic/683, generic/685, generic/686,
generic/687). For example, we test whether suid and setgid stripping works
correctly when performing various write-like operations as an unprivileged
user (fallocate, reflink, write, etc.):
echo "Test 1 - qa_user, non-exec file $verb"
setup_testfile
chmod a+rws $junk_file
commit_and_check "$qa_user" "$verb" 64k 64k
The test basically creates a file with 6666 permissions. While the file has
the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits set it does not have the S_IXGRP set. On a
regular filesystem like xfs what will happen is:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> setattr_copy()
In should_remove_suid() we can see that ATTR_KILL_SUID is raised
unconditionally because the file in the test has S_ISUID set.
But we also see that ATTR_KILL_SGID won't be set because while the file
is S_ISGID it is not S_IXGRP (see above) which is a condition for
ATTR_KILL_SGID being raised.
So by the time we call notify_change() we have attr->ia_valid set to
ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_FORCE. Now notify_change() sees that
ATTR_KILL_SUID is set and does:
ia_valid = attr->ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE
attr->ia_mode = (inode->i_mode & ~S_ISUID);
which means that when we call setattr_copy() later we will definitely
update inode->i_mode. Note that attr->ia_mode still contains S_ISGID.
Now we call into the filesystem's ->setattr() inode operation which will
end up calling setattr_copy(). Since ATTR_MODE is set we will hit:
if (ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode;
vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode);
if (!vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid) &&
!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FSETID))
mode &= ~S_ISGID;
inode->i_mode = mode;
}
and since the caller in the test is neither capable nor in the group of the
inode the S_ISGID bit is stripped.
But assume the file isn't suid then ATTR_KILL_SUID won't be raised which
has the consequence that neither the setgid nor the suid bits are stripped
even though it should be stripped because the inode isn't in the caller's
groups and the caller isn't privileged over the inode.
If overlayfs is in the mix things become a bit more complicated and the bug
shows up more clearly. When e.g., ovl_setattr() is hit from
ovl_fallocate()'s call to file_remove_privs() then ATTR_KILL_SUID and
ATTR_KILL_SGID might be raised but because the check in notify_change() is
questioning the ATTR_KILL_SGID flag again by requiring S_IXGRP for it to be
stripped the S_ISGID bit isn't removed even though it should be stripped:
sys_fallocate()
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> ovl_fallocate()
-> file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_FORCE | kill;
-> notify_change()
-> ovl_setattr()
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> ovl_do_notify_change()
-> notify_change()
// GIVE UP MOUNTER'S CREDS
// TAKE ON MOUNTER'S CREDS
-> vfs_fallocate()
-> xfs_file_fallocate()
-> file_modified()
-> __file_remove_privs()
-> dentry_needs_remove_privs()
-> should_remove_suid()
-> __remove_privs()
newattrs.ia_valid = attr_force | kill;
-> notify_change()
The fix for all of this is to make file_remove_privs()'s
should_remove_suid() helper to perform the same checks as we already
require in setattr_prepare() and setattr_copy() and have notify_change()
not pointlessly requiring S_IXGRP again. It doesn't make any sense in the
first place because the caller must calculate the flags via
should_remove_suid() anyway which would raise ATTR_KILL_SGID.
While we're at it we move should_remove_suid() from inode.c to attr.c
where it belongs with the rest of the iattr helpers. Especially since it
returns ATTR_KILL_S{G,U}ID flags. We also rename it to
setattr_should_drop_suidgid() to better reflect that it indicates both
setuid and setgid bit removal and also that it returns attr flags.
Running xfstests with this doesn't report any regressions. We should really
try and use consistent checks.
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Pull vfs file updates from Al Viro:
"struct file-related stuff"
* tag 'pull-file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
dma_buf_getfile(): don't bother with ->f_flags reassignments
Change calling conventions for filldir_t
locks: fix TOCTOU race when granting write lease
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Beginning of the merge window we introduced the vfs{g,u}id_t types in
b27c82e12965 ("attr: port attribute changes to new types") and changed
various codepaths over including chown_common().
During that change we forgot to account for the case were the passed
ownership value is -1. In this case the ownership fields in struct iattr
aren't initialized but we rely on them being initialized by the time we
generate the ownership to pass down to the LSMs. All the major LSMs
don't care about the ownership values at all. Only Tomoyo uses them and
so it took a while for syzbot to unearth this issue.
Fix this by initializing the ownership fields and do it within the
retry_deleg block. While notify_change() doesn't alter the ownership
fields currently we shouldn't rely on it.
Since no kernel has been released with these changes this does not
needed to be backported to any stable kernels.
[Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>]
* rewrote commit message
* use INVALID_VFS{G,U}ID macros
Fixes: b27c82e12965 ("attr: port attribute changes to new types") # mainline only
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+541e21dcc32c4046cba9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Thread A trying to acquire a write lease checks the value of i_readcount
and i_writecount in check_conflicting_open() to verify that its own fd
is the only fd referencing the file.
