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2018-04-05headers: untangle kmemleak.h from mm.hRandy Dunlap
Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious reason. It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that don't already #include it. Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source files that do not use it. This is tested on i386 allmodconfig and x86_64 allmodconfig. It would be good to run it through the 0day bot for other $ARCHes. I have neither the horsepower nor the storage space for the other $ARCHes. Update: This patch has been extensively build-tested by both the 0day bot & kisskb/ozlabs build farms. Both of them reported 2 build failures for which patches are included here (in v2). [ slab.h is the second most used header file after module.h; kernel.h is right there with slab.h. There could be some minor error in the counting due to some #includes having comments after them and I didn't combine all of those. ] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: security/keys/big_key.c needs vmalloc.h, per sfr] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/e4309f98-3749-93e1-4bb7-d9501a39d015@infradead.org Link: http://kisskb.ellerman.id.au/kisskb/head/13396/ Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> [2 build failures] Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> [2 build failures] Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-03-06ucount: Remove the atomicity from ucount->countEric W. Biederman
Always increment/decrement ucount->count under the ucounts_lock. The increments are there already and moving the decrements there means the locking logic of the code is simpler. This simplification in the locking logic fixes a race between put_ucounts and get_ucounts that could result in a use-after-free because the count could go zero then be found by get_ucounts and then be freed by put_ucounts. A bug presumably this one was found by a combination of syzkaller and KASAN. JongWhan Kim reported the syzkaller failure and Dmitry Vyukov spotted the race in the code. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f6b2db1a3e8d ("userns: Make the count of user namespaces per user") Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-03-02sched/headers: Prepare to remove <linux/cred.h> inclusion from <linux/sched.h>Ingo Molnar
Add #include <linux/cred.h> dependencies to all .c files rely on sched.h doing that for them. Note that even if the count where we need to add extra headers seems high, it's still a net win, because <linux/sched.h> is included in over 2,200 files ... Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-02-23Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show up. From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem, but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops. Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature. There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify instances inside a user namespace. Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the hierachy and properties of namespaces. Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory. Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions on the wrong inode were being checked. I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work better. A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission check happened when the original filesystem was mounted. Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics simpler which benefits CRIU. The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock. vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid() proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts. prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant introduce the walk_process_tree() helper nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns fs: Better permission checking for submounts exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
2017-02-08kernel/ucount.c: mark user_header with kmemleak_ignore()Luis R. Rodriguez
The user_header gets caught by kmemleak with the following splat as missing a free: unreferenced object 0xffff99667a733d80 (size 96): comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294892317 (age 62191.468s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): a0 b6 92 b4 ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 ................ 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0 __kmalloc+0x144/0x260 __register_sysctl_table+0x54/0x5e0 register_sysctl+0x1b/0x20 user_namespace_sysctl_init+0x17/0x34 do_one_initcall+0x52/0x1a0 kernel_init_freeable+0x173/0x200 kernel_init+0xe/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 The BUG_ON()s are intended to crash so no need to clean up after ourselves on error there. This is also a kernel/ subsys_init() we don't need a respective exit call here as this is never modular, so just white list it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170203211404.31458-1-mcgrof@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-01-24inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limitsNikolay Borisov
This patchset converts inotify to using the newly introduced per-userns sysctl infrastructure. Currently the inotify instances/watches are being accounted in the user_struct structure. This means that in setups where multiple users in unprivileged containers map to the same underlying real user (i.e. pointing to the same user_struct) the inotify limits are going to be shared as well, allowing one user(or application) to exhaust all others limits. Fix this by switching the inotify sysctls to using the per-namespace/per-user limits. This will allow the server admin to set sensible global limits, which can further be tuned inside every individual user namespace. Additionally, in order to preserve the sysctl ABI make the existing inotify instances/watches sysctls modify the values of the initial user namespace. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-01-24userns: Make ucounts lock irq-safeNikolay Borisov