Thread B trying to open the file for read will call break_lease() in
do_dentry_open() before incrementing i_readcount, which leaves a small
window where thread A can acquire the write lease and then thread B
completes the open of the file for read without breaking the write lease
that was acquired by thread A.
Fix this race by incrementing i_readcount before checking for existing
leases, same as the case with i_writecount.
Use a helper put_file_access() to decrement i_readcount or i_writecount
in do_dentry_open() and __fput().
Fixes: 387e3746d01c ("locks: eliminate false positive conflicts for write lease")
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs iov_iter updates from Al Viro:
"Part 1 - isolated cleanups and optimizations.
One of the goals is to reduce the overhead of using ->read_iter() and
->write_iter() instead of ->read()/->write().
new_sync_{read,write}() has a surprising amount of overhead, in
particular inside iocb_flags(). That's the explanation for the
beginning of the series is in this pile; it's not directly
iov_iter-related, but it's a part of the same work..."
* tag 'pull-work.iov_iter-base' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
first_iovec_segment(): just return address
iov_iter: massage calling conventions for first_{iovec,bvec}_segment()
iov_iter: first_{iovec,bvec}_segment() - simplify a bit
iov_iter: lift dealing with maxpages out of first_{iovec,bvec}_segment()
iov_iter_get_pages{,_alloc}(): cap the maxsize with MAX_RW_COUNT
iov_iter_bvec_advance(): don't bother with bvec_iter
copy_page_{to,from}_iter(): switch iovec variants to generic
keep iocb_flags() result cached in struct file
iocb: delay evaluation of IS_SYNC(...) until we want to check IOCB_DSYNC
struct file: use anonymous union member for rcuhead and llist
btrfs: use IOMAP_DIO_NOSYNC
teach iomap_dio_rw() to suppress dsync
No need of likely/unlikely on calls of check_copy_size()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs lseek updates from Al Viro:
"Jason's lseek series.
Saner handling of 'lseek should fail with ESPIPE' - this gets rid of
the magical no_llseek thing and makes checks consistent.
In particular, the ad-hoc "can we do splice via internal pipe" checks
got saner (and somewhat more permissive, which is what Jason had been
after, AFAICT)"
* tag 'pull-work.lseek' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: remove no_llseek
fs: check FMODE_LSEEK to control internal pipe splicing
vfio: do not set FMODE_LSEEK flag
dma-buf: remove useless FMODE_LSEEK flag
fs: do not compare against ->llseek
fs: clear or set FMODE_LSEEK based on llseek function
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Now that all callers of ->llseek are going through vfs_llseek(), we
don't gain anything by keeping no_llseek around. Nothing actually calls
it and setting ->llseek to no_lseek is completely equivalent to
leaving it NULL.
Longer term (== by the end of merge window) we want to remove all such
intializations. To simplify the merge window this commit does *not*
touch initializers - it only defines no_llseek as NULL (and simplifies
the tests on file opening).
At -rc1 we'll need do a mechanical removal of no_llseek -
git grep -l -w no_llseek | grep -v porting.rst | while read i; do
sed -i '/\<no_llseek\>/d' $i
done
would do it.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Pipe-like behaviour on llseek(2) (i.e. unconditionally failing with
-ESPIPE) can be expresses in 3 ways:
1) ->llseek set to NULL in file_operations
2) ->llseek set to no_llseek in file_operations
3) FMODE_LSEEK *not* set in ->f_mode.
Enforce (3) in cases (1) and (2); that will allow to simplify the
checks and eventually get rid of no_llseek boilerplate.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Now that we introduced new infrastructure to increase the type safety
for filesystems supporting idmapped mounts port the first part of the
vfs over to them.
This ports the attribute changes codepaths to rely on the new better
helpers using a dedicated type.
Before this change we used to take a shortcut and place the actual
values that would be written to inode->i_{g,u}id into struct iattr. This
had the advantage that we moved idmappings mostly out of the picture
early on but it made reasoning about changes more difficult than it
should be.
The filesystem was never explicitly told that it dealt with an idmapped
mount. The transition to the value that needed to be stored in
inode->i_{g,u}id appeared way too early and increased the probability of
bugs in various codepaths.
We know place the same value in struct iattr no matter if this is an
idmapped mount or not. The vfs will only deal with type safe
vfs{g,u}id_t. This makes it massively safer to perform permission checks
as the type will tell us what checks we need to perform and what helpers
we need to use.
Fileystems raising FS_ALLOW_IDMAP can't simply write ia_vfs{g,u}id to
inode->i_{g,u}id since they are different types. Instead they need to
use the dedicated vfs{g,u}id_to_k{g,u}id() helpers that map the
vfs{g,u}id into the filesystem.
The other nice effect is that filesystems like overlayfs don't need to
care about idmappings explicitly anymore and can simply set up struct
iattr accordingly directly.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=win6+ahs1EwLkcq8apqLi_1wXFWbrPf340zYEhObpz4jA@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-9-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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* calculate at the time we set FMODE_OPENED (do_dentry_open() for normal
opens, alloc_file() for pipe()/socket()/etc.)
* update when handling F_SETFL
* keep in a new field - file->f_iocb_flags; since that thing is needed only
before the refcount reaches zero, we can put it into the same anon union
where ->f_rcuhead and ->f_llist live - those are used only after refcount
reaches zero.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux
Pull RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt:
- Support for the Svpbmt extension, which allows memory attributes to
be encoded in pages
- Support for the Allwinner D1's implementation of page-based memory
attributes
- Support for running rv32 binaries on rv64 systems, via the compat
subsystem
- Support for kexec_file()
- Support for the new generic ticket-based spinlocks, which allows us
to also move to qrwlock. These should have already gone in through
the asm-geneic tree as well
- A handful of cleanups and fixes, include some larger ones around
atomics and XIP
* tag 'riscv-for-linus-5.19-mw0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux: (51 commits)
RISC-V: Prepare dropping week attribute from arch_kexec_apply_relocations[_add]
riscv: compat: Using seperated vdso_maps for compat_vdso_info
RISC-V: Fix the XIP build
RISC-V: Split out the XIP fixups into their own file
RISC-V: ignore xipImage
RISC-V: Avoid empty create_*_mapping definitions
riscv: Don't output a bogus mmu-type on a no MMU kernel
riscv: atomic: Add custom conditional atomic operation implementation
riscv: atomic: Optimize dec_if_positive functions
riscv: atomic: Cleanup unnecessary definition
RISC-V: Load purgatory in kexec_file
RISC-V: Add purgatory
RISC-V: Support for kexec_file on panic
RISC-V: Add kexec_file support
RISC-V: use memcpy for kexec_file mode
kexec_file: Fix kexec_file.c build error for riscv platform
riscv: compat: Add COMPAT Kbuild skeletal support
riscv: compat: ptrace: Add compat_arch_ptrace implement
riscv: compat: signal: Add rt_frame implementation
riscv: add memory-type errata for T-Head
...
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Pull nfsd updates from Chuck Lever:
"We introduce 'courteous server' in this release. Previously NFSD would
purge open and lock state for an unresponsive client after one lease
period (typically 90 seconds). Now, after one lease period, another
client can open and lock those files and the unresponsive client's
lease is purged; otherwise if the unresponsive client's open and lock
state is uncontended, the server retains that open and lock state for
up to 24 hours, allowing the client's workload to resume after a
lengthy network partition.
A longstanding issue with NFSv4 file creation is also addressed.
Previously a file creation can fail internally, returning an error to
the client, but leave the newly created file in place as an artifact.
The file creation code path has been reorganized so that internal
failures and race conditions are less likely to result in an unwanted
file creation.
A fault injector has been added to help exercise paths that are run
during kernel metadata cache invalidation. These caches contain
information maintained by user space about exported filesystems. Many
of our test workloads do not trigger cache invalidation.
There is one patch that is needed to support PREEMPT_RT and a fix for
an ancient 'sleep while spin-locked' splat that seems to have become
easier to hit since v5.18-rc3"
* tag 'nfsd-5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux: (36 commits)
NFSD: nfsd_file_put() can sleep
NFSD: Add documenting comment for nfsd4_release_lockowner()
NFSD: Modernize nfsd4_release_lockowner()
NFSD: Fix possible sleep during nfsd4_release_lockowner()
nfsd: destroy percpu stats counters after reply cache shutdown
nfsd: Fix null-ptr-deref in nfsd_fill_super()
nfsd: Unregister the cld notifier when laundry_wq create failed
SUNRPC: Use RMW bitops in single-threaded hot paths
NFSD: Clean up the show_nf_flags() macro
NFSD: Trace filecache opens
NFSD: Move documenting comment for nfsd4_process_open2()
NFSD: Fix whitespace
NFSD: Remove dprintk call sites from tail of nfsd4_open()
NFSD: Instantiate a struct file when creating a regular NFSv4 file
NFSD: Clean up nfsd_open_verified()
NFSD: Remove do_nfsd_create()
NFSD: Refactor NFSv4 OPEN(CREATE)
NFSD: Refactor NFSv3 CREATE
NFSD: Refactor nfsd_create_setattr()
NFSD: Avoid calling fh_drop_write() twice in do_nfsd_create()
...
|
|
There have been reports of races that cause NFSv4 OPEN(CREATE) to
return an error even though the requested file was created. NFSv4
does not provide a status code for this case.
To mitigate some of these problems, reorganize the NFSv4
OPEN(CREATE) logic to allocate resources before the file is actually
created, and open the new file while the parent directory is still
locked.
Two new APIs are added:
+ Add an API that works like nfsd_file_acquire() but does not open
the underlying file. The OPEN(CREATE) path can use this API when it
already has an open file.