The ucounts_lock is being used to protect various ucounts lifecycle management functionalities. However, those services can also be invoked when a pidns is being freed in an RCU callback (e.g. softirq context). This can lead to deadlocks. There were already efforts trying to prevent similar deadlocks in add7c65ca426 ("pid: fix lockdep deadlock warning due to ucount_lock"), however they just moved the context from hardirq to softrq. Fix this issue once and for all by explictly making the lock disable irqs altogether. Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> reported: > I've got the following deadlock report while running syzkaller fuzzer > on eec0d3d065bfcdf9cd5f56dd2a36b94d12d32297 of linux-next (on odroid > device if it matters): > > ================================= > [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] > 4.10.0-rc3-next-20170112-xc2-dirty #6 Not tainted > --------------------------------- > inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. > swapper/2/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: > (ucounts_lock){+.?...}, at: [< inline >] spin_lock > ./include/linux/spinlock.h:302 > (ucounts_lock){+.?...}, at: [<ffff2000081678c8>] > put_ucounts+0x60/0x138 kernel/ucount.c:162 > {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: > [<ffff2000081c82d8>] mark_lock+0x220/0xb60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3054 > [< inline >] mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2941 > [<ffff2000081c97a8>] __lock_acquire+0x388/0x3260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 > [<ffff2000081cce24>] lock_acquire+0xa4/0x138 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 > [< inline >] __raw_spin_lock ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:144 > [<ffff200009798128>] _raw_spin_lock+0x90/0xd0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 > [< inline >] spin_lock ./include/linux/spinlock.h:302 > [< inline >] get_ucounts kernel/ucount.c:131 > [<ffff200008167c28>] inc_ucount+0x80/0x6c8 kernel/ucount.c:189 > [< inline >] inc_mnt_namespaces fs/namespace.c:2818 > [<ffff200008481850>] alloc_mnt_ns+0x78/0x3a8 fs/namespace.c:2849 > [<ffff200008487298>] create_mnt_ns+0x28/0x200 fs/namespace.c:2959 > [< inline >] init_mount_tree fs/namespace.c:3199 > [<ffff200009bd6674>] mnt_init+0x258/0x384 fs/namespace.c:3251 > [<ffff200009bd60bc>] vfs_caches_init+0x6c/0x80 fs/dcache.c:3626 > [<ffff200009bb1114>] start_kernel+0x414/0x460 init/main.c:648 > [<ffff200009bb01e8>] __primary_switched+0x6c/0x70 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S:456 > irq event stamp: 2316924 > hardirqs last enabled at (2316924): [< inline >] rcu_do_batch > kernel/rcu/tree.c:2911 > hardirqs last enabled at (2316924): [< inline >] > invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:3182 > hardirqs last enabled at (2316924): [< inline >] > __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:3149 > hardirqs last enabled at (2316924): [<ffff200008210414>] > rcu_process_callbacks+0x7a4/0xc28 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3166 > hardirqs last disabled at (2316923): [< inline >] rcu_do_batch > kernel/rcu/tree.c:2900 > hardirqs last disabled at (2316923): [< inline >] > invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:3182 > hardirqs last disabled at (2316923): [< inline >] > __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:3149 > hardirqs last disabled at (2316923): [<ffff20000820fe80>] > rcu_process_callbacks+0x210/0xc28 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3166 > softirqs last enabled at (2316912): [<ffff20000811b4c4>] > _local_bh_enable+0x4c/0x80 kernel/softirq.c:155 > softirqs last disabled at (2316913): [< inline >] > do_softirq_own_stack ./include/linux/interrupt.h:488 > softirqs last disabled at (2316913): [< inline >] > invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:371 > softirqs last disabled at (2316913): [<ffff20000811c994>] > irq_exit+0x264/0x308 kernel/softirq.c:405 > > other info that might help us debug this: > Possible unsafe locking scenario: > > CPU0 > ---- > lock(ucounts_lock); > <Interrupt> > lock(ucounts_lock); > > *** DEADLOCK *** > > 1 lock held by swapper/2/0: > #0: (rcu_callback){......}, at: [< inline >] __rcu_reclaim > kernel/rcu/rcu.h:108 > #0: (rcu_callback){......}, at: [< inline >] rcu_do_batch > kernel/rcu/tree.c:2919 > #0: (rcu_callback){......}, at: [< inline >] > invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:3182 > #0: (rcu_callback){......}, at: [< inline >] > __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:3149 > #0: (rcu_callback){......}, at: [<ffff200008210390>] > rcu_process_callbacks+0x720/0xc28 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3166 > > stack backtrace: > CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3-next-20170112-xc2-dirty #6 > Hardware name: Hardkernel ODROID-C2 (DT) > Call trace: > [<ffff20000808fa60>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x440 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:500 > [<ffff20000808fec0>] show_stack+0x20/0x30 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:225 > [<ffff2000088a99e0>] dump_stack+0x110/0x168 > [<ffff2000082fa2b4>] print_usage_bug.part.27+0x49c/0x4bc > kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2387 > [< inline >] print_usage_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2357 > [< inline >] valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2400 > [< inline >] mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2617 > [<ffff2000081c89ec>] mark_lock+0x934/0xb60 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3065 > [< inline >] mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2923 > [<ffff2000081c9a60>] __lock_acquire+0x640/0x3260 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3295 > [<ffff2000081cce24>] lock_acquire+0xa4/0x138 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3753 > [< inline >] __raw_spin_lock ./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:144 > [<ffff200009798128>] _raw_spin_lock+0x90/0xd0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 > [< inline >] spin_lock ./include/linux/spinlock.h:302 > [<ffff2000081678c8>] put_ucounts+0x60/0x138 kernel/ucount.c:162 > [<ffff200008168364>] dec_ucount+0xf4/0x158 kernel/ucount.c:214 > [< inline >] dec_pid_namespaces kernel/pid_namespace.c:89 > [<ffff200008293dc8>] delayed_free_pidns+0x40/0xe0 kernel/pid_namespace.c:156 > [< inline >] __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:118 > [< inline >] rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2919 > [< inline >] invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:3182 > [< inline >] __rcu_process_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:3149 > [<ffff2000082103d8>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x768/0xc28 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3166 > [<ffff2000080821dc>] __do_softirq+0x324/0x6e0 kernel/softirq.c:284 > [< inline >] do_softirq_own_stack ./include/linux/interrupt.h:488 > [< inline >] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:371 > [<ffff20000811c994>] irq_exit+0x264/0x308 kernel/softirq.c:405 > [<ffff2000081ecc28>] __handle_domain_irq+0xc0/0x150 kernel/irq/irqdesc.c:636 > [<ffff200008081c80>] gic_handle_irq+0x68/0xd8 > Exception stack(0xffff8000648e7dd0 to 0xffff8000648e7f00) > 7dc0: ffff8000648d4b3c 0000000000000007 > 7de0: 0000000000000000 1ffff0000c91a967 1ffff0000c91a967 1ffff0000c91a967 > 7e00: ffff20000a4b6b68 0000000000000001 0000000000000007 0000000000000001 > 7e20: 1fffe4000149ae90 ffff200009d35000 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 > 7e40: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000002624a1a 0000000000000000 > 7e60: 0000000000000000 ffff200009cbcd88 000060006d2ed000 0000000000000140 > 7e80: ffff200009cff000 ffff200009cb6000 ffff200009cc2020 ffff200009d2159d > 7ea0: 0000000000000000 ffff8000648d4380 0000000000000000 ffff8000648e7f00 > 7ec0: ffff20000820a478 ffff8000648e7f00 ffff20000820a47c 0000000010000145 > 7ee0: 0000000000000140 dfff200000000000 ffffffffffffffff ffff20000820a478 > [<ffff2000080837f8>] el1_irq+0xb8/0x130 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:486 > [< inline >] arch_local_irq_restore > ./arch/arm64/include/asm/irqflags.h:81 > [<ffff20000820a47c>] rcu_idle_exit+0x64/0xa8 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1030 > [< inline >] cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:200 > [<ffff2000081bcbfc>] do_idle+0x1dc/0x2d0 kernel/sched/idle.c:243 > [<ffff2000081bd1cc>] cpu_startup_entry+0x24/0x28 kernel/sched/idle.c:345 > [<ffff200008099f8c>] secondary_start_kernel+0x2cc/0x358 > arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c:276 > [<000000000279f1a4>] 0x279f1a4 Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Fixes: add7c65ca426 ("pid: fix lockdep deadlock warning due to ucount_lock") Fixes: f333c700c610 ("pidns: Add a limit on the number of pid namespaces") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg2426637.html Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <n.borisov.lkml@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-31mntns: Add a limit on the number of mount namespaces.Eric W. Biederman
v2: Fixed the very obvious lack of setting ucounts on struct mnt_ns reported by Andrei Vagin, and the kbuild test report. Reported-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08netns: Add a limit on the number of net namespacesEric W. Biederman
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08cgroupns: Add a limit on the number of cgroup namespacesEric W. Biederman
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08ipcns: Add a limit on the number of ipc namespacesEric W. Biederman
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08utsns: Add a limit on the number of uts namespacesEric W. Biederman
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08pidns: Add a limit on the number of pid namespacesEric W. Biederman
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08userns: Generalize the user namespace count into ucountEric W. Biederman
The same kind of recursive sane default limit and policy countrol that has been implemented for the user namespace is desirable for the other namespaces, so generalize the user namespace refernce count into a ucount. Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08userns: Make the count of user namespaces per userEric W. Biederman
Add a structure that is per user and per user ns and use it to hold the count of user namespaces. This makes prevents one user from creating denying service to another user by creating the maximum number of user namespaces. Rename the sysctl export of the maximum count from /proc/sys/userns/max_user_namespaces to /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces to reflect that the count is now per user. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08userns: Add a limit on the number of user namespacesEric W. Biederman
Export the export the maximum number of user namespaces as /proc/sys/userns/max_user_namespaces. Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08userns: Add per user namespace sysctls.Eric W. Biederman
Limit per userns sysctls to only be opened for write by a holder of CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. Add all of the necessary boilerplate for having per user namespace sysctls. Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>