+ Add an API that is kin to dentry_open(). NFSD needs to create a
file and grab an open "struct file *" atomically. The
alloc_empty_file() has to be done before the inode create. If it
fails (for example, because the NFS server has exceeded its
max_files limit), we avoid creating the file and can still return
an error to the NFS client.
BugLink: https://bugzilla.linux-nfs.org/show_bug.cgi?id=382
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Tested-by: JianHong Yin <jiyin@redhat.com>
|
|
Currently various places test if direct IO is possible on a file by
checking for the existence of the direct_IO address space operation.
This is a poor choice, as the direct_IO operation may not be used - it is
only used if the generic_file_*_iter functions are called for direct IO
and some filesystems - particularly NFS - don't do this.
Instead, introduce a new f_mode flag: FMODE_CAN_ODIRECT and change the
various places to check this (avoiding pointer dereferences).
do_dentry_open() will set this flag if ->direct_IO is present, so
filesystems do not need to be changed.
NFS *is* changed, to set the flag explicitly and discard the direct_IO
entry in the address_space_operations for files.
Other filesystems which currently use noop_direct_IO could usefully be
changed to set this flag instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/164859778128.29473.15189737957277399416.stgit@noble.brown
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Implement compat sys_call_table and some system call functions:
truncate64, ftruncate64, fallocate, pread64, pwrite64,
sync_file_range, readahead, fadvise64_64 which need argument
translation.
Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Tested-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405071314.3225832-12-guoren@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
|
|
The value is now completely unused except for reporting it back through
the F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT ioctl, so remove the value and the two ioctls
for it.
Trying to use the F_SET_FILE_RW_HINT and F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT fcntls will
now return EINVAL, just like it would on a kernel that never supported
this functionality in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308060529.736277-3-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
In previous patches we added new and modified existing helpers to handle
idmapped mounts of filesystems mounted with an idmapping. In this final
patch we convert all relevant places in the vfs to actually pass the
filesystem's idmapping into these helpers.
With this the vfs is in shape to handle idmapped mounts of filesystems
mounted with an idmapping. Note that this is just the generic
infrastructure. Actually adding support for idmapped mounts to a
filesystem mountable with an idmapping is follow-up work.
In this patch we extend the definition of an idmapped mount from a mount
that that has the initial idmapping attached to it to a mount that has
an idmapping attached to it which is not the same as the idmapping the
filesystem was mounted with.
As before we do not allow the initial idmapping to be attached to a
mount. In addition this patch prevents that the idmapping the filesystem
was mounted with can be attached to a mount created based on this
filesystem.
This has multiple reasons and advantages. First, attaching the initial
idmapping or the filesystem's idmapping doesn't make much sense as in
both cases the values of the i_{g,u}id and other places where k{g,u}ids
are used do not change. Second, a user that really wants to do this for
whatever reason can just create a separate dedicated identical idmapping
to attach to the mount. Third, we can continue to use the initial
idmapping as an indicator that a mount is not idmapped allowing us to
continue to keep passing the initial idmapping into the mapping helpers
to tell them that something isn't an idmapped mount even if the
filesystem is mounted with an idmapping.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123114227.3124056-11-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121032.3753852-11-brauner@kernel.org (v2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203111707.3901969-11-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
In a few places the vfs needs to interact with bare k{g,u}ids directly
instead of struct inode. These are just a few. In previous patches we
introduced low-level mapping helpers that are able to support
filesystems mounted an idmapping. This patch simply converts the places
to use these new helpers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123114227.3124056-7-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121032.3753852-7-brauner@kernel.org (v2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203111707.3901969-7-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
The low-level mapping helpers were so far crammed into fs.h. They are
out of place there. The fs.h header should just contain the higher-level
mapping helpers that interact directly with vfs objects such as struct
super_block or struct inode and not the bare mapping helpers. Similarly,
only vfs and specific fs code shall interact with low-level mapping
helpers. And so they won't be made accessible automatically through
regular {g,u}id helpers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211123114227.3124056-3-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211130121032.3753852-3-brauner@kernel.org (v2)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211203111707.3901969-3-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"257 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: scripts, ocfs2, vfs, and
mm (slab-generic, slab, slub, kconfig, dax, kasan, debug, pagecache,
gup, swap, memcg, pagemap, mprotect, mremap, iomap, tracing, vmalloc,
pagealloc, memory-failure, hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, tools,
memblock, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, readahead, nommu, ksm,
vmstat, madvise, memory-hotplug, rmap, zsmalloc, highmem, zram,
cleanups, kfence, and damon)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (257 commits)
mm/damon: remove return value from before_terminate callback
mm/damon: fix a few spelling mistakes in comments and a pr_debug message
mm/damon: simplify stop mechanism
Docs/admin-guide/mm/pagemap: wordsmith page flags descriptions
Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: simplify the content
Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: fix a wrong link
Docs/admin-guide/mm/damon/start: fix wrong example commands
mm/damon/dbgfs: add adaptive_targets list check before enable monitor_on
mm/damon: remove unnecessary variable initialization
Documentation/admin-guide/mm/damon: add a document for DAMON_RECLAIM
mm/damon: introduce DAMON-based Reclamation (DAMON_RECLAIM)
selftests/damon: support watermarks
mm/damon/dbgfs: support watermarks
mm/damon/schemes: activate schemes based on a watermarks mechanism
tools/selftests/damon: update for regions prioritization of schemes
mm/damon/dbgfs: support prioritization weights
mm/damon/vaddr,paddr: support pageout prioritization
mm/damon/schemes: prioritize regions within the quotas
mm/damon/selftests: support schemes quotas
mm/damon/dbgfs: support quotas of schemes
...
|
|
When truncating pagecache on file THP, the private pages of a process
should not be unmapped mapping. This incorrect behavior on a dynamic
shared libraries which will cause related processes to happen core dump.
A simple test for a DSO (Prerequisite is the DSO mapped in file THP):
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("open");
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
The test only to open a target DSO, and do nothing. But this operation
will lead one or more process to happen core dump. This patch mainly to
fix this bug.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211025092134.18562-3-rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: eb6ecbed0aa2 ("mm, thp: relax the VM_DENYWRITE constraint on file-backed THPs")
Signed-off-by: Rongwei Wang <rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Collin Fijalkovich <cfijalkovich@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "fix two bugs for file THP".
This patch (of 2):
Transparent huge page has supported read-only non-shmem files. The
file- backed THP is collapsed by khugepaged and truncated when written
(for shared libraries).
However, there is a race when multiple writers truncate the same page
cache concurrently.
In that case, subpage(s) of file THP can be revealed by find_get_entry
in truncate_inode_pages_range, which will trigger PageTail BUG_ON in
truncate_inode_page, as follows:
page:000000009e420ff2 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7ff pfn:0x50c3ff
head:0000000075ff816d order:9 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x37fffe0000010815(locked|uptodate|lru|arch_1|head)
raw: 37fffe0000000000 fffffe0013108001 dead000000000122 dead000000000400
raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
head: 37fffe0000010815 fffffe001066bd48 ffff000404183c20 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000600 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ffff000c0345a000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageTail(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/truncate.c:213!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) rfkill(E) ...
CPU: 14 PID: 11394 Comm: check_madvise_d Kdump: ...
Hardware name: ECS, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
Call trace:
truncate_inode_page+0x64/0x70
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x550/0x7e4
truncate_pagecache+0x58/0x80
do_dentry_open+0x1e4/0x3c0
vfs_open+0x38/0x44
do_open+0x1f0/0x310
path_openat+0x114/0x1dc
do_filp_open+0x84/0x134
do_sys_openat2+0xbc/0x164
__arm64_sys_openat+0x74/0xc0
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x88/0x220
do_el0_svc+0x30/0xa0
el0_svc+0x20/0x30
el0_sync_handler+0x1a4/0x1b0
el0_sync+0x180/0x1c0
Code: aa0103e0 900061e1 910ec021 9400d300 (d4210000)
This patch mainly to lock filemap when one enter truncate_pagecache(),
avoiding truncating the same page cache concurrently.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211025092134.18562-1-rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211025092134.18562-2-rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com
Fixes: eb6ecbed0aa2 ("mm, thp: relax the VM_DENYWRITE constraint on file-backed THPs")
Signed-off-by: Xu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Rongwei Wang <rongwei.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Collin Fijalkovich <cfijalkovich@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Since the openat2(2) syscall uses a struct open_how pointer to communicate
its parameters they are not usefully recorded by the audit SYSCALL record's
four existing arguments.
Add a new audit record type OPENAT2 that reports the parameters in its
third argument, struct open_how with fields oflag, mode and resolve.
The new record in the context of an event would look like:
time->Wed Mar 17 16:28:53 2021
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): proctitle=
73797363616C6C735F66696C652F6F70656E617432002F746D702F61756469742D
7465737473756974652D737641440066696C652D6F70656E617432
type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): item=1 name="file-openat2"
inode=29 dev=00:1f mode=0100600 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE
cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1616012933.531:184):
item=0 name="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests"
inode=25 dev=00:1f mode=040700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT
cap_fp=0 cap_fi=0 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=CWD msg=audit(1616012933.531:184):
cwd="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests"
type=OPENAT2 msg=audit(1616012933.531:184):
oflag=0100302 mode=0600 resolve=0xa
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1616012933.531:184): arch=c000003e syscall=437
success=yes exit=4 a0=3 a1=7ffe315f1c53 a2=7ffe315f1550 a3=18
items=2 ppid=528 pid=540 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0
fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm="openat2"
exe="/root/rgb/git/audit-testsuite/tests/syscalls_file/openat2"
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
key="testsuite-1616012933-bjAUcEPO"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d23fbb89186754487850367224b060e26f9b7181.1621363275.git.rgb@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
[PM: tweak subject, wrap example, move AUDIT_OPENAT2 to 1337]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
We added CONFIG_MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING in 2015, and soon after turned it
off in Fedora and RHEL8. Several other distros have followed suit.
I've heard of one problem in all that time: Someone migrated from an
older distro that supported "-o mand" to one that didn't, and the host
had a fstab entry with "mand" in it which broke on reboot. They didn't
actually _use_ mandatory locking so they just removed the mount option
and moved on.
This patch rips out mandatory locking support wholesale from the kernel,
along with the Kconfig option and the Documentation file. It also
changes the mount code to ignore the "mand" mount option instead of
erroring out, and to throw a big, ugly warning.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs name lookup updates from Al Viro:
"Small namei.c patch series, mostly to simplify the rules for nameidata
state. It's actually from the previous cycle - but I didn't post it
for review in time...
Changes visible outside of fs/namei.c: file_open_root() calling
conventions change, some freed bits in LOOKUP_... space"
* 'work.namei' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
namei: make sure nd->depth is always valid
teach set_nameidata() to handle setting the root as well
take LOOKUP_{ROOT,ROOT_GRABBED,JUMPED} out of LOOKUP_... space
switch file_open_root() to struct path
|
|
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
"190 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (hugetlb, userfaultfd,
vmscan, kconfig, proc, z3fold, zbud, ras, mempolicy, memblock,
migration, thp, nommu, kconfig, madvise, memory-hotplug, zswap,
zsmalloc, zram, cleanups, kfence, and hmm), procfs, sysctl, misc,
core-kernel, lib, lz4, checkpatch, init, kprobes, nilfs2, hfs,
signals, exec, kcov, selftests, compress/decompress, and ipc"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (190 commits)
ipc/util.c: use binary search for max_idx
ipc/sem.c: use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for use_global_lock
ipc: use kmalloc for msg_queue and shmid_kernel
ipc sem: use kvmalloc for sem_undo allocation
lib/decompressors: remove set but not used variabled 'level'
selftests/vm/pkeys: exercise x86 XSAVE init state
selftests/vm/pkeys: refill shadow register after implicit kernel write
selftests/vm/pkeys: handle negative sys_pkey_alloc() return code
selftests/vm/pkeys: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really, really random
kcov: add __no_sanitize_coverage to fix noinstr for all architectures
exec: remove checks in __register_bimfmt()
x86: signal: don't do sas_ss_reset() until we are certain that sigframe won't be abandoned
hfsplus: report create_date to kstat.btime
hfsplus: remove unnecessary oom message
nilfs2: remove redundant continue statement in a while-loop
kprobes: remove duplicated strong free_insn_page in x86 and s390
init: print out unknown kernel parameters
checkpatch: do not complain about positive return values starting with EPOLL
checkpatch: improve the indented label test
checkpatch: scripts/spdxcheck.py now requires python3
...
|
|
Transparent huge pages are supported for read-only non-shmem files, but
are only used for vmas with VM_DENYWRITE. This condition ensures that
file THPs are protected from writes while an application is running
(ETXTBSY). Any existing file THPs are then dropped from the page cache
when a file is opened for write in do_dentry_open(). Since sys_mmap
ignores MAP_DENYWRITE, this constrains the use of file THPs to vmas
produced by execve().
Systems that make heavy use of shared libraries (e.g. Android) are unable
to apply VM_DENYWRITE through the dynamic linker, preventing them from
benefiting from the resultant reduced contention on the TLB.
This patch reduces the constraint on file THPs allowing use with any
executable mapping from a file not opened for write (see
inode_is_open_for_write()). It also introduces additional conditions to
ensure that files opened for write will never be backed by file THPs.
Restricting the use of THPs to executable mappings eliminates the risk
that a read-only file later opened for write would encounter significant
latencies due to page cache truncation.
The ld linker flag '-z max-page-size=(hugepage size)' can be used to
produce executables with the necessary layout. The dynamic linker must
map these file's segments at a hugepage size aligned vma for the mapping
to be backed with THPs.
Comparison of the performance characteristics of 4KB and 2MB-backed
libraries follows; the Android dex2oat tool was used to AOT compile an
example application on a single ARM core.
4KB Pages:
==========
count event_name # count / runtime
598,995,035,942 cpu-cycles # 1.800861 GHz
81,195,620,851 raw-stall-frontend # 244.112 M/sec
347,754,466,597 iTLB-loads # 1.046 G/sec
2,970,248,900 iTLB-load-misses # 0.854122% miss rate
Total test time: 332.854998 seconds.
2MB Pages:
==========
count event_name # count / runtime
592,872,663,047 cpu-cycles # 1.800358 GHz
76,485,624,143 raw-stall-frontend # 232.261 M/sec
350,478,413,710 iTLB-loads # 1.064 G/sec
803,233,322 iTLB-load-misses # 0.229182% miss rate
Total test time: 329.826087 seconds
A check of /proc/$(pidof dex2oat64)/smaps shows THPs in use:
/apex/com.android.art/lib64/libart.so
FilePmdMapped: 4096 kB
/apex/com.android.art/lib64/libart-compiler.so
FilePmdMapped: 2048 kB
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210406000930.3455850-1-cfijalkovich@google.com
Signed-off-by: Collin Fijalkovich <cfijalkovich@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Hridya Valsaraju <hridya@google.com>
Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The new openat2() syscall verifies that no unknown O-flag values are
set and returns an error to userspace if they are while the older open
syscalls like open() and openat() simply ignore unknown flag values:
#define O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID (1 << 31)
struct open_how how = {
.flags = O_RDONLY | O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID,
.resolve = 0,
};
/* fails */
fd = openat2(-EBADF, "/dev/null", &how, sizeof(how));
/* succeeds */
fd = openat(-EBADF, "/dev/null", O_RDONLY | O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID);
However, openat2() silently truncates the upper 32 bits meaning:
#define O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID_LOWER32 (1 << 31)
#define O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID_UPPER32 (1 << 40)
struct open_how how_lowe32 = {
.flags = O_RDONLY | O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID_LOWER32,
};
struct open_how how_upper32 = {
.flags = O_RDONLY | O_FLAG_CURRENTLY_INVALID_UPPER32,
};
/* fails */
fd = openat2(-EBADF, "/dev/null", &how_lower32, sizeof(how_lower32));
/* succeeds */
fd = openat2(-EBADF, "/dev/null", &how_upper32, sizeof(how_upper32));
Fix this by preventing the immediate truncation in build_open_flags().
There's a snafu here though stripping FMODE_* directly from flags would
cause the upper 32 bits to be truncated as well due to integer promotion
rules since FMODE_* is unsigned int, O_* are signed ints (yuck).
In addition, struct open_flags currently defines flags to be 32 bit
which is reasonable. If we simply were to bump it to 64 bit we would
need to change a lot of code preemptively which doesn't seem worth it.
So simply add a compile-time check verifying that all currently known
O_* flags are within the 32 bit range and fail to build if they aren't
anymore.
This change shouldn't regress old open syscalls since they silently
truncate any unknown values anyway. It is a tiny semantic change for
openat2() but it is very unlikely people pass ing > 32 bit unknown flags
and the syscall is relatively new too.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210528092417.3942079-3-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
... and provide file_open_root_mnt(), using the root of given mount.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
|
|
For core file operations such as changing directories or chrooting,
determining file access, changing mode or ownership the vfs will verify
that the caller is privileged over the inode. Extend the various helpers
to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount map it into the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the permissions
checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. When changing file
ownership we need to map the uid and gid from the mount's user
namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-17-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
When truncating files the vfs will verify that the caller is privileged
over the inode. Extend it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is
accessed through an idmapped mount it is mapped according to the mount's
user namespace. Afterwards the permissions checks are identical to
non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-16-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
When file attributes are changed most filesystems rely on the
setattr_prepare(), setattr_copy(), and notify_change() helpers for
initialization and permission checking. Let them handle idmapped mounts.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Helpers that perform checks on the ia_uid and ia_gid fields in struct
iattr assume that ia_uid and ia_gid are intended values and have already
been mapped correctly at the userspace-kernelspace boundary as we
already do today. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-8-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
The two helpers inode_permission() and generic_permission() are used by
the vfs to perform basic permission checking by verifying that the
caller is privileged over an inode. In order to handle idmapped mounts
we extend the two helpers with an additional user namespace argument.
On idmapped mounts the two helpers will make sure to map the inode
according to the mount's user namespace and then peform identical
permission checks to inode_permission() and generic_permission(). If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-6-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
Add two simple helpers to check permissions on a file and path
respectively and convert over some callers. It simplifies quite a few
codepaths and also reduces the churn in later patches quite a bit.
Christoph also correctly points out that this makes codepaths (e.g.
ioctls) way easier to follow that would otherwise have to do more
complex argument passing than necessary.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
Now that we support non-blocking path resolution internally, expose it
via openat2() in the struct open_how ->resolve flags. This allows
applications using openat2() to limit path resolution to the extent that
it is already cached.
If the lookup cannot be satisfied in a non-blocking manner, openat2(2)
will return -1/-EAGAIN.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
"This set of changes ultimately fixes the interaction of posix file
lock and exec. Fundamentally most of the change is just moving where
unshare_files is called during exec, and tweaking the users of
files_struct so that the count of files_struct is not unnecessarily
played with.
Along the way fcheck and related helpers were renamed to more
accurately reflect what they do.
There were also many other small changes that fell out, as this is the
first time in a long time much of this code has been touched.
Benchmarks haven't turned up any practical issues but Al Viro has
observed a possibility for a lot of pounding on task_lock. So I have
some changes in progress to convert put_files_struct to always rcu
free files_struct. That wasn't ready for the merge window so that will
have to wait until next time"
* 'exec-for-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (27 commits)
exec: Move io_uring_task_cancel after the point of no return
coredump: Document coredump code exclusively used by cell spufs
file: Remove get_files_struct
file: Rename __close_fd_get_file close_fd_get_file
file: Replace ksys_close with close_fd
file: Rename __close_fd to close_fd and remove the files parameter
file: Merge __alloc_fd into alloc_fd
file: In f_dupfd read RLIMIT_NOFILE once.
file: Merge __fd_install into fd_install
proc/fd: In fdinfo seq_show don't use get_files_struct
bpf/task_iter: In task_file_seq_get_next use task_lookup_next_fd_rcu
proc/fd: In proc_readfd_common use task_lookup_next_fd_rcu
file: Implement task_lookup_next_fd_rcu
kcmp: In get_file_raw_ptr use task_lookup_fd_rcu
proc/fd: In tid_fd_mode use task_lookup_fd_rcu
file: Implement task_lookup_fd_rcu
file: Rename fcheck lookup_fd_rcu
file: Replace fcheck_files with files_lookup_fd_rcu
file: Factor files_lookup_fd_locked out of fcheck_files
file: Rename __fcheck_files to files_lookup_fd_raw
...
|
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The function __close_fd was added to support binder[1]. Now that
binder has been fixed to no longer need __close_fd[2] all calls
to __close_fd pass current->files.
Therefore transform the files parameter into a local variable
initialized to current->files, and rename __close_fd to close_fd to
reflect this change, and keep it in sync with the similar changes to
__alloc_fd, and __fd_install.
This removes the need for callers to care about the extra care that
needs to be take if anything except current->files is passed, by
limiting the callers to only operation on current->files.
[1] 483ce1d4b8c3 ("take descriptor-related part of close() to file.c")
[2] 44d8047f1d87 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds")
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200817220425.9389-17-ebiederm@xmission.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201120231441.29911-21-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
This was an oversight in the original implementation, as it makes no
sense to specify both scoping flags to the same openat2(2) invocation
(before this patch, the result of such an invocation was equivalent to
RESOLVE_IN_ROOT being ignored).
This is a userspace-visible ABI change, but the only user of openat2(2)
at the moment is LXC which doesn't specify both flags and so no
userspace programs will break as a result.
Fixes: fddb5d430ad9 ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201027235044.5240-2-cyphar@cyphar.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
The execve(2)/uselib(2) syscalls have always rejected non-regular files.
Recently, it was noticed that a deadlock was introduced when trying to
execute pipes, as the S_ISREG() test was happening too late. This was
fixed in commit 73601ea5b7b1 ("fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files
during execve()"), but it was added after inode_permission() had already
run, which meant LSMs could see bogus attempts to execute non-regular
files.
Move the test into the other inode type checks (which already look for
other pathological conditions[1]). Since there is no need to use
FMODE_EXEC while we still have access to "acc_mode", also switch the test
to MAY_EXEC.
Also include a comment with the redundant S_ISREG() checks at the end of
execve(2)/uselib(2) to note that they are present to avoid any mistakes.
My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:
do_open_execat()
struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
.acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
...
do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
/* new location of MAY_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */
inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
vfs_open(path, file)
do_dentry_open(file, path->dentry->d_inode, open)
/* old location of FMODE_EXEC vs S_ISREG() test */
security_file_open(f)
open()
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202006041910.9EF0C602@keescook/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-3-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull init and set_fs() cleanups from Al Viro:
"Christoph's 'getting rid of ksys_...() uses under KERNEL_DS' series"
* 'hch.init_path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (50 commits)
init: add an init_dup helper
init: add an init_utimes helper
init: add an init_stat helper
init: add an init_mknod helper
init: add an init_mkdir helper
init: add an init_symlink helper
init: add an init_link helper
init: add an init_eaccess helper
init: add an init_chmod helper
init: add an init_chown helper
init: add an init_chroot helper
init: add an init_chdir helper
init: add an init_rmdir helper
init: add an init_unlink helper
init: add an init_umount helper
init: add an init_mount helper
init: mark create_dev as __init
init: mark console_on_rootfs as __init
init: initialize ramdisk_execute_command at compile time
devtmpfs: refactor devtmpfsd()
...
|
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Add a simple helper to check if a file exists based on kernel space file
name and switch the early init code over to it. Note that this
theoretically changes behavior as it always is based on the effective
permissions. But during early init that doesn't make a difference.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to chmod with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to chown with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
|
Add a simple helper to chroot with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_chroot.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Add a simple helper to chdir with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_chdir.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Fold it into the only remaining caller.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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